Review of water and climate adaptation financing and institutional frameworks in South Asia. Background Paper 3 by Suhardiman, Diana et al.
Climate Risks and Solutions: Adaptation 
Frameworks for Water Resources Planning, 
Development and Management in South Asia
Background Paper 3 
Diana Suhardiman, Sanjiv de Silva, Indika Arulingam, Sashan Rodrigo
and Alan Nicol
 
Review of Water and Climate Adaptation 
Financing and Institutional Frameworks in 
South Asia
About this Report
This is one of three papers commissioned by the World Bank and jointly implemented with 
the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) as part of the first phase of a 
two-phase Technical Assistance (TA) project to assess the opportunities for adaptation to 
climate change in the water sector in seven countries in South Asia (Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The TA – Climate Risks and 
Solutions: Adaptation Frameworks for Water Resources Planning, Development and 
Management in South Asia – is funded by the South Asia Water Initiative (SAWI), a 
partnership of the governments of Australia, Norway and the United Kingdom.
Background Paper 1 describes the scientific understanding of predicted impacts of climate 
change on water resources and associated risks.
Lacombe, G.; Chinnasamy, P.; Nicol, A. 2019. Review of climate change science, 
knowledge and impacts on water resources in South Asia. Background Paper 1. Colombo, 
Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 73p. (Climate Risks and 
Solutions: Adaptation Frameworks for Water Resources Planning, Development and 
Management in South Asia). doi: 10.5337/2019.202
http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/Other/PDF/sawi-paper-1.pdf 
Background Paper 2 assesses the suitability of the enabling policy frameworks (existing 
policy, legislation, strategies and plans) for adapting to the impacts of climate change. 
Davis, R.; Hirji, R. 2019. Review of water and climate change policies in South Asia. 
Background Paper 2. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI). 120p. (Climate Risks and Solutions: Adaptation Frameworks for Water Resources 
Planning, Development and Management in South Asia). doi: 10.5337/2019.203 
http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/Other/PDF/sawi-paper-2.pdf 
Background Paper 3 (this paper) assesses the financial, economic, and institutional 
landscape for adapting to climate change.
Suhardiman, D.; de Silva, S.; Arulingam, I.; Rodrigo, S.; Nicol, A. 2019. Review of water 
and climate adaptation financing and institutional frameworks in South Asia. Background 
Paper 3. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 110p. 
(Climate Risks and Solutions: Adaptation Frameworks for Water Resources Planning, 
Development and Management in South Asia). doi: 10.5337/2019.204
http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Publications/Other/PDF/sawi-paper-3.pdf 
Climate Risks and Solutions: Adaptation Frameworks for Water 
Resources Planning, Development and Management in South Asia
Background Paper 3
Review of Water and Climate Adaptation Financing and 
Institutional Frameworks in South Asia
Diana Suhardiman, Sanjiv de Silva, Indika Arulingam, Sashan Rodrigo 
and Alan Nicol
 
 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI)
The authors: Diana Suhardiman is Research Group Leader - Governance and Gender at the Southeast 
Asia Office of the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Vientiane, Lao PDR; Sanjiv de 
Silva is Researcher - Natural Resources Governance and Indika Arulingam is Research Officer – Social 
Scientist at IWMI, Colombo, Sri Lanka; Sashan Rodrigo was a research consultant at IWMI, Colombo, 
Sri Lanka, at the time this research study was conducted; and Alan Nicol is Strategic Program Leader 
– Promoting Sustainable Growth at IWMI, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
Suhardiman, D.; de Silva, S.; Arulingam, I.; Rodrigo, S.; Nicol, A. 2019. Review of water and climate 
adaptation financing and institutional frameworks in South Asia. Background Paper 3. Colombo, 
Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute (IWMI). 110p. (Climate Risks and Solutions: 
Adaptation Frameworks for Water Resources Planning, Development and Management in South Asia). 
10.5337/2019.204
/ water resources development / water demand / water availability / water quality / water management 
/ water supply / water institutions / water scarcity / water governance / international waters / 
climate change adaptation / flooding / drought / rainfall / economic situation / financing / funding / 
costs / landscape / decision making / planning / energy resources / food security / food production / 
hydropower / surface water / groundwater depletion / integrated management / population growth / 
poverty / climate-smart agriculture / domestic water / cooperation / nongovernmental organizations / 
government agencies / risk management / irrigation systems / coastal area / stakeholders / South Asia 
/ Sri Lanka / Nepal / Bangladesh / India / Pakistan / Afghanistan / Bhutan /
ISBN 978-92-9090-884-5
 
Copyright 2019, by IWMI. All rights reserved. IWMI encourages the use of its material provided that 
the organization is acknowledged and kept informed in all such instances.
The views and interpretation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion 
whatsoever on the part of the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) concerning the legal 
status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its 
frontiers or boundaries.
Front cover photograph: A woman adjusting a sprinkler in Alwar, Rajasthan, India (photo: Shaoyu 
Liu/IWMI).
Please direct inquiries and comments to: IWMI-Publications@cgiar.org.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This background paper is one of three papers commissioned by the World Bank and jointly implemented 
with the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) as part of the first phase of a two-phase 
Technical Assistance (TA) project to assess the opportunities for adaptation to climate change in the 
water sector in South Asia (including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka). The TA – Climate Risks and Solutions: Adaptation Frameworks for Water Resources 
Planning, Development and Management in South Asia – is funded by the South Asia Water Initiative 
(SAWI), a partnership of the governments of Australia, Norway and the United Kingdom. SAWI funds 
a multi-donor trust fund implemented by the World Bank that works to improve the management of 
the major Himalayan river systems of South Asia for sustainable, fair and inclusive development and 
climate resilience.
The first phase was implemented under the overall guidance of Dr. Rafik Hirji (formerly Senior 
Water Resources Specialist, Task Team Leader, World Bank) and Dr. Alan Nicol (Strategic Program 
Leader - Promoting Sustainable Growth, IWMI), who led the team from IWMI. The background 
papers were presented and reviewed at the Regional Conference on Risks and Solutions: Adaptation 
Frameworks for Water Resources Planning, Development and Management in South Asia, which 
was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on July 12-13, 2016. This regional conference was attended by 65 
national, regional and international climate change and water resources experts, including over 20 
representatives of governments in the region.
The authors are grateful to the following individuals for their constructive comments and 
feedback on this report: Dr. Halla Qaddumi (Senior Economist, World Bank); Mr. Karma Dupchu 
(Chief, Hydrology Division, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Bhutan); Dr. Priyanie Amerasinghe (Senior 
Researcher: Human and Environmental Health, IWMI); Ms. Sita Shashi Bam (Regional Coordinator, 
Nepal Climate Change Support Program, Ministry of Population and Environment, Nepal); Mr. Madhav 
Belbase (Joint Secretary, Water and Energy Commission Secretariat, Nepal); Dr. Herath Manthrithilake 
(Head, Sri Lanka Development Initiative, IWMI); Dr. S. Pathmarajah (Senior Lecturer, Faculty of 
Agriculture, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka); Dr. Kusum Athukorala (Chair, Sri Lanka Water 
Partnership); Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed Sheikh (Director General-Research and Coordination, Pakistan Council 
of Research in Water Resources); Md. Abul Kalam Azad (Assistant Professor, Institute of Disaster 
Management and Vulnerability Studies, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh); Ms. Tenzin Wangmo (Chief 
Environment Officer, Water Resources Coordination Division, National Environment Commission, 
Bhutan); and Professor Shakil Romshoo (Department of Geology and Geophysics, University of 
Kashmir, India).
The authors are also grateful for the feedback provided by participants of the above-mentioned 
regional conference.
The services provided by the Publications Unit of IWMI and the World Bank are gratefully 
acknowledged.

vCONTENTS
Figures   vii
Tables   vii
Boxes    vii
Acronyms and Abbreviations viii
Executive Summary xiii
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
Chapter 2. Development, Water Resources and the Economic Implications of  
 Climate Change in South Asia 3
 Country Contexts 15
  Afghanistan 15 
  Bangladesh 16 
  Bhutan 18 
  India 19 
  Nepal 20 
  Pakistan 21 
  Sri Lanka 22
Chapter 3. Financial Structures and Mechanisms in Climate Adaptation 25
 Global Overview 25
  Financing of Adaptation by the Multilateral Development Banks 27
  World Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan 28
 Country-level Analysis 29
  Afghanistan 29 
  Bangladesh 30 
  Bhutan 34 
  India 35 
  Nepal 38 
  Pakistan 39 
  Sri Lanka 41
 Current Trends of Existing Financial Structures and Mechanisms 42
Chapter 4. Institutional Perspectives on Climate Adaptation 45
 Sectoral Fragmentation and Its Implications for Climate Adaptation:  45 
 Country-level Analysis  
  Afghanistan 45 
  Bangladesh 47 
  Bhutan 51 
  India 52 
  Nepal 55 
  Pakistan 58 
  Sri Lanka 60
 Current Trends of Existing Institutional Frameworks 63
  Centralized Approach Does Not Automatically Lead to Holistic  63 
  Climate Adaptation  
 
vi
  Institutional Challenges of, and Opportunities for, Mainstreaming Climate  65 
  Adaptation into National Development Programs 
Chapter 5. The Need for Regional Cooperation 67
Chapter 6. Key Findings and Recommendations 71
Chapter 7. Conclusions 81
References   82
Appendix. Details of the Study Methodology and Information Sources 93
 
 
vii
FIGURES
Figure 2.1. Global climate risk index, 1995-2014  11
TABLES
Table 2.1. Snapshot of country development context, South Asia 5
Table 2.2. Contribution of water-related sectors to development, and key aspects  6 
	 that	could	affect	water	demand,	South	Asia	
Table 2.3. Water demand in South Asia, by agriculture, industry and domestic supply  9 
 sectors, 2010-2050  
Table 2.4. Population and total water availability per capita in South Asia, 2010-2100  9
Table 2.5. Major climate risks and sectors potentially affected (South Asian countries) 12
Table 2.6. Projected reductions in GDP (%) due to climate change in South Asian countries,  14 
 2050 and 2100 
Table 3.1. Major multilateral funding mechanisms focusing on adaptation 26
Table 3.2. Climate financing of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, 2014 and 2015 28
Table 6.1. Typology of institutional approaches in climate adaptation 77
BOXES
Box ES.1. Key findings xiv
Box ES.2. Recommendations xv
Box ES.3. Regional cooperation is a critical element in adaptation xvii
Box 2.1. Key findings on water resources and the economic implications of climate 3
 change in South Asia 
Box 3.1. Key findings on financial structures and mechanisms in climate adaptation 25
Box 3.2. Decision making in the hydropower sector in Nepal 40
Box 4.1. Key findings on institutional structure mechanisms in climate adaptation 45
Box 4.2. Toward Integrated Water Resources Management under the BMDA 50
Box 4.3. MASL as an example of an evolving RBO 62
Box 6.1. Adaptation finance and institutions 71
 
   
  
 
viii
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADB  Asian Development Bank
ADP  Annual Development Program
AfDB  African Development Bank
ANDMA  Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority
BAU  Business-as-usual
BCAS  Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
BCCRF  Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
BCCSAP  Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
BCCT  Bangladesh Climate Change Trust
BCCTF  Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund
BDT  Bangladeshi Taka
BIDS  Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
BMDA  Barind Multipurpose Development Agency
BWA  Bhutan Water Authority
BWDB  Bangladesh Water Development Board
CAD  Command Area Development
CARDF  Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility
CBO  Community-based Organization
CCAP  Climate Change Action Plan
CCC  Climate Change Cell
CCD  Climate Change Division
CCD  Coast Conservation Department
CCKN  Climate Change Knowledge Network
CCPSC  Climate Change Program Steering Committee
CCS  Climate Change Secretariat
CCU  Climate Change Unit
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism
CDMP  Comprehensive Disaster Management Program
CEA  Central Environmental Authority
CEGIS  Center for Environmental and Geographic Information System
CFF  Climate Fiscal Framework
CFU  Climate Finance Unit
CGE  Computable general equilibrium 
CIF  Climate investment fund 
COP  Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC)
CPEIR  Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review
DANIDA  Danish International Development Agency
DFI  Development finance institutions
DFID  Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DNA  Designated national authority
DoA&C  Department of Agriculture and Cooperation
DoE  Department of Environment
DoLR  Department of Land Resources
DRR  Disaster risk reduction 
DTW  Deep tube well
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIA  Economic impact assessment
ix
EIB  European Investment Bank
ETI  Energy, technology, and industry
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FO  Farmer organization
GBM  Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna 
GCCA  Global Climate Change Alliance 
GCF  Green Climate Fund
GDP  Gross domestic product
GED  General Economic Division
GEF  Global Environment Facility
GHG  Greenhouse gas
GIZ   Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GLOF  Glacial lake outburst flood
GMIS  Gender Management Information System
GoA  Government of Afghanistan
GoB  Government of Bangladesh 
GoI  Government of India
GoN  Government of Nepal
GoP  Government of Pakistan
HIC  High-income country
IBFCR  Inclusive Budgeting and Financing for Climate Resilience
ICIMOD  International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
IDBG  Inter-American Development Bank Group
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IMED  Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division
INCCA  Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment
INCF  Indian National Climate Fund 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IUCN  International Union for Conservation of Nature
IWMI  International Water Management Institute 
IWMP  Integrated Watershed Management Program
IWRM  Integrated water resources management
IWT  Indus Water Treaty
JCS  Joint Country Strategy
JRC  Joint Rivers Commission
KRBM  Koshi River Basin Management
LAPA  Local Adaptation Plans for Action
LDCF  Least Developed Countries Fund
LEAD  Leadership for Environment and Development
LIC  Low-income country
LMIC  Low- and middle-income country
MAIL  Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
MASL  Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka
MBF  Ministry Budget Framework
MDB   Multilateral development bank
MIC  Middle-income country
MoCC  Ministry of Climate Change
MCCICC  Multi-Stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MFF  Mangroves for the Future
xMoA  Ministry of Agriculture
MoAF  Ministry of Agriculture and Forests
MoAFW  Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare
MoCC  Ministry of Climate Change
MoE  Ministry of Energy
MoEn  Ministry of Environment
MoEA  Ministry of External Affairs
MoEF  Ministry of Environment and Forests
MoEFCC  Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change
MoEW  Ministry of Energy and Water
MoF  Ministry of Finance
MoFDM  Ministry of Food and Disaster Management
MoHCA  Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs
MoI  Ministry of Irrigation
MoIWRM Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources Management
MoLGRDC Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives
MoMDE  Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment
MoNDM  Ministry of National Disaster Management
MoNRE  Ministry of New and Renewable Energy
MoP   Ministry of Power 
MoPl  Ministry of Planning
MoRRD  Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
MoST  Ministry of Science and Technology
MoSTE  Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment
MoUD  Ministry of Urban Development
MoWP  Ministry of Water and Power
MoWR  Ministry of Water Resources
MSTCCC Multi-Sectoral Technical Committee on Climate Change
MTBF  Medium Term Budget Framework
NABARD National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
NAF  National Adaptation Fund
NAP  National adaptation plan
NAPA  National Adaptation Programme of Action
NAPCC  National Action Plan on Climate Change 
NAST  Nepal Academy of Science and Technology
NCCKMC National Climate Change and Knowledge Management Center
NCCP  National Climate Change Plan
NCCSP  Nepal Climate Change Support Program
NCEF  National Clean Environment Fund
NDB  Non-Development Budget 
NDF  National Development Framework
NDMC  National Disaster Management Committee
NEC  National Environment Commission
NECS  National Environment Commission Secretariat
NEMAP  National Environment Management Action Plan
NEPA  National Environment Protection Act
NGO  Nongovernmental organization
NIE  National implementing entity
NICCSA  National Institute for Climate Change Studies and Actions
xi
NPC  National Planning Commission
NPDM  National Plan for Disaster Management
NSAPR  National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction
NWG  National working group
NWP  National Water Plan
NWRC  National Water Resources Council
NWSDB  National Water Supply and Drainage Board
O&M  Operation and maintenance
ODA  Official development assistance 
ODI  Overseas Development Institute
PC  Planning Commission
PCA  Per capita availability
PDMC  Provincial disaster management committee
PECM  Poverty, Environment and Climate Change Mainstreaming
PEPC  Pakistan Environmental Protection Council
PFM  Public Financial Management
PIEDAR  Pakistan Institute for Environment-Development Action Research
PIM  Participatory irrigation management 
PMCCC  Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change
PMO  Prime Minister’s Office
PPCR  Pilot Program for Climate Resilience
PPP  Public-private partnership
R&D  Research and development
RBO  River basin organization
RCP  Representative Concentration Pathway
RNR  Renewable natural resource
ROR  Rate of return
SAARC  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SACEP  South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme
SAPA  Sector adaptation plan of action
SAPCC  State Action Plans on Climate Change
SASP  South Asian Seas Programme
SAWI  South Asia Water Initiative
SCOPE  Pakistan Environmentalists Association, Society for Conservation and Protection of 
  Environment
SDG  Sustainable Development Goal
SIDS  Small island developing states 
SSP  Shared Socioeconomic Pathway
STW  Shallow tube well
UNCBD  United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
UNCCD  United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNCDF  United Nations Capital Development Fund
UP  Union Parishad
VDC  Village Development Committee
WACREP Water and Climate Resilience Program
WAPDA  Water and Power Development Authority
WARPO  Water Resources Planning Organization
xii
WEC  Water and Energy Commission
WECS  Water and Energy Commission Secretariat
WUA  Water Users’ Association
WUE  Water-use Efficiency
xiii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper looks at two particular, yet interlinked, aspects: the current financial flows related to climate 
adaptation strategies, and the institutional landscapes in place for driving adaptation planning and 
action on the ground, with a particular focus on the water sector. The paper sees water resources as 
being central to climate adaptation given that a range of climatic impacts are expressed in quantitative 
or temporal dimensions of water availability, with strong links to water quality. Thus, it argues that 
improving water resources management represents a key adaptive strategy for countries.
A structural approach is also adopted to assess the manner in which adaptation planning 
occurs, including decision making around allocation of finance for adaptation activities. The paper 
considers how these processes integrate adaptation across sectors, as well as their representativeness 
in recognizing and addressing the particular needs of vulnerable population groups. While much of 
the analysis is at country scale, the paper recognizes the importance of regional cooperation given the 
high incidence of transboundary water resources in South Asia. The report arrives at recommendations 
that reflect common characteristics across the assessed countries—as well as more country-specific 
needs—if identified gaps in adaptation financing and planning processes are to be strengthened.
Given that the paper was developed primarily through a desk-based review of existing literature 
and data, the information presented and the analysis are reflective of this limitation. Therefore, the 
significant difference in the availability of information across the seven countries must be considered. 
This is reflected in the paper through the varying levels of detail available for the different countries, 
which also partly reflects the different levels of complexity between the larger economies, such as 
India, compared to others, such as Bhutan. Country experiences with adaptation are also different, 
with Bangladesh, in particular, exhibiting adaptation mechanisms developed over a long history of 
adapting to several different major natural disaster scenarios. The absence of opportunities to generate 
primary data has been managed through several iterations of in-country expert review at various stages 
of development of this paper.
Together with the other two papers in this series, and through a review of existing literature, 
this paper provides a point of reference for a wide range of actors with the ability to take up its 
findings. These actors include policy makers and planners at national and subnational levels, donors, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups.
The paper illustrates the centrality of water in a wide range of key economic sectors, such as 
food production, energy and industry. In Nepal and Bhutan, for instance, hydropower generation is 
dominant as the primary economic driver. Irrigation, on the other hand, holds relevance across the 
board. The importance of surface water and groundwater varies, but the prominence of the latter in 
some countries (India, Bangladesh) and rapid growth in others (Sri Lanka, Afghanistan) is notable, 
given its association as a buffer in times of water stress. Although contributing less today to gross 
domestic product (GDP), agriculture is clearly central to food security and continues to employ half or 
more of each country’s workforce, with the exception of Sri Lanka. In Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
agriculture accounts for 60% or more of the national workforce. 
Presenting Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) as a key adaptive strategy is 
crucial in relation to the way water has become a multi-faceted driver of development, and also 
with regard to its high vulnerability to climate change. As observed in the first paper in this series 
(Lacombe et al. 2019), major climatic risks are linked to changes in water resource conditions, be 
it quantitative changes (floods, droughts), other forms of sudden events (storm surges, cyclones), or 
subtler, incremental impacts (rainfall variation and salinization, including coastal saltwater intrusion). 
Collectively, these risks make a compelling argument for positioning improved and more integrated 
water resources management as an explicit and vital adaptation response, which could possibly turn 
risks into development opportunities.
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An important finding of this paper is that this opportunity appears to be not fully internalized by 
countries. For instance, in addition to large disparities between estimated adaptation costs and available 
financial flows, discernible financial flows to the water sector are small compared to other sectors, such as 
agriculture. However, it is recognized that, given the intersection of water with multiple sectors, available data 
may be missing other financial allocations embedded in these sectors. Nevertheless, the disconnect between 
water and other sectors appears to continue as the analysis moves from financial allocation to adaptation 
planning, implementation and monitoring. Of course, such a conclusion applies to different degrees in 
each country, also recognizing that the current status reflects each country’s overall economic and political 
conditions, and exposure to environmental risks. This is perhaps best demonstrated by Bangladesh, which 
comes closest to being an exception to this conclusion, given ongoing institutionally embedded efforts to 
effect greater sectoral integration and institutional continuity between fundraising and fund allocation to 
critical adaptation needs, and accountability by tracking returns on investments. The country’s long history of 
adapting to a range of major environmental risks is undoubtedly an advantage. See Box ES.1 for key findings.
Box ES.1. Key findings.
Highlighting the centrality of water in the understanding of climate risks, costs and adaptive 
opportunities 
•  Water is vital for economic development, including livelihoods and food security.
•  Given the high vulnerability of water to climate change, it is extremely important that improved 
and more integrated water resources management be placed at the center of adaption strategies.
•  This centrality of water is recognized in climate and water policies, but is rarely translated in 
country adaptation responses and priorities. 
Assessing the cost of climate change impacts
•   Adaptation cost assessments are patchy with fragmented sectoral coverage. This impedes 
understanding a country’s risks, and financing needs and priorities.
•   Current cost estimates expressed as a percentage of GDP mask important geographic and 
demographic differences, which may mean that vulnerable groups as well as key sectors are 
overlooked or underrepresented.
Adaptation financing
•   All countries, with the exception of India and Bangladesh, face a significant financial gap in 
climate adaptation and are heavily dependent on external funding.
•   The smaller economies struggle to navigate a complex and competitive external funding 
landscape with underdeveloped in-country capacity.
•   In-country private sector financing is seemingly a relatively untapped funding source.
•   Poor transparency and accountability in climate finance allocation undermines attempts to 
assess the efficiency and efficacy of adaptation action.
Institutions
•   Sectoral fragmentation is a fundamental structural weakness. It disrupts the institutional 
continuity needed from accessing funds to tracking their investment in adaptation.
•   National coordination bodies (such as climate cells) struggle to cope with entrenched sectoral 
approaches, and lack of capacity to generate cross-sectoral collaboration.
xv
The analysis looks at adaptation financing (treated wherever possible as separate to mitigation 
financing) and institutional preparedness for planning and action for adaptation as a continuum. The 
absence of comprehensive cost assessments of climate change impacts, in general, and water resources 
management, in particular, has important ramifications across the seven countries. Existing assessments 
are generally sector focused with some sectors not assessed. This impedes understanding a country’s 
financing needs, and risks disadvantaging those sectors without assessments in relation to funding 
from external sources and allocations from national budgets. Another key weakness is the expression 
of actual and potential costs in terms of GDP. This risks glossing over the significant geographic and 
demographic differences in the distribution of these costs. As poor and marginalized groups are more 
vulnerable to climate shocks, linking cost estimates to specific population groups and locations arises 
as a critical adjustment necessary across the countries. See Box ES.2 for recommendations.
Box ES.2. Recommendations.
Overall, a more refined and holistic approach to climate adaptation is needed that defines the multi-
sectoral linkages of various climate risks (see, for example, Table 1.1 in Davis and Hirji 2019,) and 
recognizes the various steps, such as securing funds, planning, fund allocation and tracking, as parts of 
a single, integrated process. Implementing such an approach is likely to require institutional linkages 
to be built between sectors (horizontal integration) and between central agencies with a mandate for 
overall planning and coordination, and between regional and local stakeholders (vertical integration).
Assessing the cost of climate change impacts
•  Estimates of climate change costs must be disaggregated across sectors. Although such 
countries have started taking initiatives in this regard (for example, Bhutan with sector 
adaptation plans of action [SAPA]), further work needs to be done. Noting inter-sectoral 
linkages can indicate where multiple costs can be avoided or minimized through the same 
investment. 
•  Cost estimates should reflect the different vulnerabilities of specific population groups, key 
sectors and geographical areas for a more spatially and socially nuanced adaptation response.
Adaptation finance 
•  Investing in IWRM needs to be central to the national adaptation strategy—consistent with the 
climate and water policies—in view of the multi-sectoral relevance of water, with explicit financing.
•  A tracking mechanism around which a “value for money” accountability mechanism can be 
developed should be considered, e.g., the climate change marker being considered by the 
Government of Bangladesh (GoB). This would help track the total amount of resources spent 
on climate-related expenditure against the impact generated.
Institutions
•  Adequate staffing and training following a skill gap assessment can improve performance 
of national adaptation focal agencies toward more effective climate adaptation.
•  Just as water resources must be central to the overall adaptation response, adaptation itself 
must be placed at the center of future development planning. 
•  Regional approaches for promoting opportunities for greater sharing of knowledge and 
cooperation (e.g., on flood early warning, cost-effective approaches for dealing with arsenic 
in water supply, and measures for preventing saltwater intrusion in coastal aquifers), and 
for mediation (in water-sharing issues) is critical for transboundary cooperation toward 
more holistic adaptation measures is South Asia. 
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All countries are faced with having a significant gap in finance for climate adaptation. In countries 
with larger economies, such as India and Bangladesh, over 80% of identifiable adaptation finance has 
originated from national budgets, although this trend shows a sharp decline in Bangladesh in recent 
years. Financing in the other countries shows a marked dependency on external funding. Navigating a 
dense landscape of different external funds and competition for limited finance among countries require 
additional and unique in-country institutional capacities. The shift from grants to loans on the part of 
donors also means that adaptation costs are likely to increase when financed from external funding. An 
area seemingly relatively untapped is private sector financing. Furthermore, the limited information 
available on finance flows to the water sector suggests that water resources management is generally 
not a priority in the context of climate adaptation. Water often falls outside of the top-funded sectors for 
climate adaptation, with agriculture generally being the top recipient. 
The institutional responses to mobilize adaptation involve either the formation of inter-ministerial 
coordination bodies or assigning the responsibility to tackle climate-related issues to specific sector 
ministries. Several countries have also established separate climate funds, which, to some extent, 
delink the tasks of financing with adaptation planning and implementation. These mechanisms, with 
the exception of those in Bangladesh, also struggle to overcome perennial weaknesses arising from the 
sectoral fragmentation of the government. There is little evidence that existing climate institutions can 
overcome entrenched sectoral approaches to development planning. They tend to lack the capacity to 
generate cross-sectoral collaboration toward the shaping of holistic climate adaptation programs. At the 
heart of these issues lies the issue of power struggles between agencies vested with climate response 
coordination and other relevant ministries that are expected to cooperate. In Nepal, for example, both 
the Ministry of Energy (MoE) and the Ministry of Irrigation (MoI) could proceed with their plans to 
build hydropower and irrigation dams, respectively, without any consultation with the Climate Change 
Secretariat (CCS) located under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MoSTE). The 
issue is not entirely about mandates, but also reflects the need for investments in developing human 
capacities, if these coordinating bodies are to be transformed into entities capable of pushing through 
a coherent and integrated vision for adaptation within the complex political economy of fragmented 
national institutional landscapes. This fundamental structural weakness is reflected throughout the 
institutional continuum, from patchy cost assessments of climatic risks to disjointed fund allocation, and 
an almost complete absence of mechanisms to track adaptation investments against planned outcomes. 
Bangladesh is an exception to the above observation, due to the proposed adoption of a climate change 
marker attached to adaptation (and mitigation) financing. This recommendation, in fact, builds upon markers 
for poverty reduction and gender that are already in use. It is the closest to making the important transition 
to climate finance becoming an integral and explicit part of budgetary processes, with clear integration into 
sector planning and oversight mechanism. This may, in fact, offer a road map for other countries. Another 
critically important feature of these developments in Bangladesh is that the aforementioned recommended 
institutional adjustments have arisen from studies commissioned by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) no 
less. This could be construed as an indication of the degree to which responding to climatic risks has been 
positioned by the government as a national development priority. This, too, contrasts markedly with the 
inability already noted of national apex adaptation bodies to make adaptation a unifying and organizing focus.
There are other key findings, however, in which even Bangladesh is not an exception. One such 
finding is that local communities continue to be positioned as recipients of primarily centrally defined 
adaptation programs. Many of these groups are those that are already experiencing inequalities, and 
therefore possess the least adaptive capacities. Despite a few countries introducing regional adaptation 
plans (such as the Local Adaptation Plans for Action [LAPA] in Nepal), there appears to be a consensus 
that insufficient effective institutional mechanisms exist to capture and reflect context-specific needs 
articulated by local stakeholders. In addition to the risk of fostering maladaptation, failure to actively 
engage local stakeholders leads to the inability to mobilize the significant human capital for adaptation 
that currently remains mostly untapped. 
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Institutional disconnects both vertically (across administrative scales) and horizontally (sectoral 
dissonance) currently undermine deliberative decision making in climate adaptation toward the shaping 
of holistic adaptation planning, involving all relevant sectors and also including the voices of the poor 
and marginalized groups. IWRM can serve as a starting point to initiate open discussion on how cross-
sectoral interlinkages and coordination can be established as part of an institutional remedy to tackle 
climate risks. While the current institutional status quo does not always accommodate the envisioned 
integration, climate change can provide potential entry points for change to move beyond the present 
institutional traps within the water sector and more broadly. 
Finally, the biogeography of South Asia demands cognizance be taken of the critical need for 
effective regional cooperation. Transboundary impacts can have a major effect on the efficacy of 
country-level adaptation investments, with the exception of Sri Lanka, given its island nation status. 
Given the abundance of transboundary rivers in the region, and their origins in glaciers located in 
several focal countries, water assumes a central position in defining a number of the key transboundary 
elements linked to climate risks. Its riparian status in multiple major river systems, and its extremely 
high dependence on transboundary flows for surface water supplies, makes Bangladesh the poster child 
for greater regional cooperation in this context. However, cooperation across national boundaries, as 
with sectoral boundaries, is stifled by the diverse economic and political influence of each country in 
the region. India, arguably the dominant economic and political actor, to a great extent, shapes current 
transboundary cooperation mechanisms on the sharing of water through a bilateral approach that plays 
to its dominant position. One option for transcending this approach could be to focus on the issue of 
glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), which may bring a larger number of countries into the dialogue, 
and place India as both an upper and lower riparian. See Box ES.3 for notes on regional cooperation.
Box ES.3. Regional cooperation is a critical element in adaptation.
With 54 rivers shared between India and Bangladesh alone, a highly interconnected network of 
rivers and aquifers, with the exception of Sri Lanka, characterizes the South Asian landscape. 
These shared rivers and aquifers, and the predicted glacial retreat in the Himalayas support the 
livelihoods of 400 million people across the Indo-Gangetic and Brahmaputra basins in Nepal, 
India and Bangladesh alone. Links between glaciers and this network of transboundary rivers and 
aquifers highlight the limitations of adaptive action confined to national boundaries, especially 
in the case of lower riparian states, and underscore the need for regional cooperation. This is 
best illustrated by Bangladesh, which not only depends on transboundary flows for 97% of its 
surface water but is also at risk of regular flooding from unregulated and uncontrolled water flows.
Cooperation among riparian countries, however, is limited, with agreements only for a few 
specific rivers, many of which predate full recognition of the risks posed by climate change. The 
focus on water sharing thus appears rather narrow when the need today is for cooperation along a 
broader front of water management needs and adaptive actions. The existing power asymmetries 
in economic, political, geographical and country priorities pose a significant challenge to achieving 
such cooperation. Central to these dynamics is India. Given its economic and political influence, 
and geographical positioning as a midstream state, India is likely to continue to play a central role 
in shaping and reshaping governance structures and processes for regional cooperation. While 
regional political systems such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
and the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) exist, they have been slow 
to lead region-wide adaptation initiatives, leaving no clear pathway for scaling existing bilateral 
approaches to a truly regional platform.

1Chapter 1. Introduction
Developmental risks posed by climate change need to be viewed within a complex context of 
interactions between a host of drivers, including demography, economic development, urbanization and 
industrialization; availability of technology; and a variegated economic policy landscape. Within this broad 
perspective, water is central to many climate change impacts, such as floods, droughts, rainfall variation 
and salinity intrusion, which, together with other impacts such as temperature changes, are expected to 
have severe consequences for agriculture, health, energy and the environment in South Asia. According 
to IPCC (2014a), climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty 
reduction more difficult and further erode food security. How these impacts will come about, however, 
is less clear, and this is one of the major findings of IPCC (2014b), which identified that climate change 
studies that help to understand the impacts are still inadequate in many areas of Asia.
This paper is part of a series of three papers that collectively seek to take stock of current knowledge 
of climatic risks in seven countries in South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka). This includes assessing their readiness to adapt to these challenges in terms of policy and 
planning, and the financial and institutional frameworks needed for effective implementation. Such an 
assessment pays particular attention to climate change risks in water resources management, given the 
expression of many climatic risks in terms of quantitative and qualitative dimensions of water resources. 
The existing state of knowledge and information on climate change science and risk is reviewed in 
Paper 1 (Lacombe et al. 2019). Paper 2 (Davis and Hirji 2019) looks at how this knowledge landscape is 
incorporated into the policy and planning process in the seven countries. This paper (Paper 3) examines 
how these policy frameworks and responses are translated into financial and institutional structures, and 
assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these structures in dealing with climate change and climate 
risks in the water sector. 
This paper draws on an extensive literature review of current financial flows and institutional 
landscapes related to climate adaptation funding in the context of water resources management in South 
Asia. A detailed explanation of the information sources used and methodology followed is provided 
in the Appendix. The paper begins with a brief summary of the major drivers of the economy at both 
national and regional levels. It emphasizes the economic importance of the main water-related sectors, 
and provides a summary of climate change impacts on water resources and the economic consequences 
thereof. It then discusses current trends in financial and institutional frameworks for climate change 
adaptation. This includes structural factors influencing the targeting of climate finance to key needs, 
and the strengths and weaknesses that define each country’s ability to cope with different climate risks, 
emphasizing the role that water resources management plays. The conclusion highlights the key findings 
and lessons to emerge from the study.

3Chapter 2. Development, Water Resources and the Economic 
Implications of Climate Change in South Asia
South Asia has experienced the fastest economic growth rate of any region comprising low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) globally, with an average growth rate of 8% over the past 5 years (World 
Bank 2016j), which is expected to continue in 2017 and beyond (World Bank 2016k). Most countries 
in South Asia have benefitted from falling oil prices, a consistent input of remittances and low inflation 
(World Bank 2016j). India, South Asia’s largest economy, was projected to grow at 7.6% in the fiscal 
year 2016/2017 and at 7.7% in 2017/2018, and comprises approximately 82% of this region’s economy 
(World Bank 2016k). The region has also made important advances in poverty reduction. Further, there 
have been transitions in the political realm, with some of the countries witnessing major constitutional 
changes in the past decade. The development contexts of each the country is further elaborated in 
Table 2.1. Box 2.1 provides a summary of the key findings from this chapter. 
Box 2.1. Key findings on water resources and the economic implications of climate change  
in South Asia.
Water resources have played an integral role in advancing South Asia’s development goals. Going 
into the future, water demand is expected to increase considerably, exceeding supply in many cases.
Even as the contribution of the agriculture sector (the predominant user of water) to gross domestic 
product (GDP) continues to fall, the sector continues to generate half of all employment and is a 
key driver of poverty reduction. In mountainous countries such as Nepal and Bhutan, hydropower is 
expected to, or already is, contributing significantly to GDP growth. With rapid population increase 
and development in the region, by 2050, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan are expected to experience 
conditions of water stress with considerable regional disparities in distribution. 
The impact of climate change on the spatial and temporal availability of water will have multiple 
consequences for economies, while its impacts will be unevenly distributed among different sections of society. 
South Asia is considered to be one of the regions most vulnerable to climate change: extreme climatic 
events, including floods, droughts and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), are expected to be further 
exacerbated as a result of increased climatic variability. In view of the multiple drivers that impact 
water resources, climate change can be considered a significant additional source of stress on the 
availability and demand of both surface water and groundwater resources in the region. Given the 
crosscutting nature of water, this can be expected to have knock-on effects across multiple sectors. 
Without taking into account extreme climatic events, the cost on the economy could be as high as 
8.8% of GDP by 2100 under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.
The impacts of climate change are expected to disproportionately impact the most vulnerable sections 
of society. The poorest, including smallholder farmers, would be hit most severely, especially in 
countries that are highly dependent on agriculture. 
In general, there are limited efforts to assess the impacts of climate change and the costs of adaptation. 
The absence of comprehensive cost assessments of climate change impacts, in general, and for water 
resources management, in particular, is a key issue across the seven countries. Existing assessments 
are generally sector focused. The lack of information on the water sector could lead to a patchy 
picture of cost calculation and estimation, and unclear direction on water-related adaptation strategies. 
Comprehensive financial assessment of climate change impacts should disaggregate financial costs 
for the water sector specifically, while also linking these to broader development targets and specific 
population groups, with particular emphasis on gender, poor and marginalized groups. 
4Water plays a key role in advancing South Asia’s development goals. Increasing food and energy 
security for much of the region is seen as a primary goal in improving the living conditions of the 
population. The water sector also supports GDP growth in multiple ways, and supports the livelihoods 
and economic development of millions of people. Natural ecosystems require healthy water systems to 
sustain them and for the provision of vital ecosystem services. The significance of water-related sectors 
to economic and social development in each of the countries and key aspects of these sectors that could 
affect water demand are presented in Table 2.2.
The agriculture sector is the leading user of water, accounting for over 80% of total water 
withdrawals in South Asia in 2011, except for Sri Lanka where it was 51% (Markandya et al. 2017). 
While the contribution of agriculture to GDP continues to fall in the region, now accounting for one-
fifth of South Asia’s GDP, the sector generates half of all employment opportunities. The sector has 
been instrumental in rural poverty reduction in a region where, with the exception of two countries, 
over 20% of the population lives in poverty. The management of water resources, therefore, continues 
to underpin efforts to reduce poverty levels, provide food security and enable economic advancement 
in South Asia.
The nature of the sector can be expected to change considerably in the coming years. Increasing 
rural to urban migration is a region-wide phenomenon, and the change in labor force can be expected 
to have consequences on the type of agriculture that is practiced. Among other changes, in Pakistan, 
non-crop sectors are becoming important contributors to agricultural GDP, since the yield growth from 
major crops has fallen in recent years. In economies gaining middle-income status, such as Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh, the agriculture sector will be expected to diversify from chiefly rice production to more 
high-value crop production.
The overall economic growth of South Asia is largely driven by the services sector and private 
consumption (aggregate demand). The industry sector is projected to expand in some of the countries, 
with implications for water demand. In India, the manufacturing sector is geared to gain prominence 
in the next few decades, with a corresponding increase in water demand (Table 2.2). In addition, water 
resources can also be an important component of the transportation infrastructure required to boost 
industrial growth and trade. Bangladesh is currently working on developing the river network flowing 
into its largest port for this purpose.
Countries such as Bhutan and Nepal are focusing on ramping up hydropower generation capacities, 
while Pakistan has plans to do the same. In Bhutan, hydropower is already the leading contributor to 
GDP. With energy deficits being a general concern in the region, the increased hydropower generation is 
expected to meet this need domestically with export to neighboring countries also providing opportunities 
for significant financial inflows. According to Markandya et al. (2017), in countries such as India and 
Bangladesh, where the majority of energy is from other sources, the increasing demand for cooling water 
in thermal power plants is believed to pose a potential source of conflict with other demands on water, 
especially in India.
The seven countries of South Asia considered in this study (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) are home to 23.7% of the global population, but contain 
only 4.6% of the global annual renewable water resources, which are unevenly distributed between 
countries and river basins. Therefore, while water resources will continue to be a vital component of 
development, rapid population growth in the region coupled with increasing intensity of water use 
mean that water would increasingly become a scarce resource in many of these countries. Already, 
22 of 32 major Indian cities face daily water shortages, while people in Nepal face long queues for 
drinking water, and Pakistan is facing electricity and water shortages (Surie 2015). By 2050, per 
capita availability of water will dip below the Falkenmark water stress indicator (Falkenmark et al. 
1989) threshold of 1,700 cubic meters (m3) in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan (Table 2.4). Projected 
per capita water demand in each of the countries and the projected demand by key sectors is depicted 
in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
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9TABLE 2.3. Water demand in South Asia, by agriculture, industry and domestic supply sectors, 2010-
2050.
  2010   2030   2050
 Agriculture Industry Domestic Agriculture Industry Domestic Agriculture Industry Domestic
Afghanistan 35.42 0.46 0.34 37.26 1.42 2.07 38.63 3.74 3.27
Bangladesh 43.74 3.36 1.84 43.24 7.46 4.29 43.10 12.39 7.89
Bhutan 0.40 0.01 0.01 0.40 0.07 0.09 0.42 0.11 0.18
India 699.70 41.48 37.35 699.31 103.63 76.15 771.89 131.13 102.04
Nepal 7.24 0.31 0.05 7.74 0.74 0.28 8.24 1.82 0.75
Pakistan 292.25 5.62 4.48 287.53 10.34 7.64 314.85 17.32 6.24
Sri Lanka 8.30 0.51 0.68 7.92 1.49 2.07 7.60 1.59 3.37
Sources: Burek et al. 2016; Wada et al. 2016. 
Notes:  Projected agricultural demand does not include future socioeconomic change assumptions (which have been 
 included for industrial and domestic use demand).
 Water demand (in cubic kilometers per year) for agriculture (scenario – Representative Concentration Pathway 
 [RCP] 6.0), industry (scenario – Shared Socioeconomic Pathway [SSP2]) and domestic use (scenario - SSP2).
TABLE 2.4. Population and total water availability per capita in South Asia, 2010-2100.
 2010  2030  2050  2100 
Country Population PCA Population PCA Population PCA Population PCA 
 (millions) (m3) (millions) (m3) (millions) (m3) (millions) (m3)
Afghanistan 31.4 3,198 51.7 1,975 75.2 1,229 112.7 918
Bangladesh 148.7 10,149 181.1 8,093 195.8 7,559 168.3 9,227
Bhutan 0.7 75,975 1.0 47,236 1.2 33,975 1.3 41,908
India 1,224.6 1,894 1,528.6 1,658 1,733.8 1,345 1,611.1 1,766
Nepal 30.0 7,489 41.3 4,737 50.1 3,566 52.6 4,174
Pakistan 173.6 1,185 239.7 962 292.6 666 326.6 707
Sri Lanka 20.9 3,016 23.4 3,542 24.2 3,314 21.1 3,206
Sources: Burek et al. 2016; Wada et al. 2016. 
Notes:  Total renewable water resources for each country was considered to be the addition of the runoff within the 
 country and the inflow through river networks. PCA = per capita availability; m3 = cubic meters.
 Population and total water availability per capita for scenarios RCP 6.0/SSP2.
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What is clear from Table 2.3 is the progressively increasing demand for water in the industrial and 
domestic sectors across the region. On the other hand, agricultural water demand is expected to remain 
relatively static, with the exceptions of India, in particular, and Nepal, while the demand in Sri Lanka is 
expected to decline. The hidden dimension in the annual figures presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 is the 
seasonality of water availability and demand through the interaction of rainfall patterns, on the one hand, 
and water use patterns, on the other. 
Further, population growth, industrial development, excessive extraction of groundwater and surface 
water for agriculture, urbanization, environmental pollution, poor domestic water management, increasing 
variability of rainfall and extreme climatic events have all increased the susceptibility of the region to 
natural disasters such as floods and droughts (Surie 2015). In addition, the lack of regional treaties and 
open, transparent data sharing between countries has reduced the region’s ability to effectively manage 
water resources, of which a significant proportion is transboundary in nature.
In view of the multiple drivers that impact water resources, climate change can be considered a 
significant additional source of stress on water resources availability and demand in the region, with knock-
on effects across economies. Figure 2.1 highlights why South Asia is considered one of the most climate 
vulnerable regions, with virtually all the countries in this region falling within the 20 most vulnerable 
countries. The climate risk index used in this study is calculated using information on the number of 
total losses caused by weather events, the number of deaths, the insured damages and the total economic 
damages. Table 2.5 provides an overview of the major climate risks for each of the seven focal countries 
in the region, and the sectors likely to be most affected by climate variability.
In relation to climate change adaptation, the role of water is multidimensional in its support to a range 
of sectors that power growth. The widespread relevance of water also means that its overabundance or 
absence can have far-reaching developmental consequences. These include floods, GLOFs or droughts. 
Ensuring that the impacts of climate change on water resources (Lacombe et al. 2019) and their costs are 
well understood has significant implications for the shaping of adaption responses, and future adaptation 
strategies and programs.
Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) projected the economic costs of climate change at a regional level 
in South Asia (Table 2.6). They estimate that, without global deviation from a fossil fuel-intensive path, 
the region could lose an equivalent of 1.8% of its annual GDP by 2050 due to climate change. This would 
progressively increase to 8.8% by 2100 under a BAU scenario. However, according to the same study, if 
the global mean temperature rise is below or within 2 °C, the region would lose only an average of 1.3% 
of its GDP by 2050 and approximately 2.5% by 2100.
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TABLE 2.6. Projected reductions in GDP (%) due to climate change in South Asian countries, 2050 and 
2100.
Region or country    Under a BAU scenario If mean temperature rise is  
  below 2 °C
 2050 2100 2100
Asia 1.8 8.8 2.5
Afghanistan Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed
Bangladesh 2.0 9.4 2.1
Bhutan 1.4 6.6 1.7
India 1.8 8.7 1.9
Nepal 2.2 9.9 2.4
Pakistan Not assessed Not assessed Not assessed
Sri Lanka 1.2 6.5 1.4
Source: Based on Ahmed and Suphachalasai 2014.
Although the analysis suggests that, by 2050, climate risks could lead to a reduction of less than 
10% in real GDP across the seven South Asian countries, the impact on specific sectors may deviate 
from this projection. Food security, in particular, would have disproportionately severe impacts on human 
security, not least because the poorest would be hit most acutely, especially in countries that are highly 
dependent on agriculture. At the same time, the model employed to generate these estimates excludes 
the impacts of extreme climatic events, such as storms, floods and droughts, which may in fact lead to 
an underestimation of the cumulative impacts over time.
Insights into climate change impacts and their economic costs in the agriculture sector are provided 
by Markandya et al. (2017), who concluded that, overall, the demand for water could increase in several 
major South Asian river basins, many of which are also transboundary. This would exacerbate water 
scarcity conditions, independently of climate change, given the economic and demographic drivers at 
play. Consequently, without further investments in irrigation, supply of water for irrigation is expected 
to drop by as much as 89.5% in some basins. Also notable in terms of transboundary rivers is that these 
declines in the same basin vary significantly across the riparian countries. In the case of the Ganges for 
instance, the expected declines for Nepal, India and Bangladesh are 0.8%, 15.7% and 21.3%, respectively, 
demonstrating the disproportionate distribution of water stress. Similarly, in the Indus, the expected 
reduction for India is 7.1% compared with 42.7% for Pakistan.
The consequences of increased water scarcity on food production across the regions will be 
multifaceted. These are expected to include a 10% to 60% increase in the “shadow price” (opportunity 
cost) of water. In Pakistan, this increase is expected to be 230% to 350% given that crop production 
is heavily dependent on irrigation, and is likely to face significant water scarcity. Reduced irrigation is 
expected to also increase net food imports, as countries shift to trading in virtual water as a response 
strategy. Markandya et al. (2017) estimated net imports to increase by USD 621 million, USD 7 million, 
USD 4.8 billion, USD 82 million and USD 5.5 billion in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
India, respectively. In India, for example, this would represent a 42% increase from the 2014 figure. While 
helping to close the food supply deficit, one major cost is likely to be the material impact of balance of 
payments. In some countries, for example, Sri Lanka, such a strategy may go against current attempts by 
the government to reduce the balance of payment impact of food exports (de Silva et al. 2018). 
Where imports are unable to fully bridge the gap in markets, the prices of major food items, namely 
crops, meat and livestock products, and processed foods, are expected to increase by 8.5%, 9%, 4%, 21% 
and 2% in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, respectively. Increased water scarcity is 
likely to mean the structure of irrigation will also change, with rainfed agriculture increasing as irrigation 
decreases, thereby causing food production to fall and an increased vulnerability to climatic shocks. 
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The combination of these water scarcity impacts poses serious threats to the food security of South 
Asia’s poor households in particular; and at a macro level, to a decline in the GDP by 2050 of 2.7%, 
1.4%, 0.2%, 5.2%, 0.3% and 0.4% in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the rest of South 
Asia, respectively, compared to the figures in 2011. 
When climate change combines with water scarcity, these impacts intensify. The “shadow price” of 
water doubles in Bangladesh and rises by over 70% in some key basins in India. In Pakistan, it increases 
by a factor of three to four. Crop outputs are expected to decline a further 1% to 2% in all the countries, 
except Bangladesh, where the additional decline is expected to be 9% to 14%. GDP losses are much greater: 
Bangladesh 5.2%, India 1.8%, Nepal 0.8%, Pakistan 5.6%, Sri Lanka 0.6%, and rest of South Asia 0.5%. 
Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) estimated that to mitigate damage and economic losses under a 
BAU scenario, the region needs to provide an average climate change adaptation expenditure of 0.48% 
of regional GDP per year (USD 40 billion) by 2050 and 0.86% of GDP per year (USD 73 billion) by 
2100. Regional adaptation costs under the Copenhagen–Cancun scenario1 are much lower than the costs 
under the BAU scenario, requiring only an average of 0.36% of GDP per year (USD 31 billion) by 2050 
and 0.48% of GDP per year (USD 41 billion) by 2100. Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014), however, noted 
that the costs of specific adaptation measures and those in individual sectors are frequently difficult to 
determine, and may vary widely across the region.
In the water sector, increasing water-use efficiency (WUE) is highlighted by Markandya et al. (2017) 
as an adaptation with significant potential to closing the gap created by the growing demand for water 
and the decline in supply due to climate change. This scope exists because current levels of WUE in 
South Asia are around only 25% to 30% in Bangladesh, 45% in India and 30% in Pakistan, which are 
all lower than the global average of 50%. Markandya et al. (2017) calculate that food production may 
increase by about 1% (with a 10% gain in WUE) and by 4% (with a 40% improvement in WUE). A 40% 
improvement in WUE would reduce the price index of crops by 18.9% in Bangladesh, 12.4% in India, 
11.1% in Nepal, 16.6% in Pakistan, 4.5% in Sri Lanka and 17.3% in the rest of South Asia. Underpinning 
these gains is the increase in irrigated areas, leading to higher levels of food production. After juxtaposing 
the increasing costs of achieving higher levels of WUE, the same authors concluded that WUE up to 40% 
can be economically justified in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. In Nepal, after a 20% improvement, 
the economic gains are smaller than the costs. In Pakistan and the rest of South Asia, an improvement in 
WUE over 30% may not be economically profitable.
Country Contexts
Afghanistan
Afghanistan contributes 57 billion cubic meters (Bm3) to major river systems as surface water and 18 
Bm3 as groundwater. Water resources in the country are particularly susceptible to shifts in rainfall, and 
changes in glaciers and snowmelt. Afghanistan is still primarily an agrarian economy, and water availability 
or lack thereof is likely to play a significant role in how much economic development takes place. Of 
the population in the country, 75% (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS) lives in rural 
environments, and are heavily dependent on the agriculture and livestock sectors for their livelihoods. 
To maintain a reliable quantity of water for these sectors, a large portion of the cultivated land is under 
irrigation, and 98% of the volume of the country’s water resources is used for irrigation. However, because 
Afghanistan is extremely sensitive to drought, and due to the years of civil conflict, water infrastructure 
is poor. Only 27% of the population has access to improved water sources. Therefore, it is vital that the 
appropriate infrastructure and proper water management practices are in place to increase access to water. 
1 Assumes implementation of Copenhagen Accord pledges (toward 2020) and the long-term objective of keeping the 
global mean temperature rise below 2 OC.
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Overall, the economy of Afghanistan (measured by GDP) contracted between 2014 and 2015 but is 
expected to grow by 3.6% in 2017 (World Bank 2016a). The decrease in GDP is due to a combination 
of factors. These include the departure of foreign troops in 2014, which impacted businesses that 
catered specifically to foreign soldiers. Other factors include the lack of economic diversification, poor 
management of resources (including water), and the disconnect between rural communities and the 
central government with regard to allocation of development projects. The country’s GDP comprises three 
major economic sectors: agriculture (21%), industry (22%) and services (53%) (http://wdi.worldbank.
org/table/4.2). Over 40% of the population is employed in the agriculture sector and 55% lives below the 
poverty line (World Bank 2016a; Leao et al. 2018). Since over half the population earn a living from the 
agriculture sector, and due to poor water supply delivery, farmers have turned to crops with low water 
requirement as a means of adjusting to the changing climate and to make ends meet. This change can 
also be linked to the severe flooding and drought that wreaked havoc on Afghanistan’s agriculture sector 
in 2014. ADB (2014b) estimated that 70% of the losses as a result of GLOFs and flash floods were to 
crops, livestock, housing and human lives. Agriculture as a sector declined by a projected 5.7% in 2015. 
This, combined with the sluggish growth in GDP, put upward pressure on the number of people below 
the poverty line (World Bank 2016a). Indeed, water, energy, transportation, agriculture and health are the 
sectors most affected by climate change. 
Most of the losses from floods and droughts impact nearly 80% of the population, and the 
reconstruction costs of irrigation infrastructure were also high (ADB 2014b). The Ministry of Energy and 
Water (MoEW) estimated that the reconstruction costs for large-scale irrigation projects would amount 
to USD 6.3 million in the Balkh, Jowzjan and Samangan provinces (ADB 2014b). After the floods in 
2014, the costs of reconstructing traditional irrigation systems in 15 provinces in the northern region were 
estimated to reach USD 19 million.
In conclusion, Afghanistan has a wide spectrum of issues to be concerned with besides climate change. 
Even though the war is officially over, the terrorist threat still remains and the extreme centralization 
of the central government has alienated the rural population. This is the segment of the population that 
is most affected by droughts and floods, and is the majority of those that depend on either irrigated or 
traditional agriculture and livestock systems for their livelihoods. The costs of drought- and flood-related 
disasters in Afghanistan vary depending on the source. However, it is expected that such costs are likely 
to increase in the coming years, affecting the country’s agrarian economy. However, with better climate 
management practices, such as improved water storage, resource management and farmers cultivating 
less water-intensive crops, Afghanistan can see a means of adapting to climate change. Infrastructure 
development (especially irrigation) should be a priority, since poor infrastructure will be detrimental to 
the country’s resilience toward climate change and will further hinder economic growth. 
Bangladesh
Despite the seeming abundance of surface water in Bangladesh, groundwater is the most important water 
source for the domestic, industrial and agriculture sectors, with 85% of irrigation water sourced from 
groundwater (Faruque and Ali 2005). The agriculture sector is relevant not only in terms of economic 
growth but also as a source of food security, nutrition and employment. In fact, nearly 54% of rice 
production is expected from the dry season boro crop (World Bank 2016b), which is mainly irrigated 
with groundwater. Linked to this dependence on groundwater is the vulnerability of surface water flows. 
Since 90% of total renewable water resources is derived from the 57 international rivers flowing through 
Bangladesh (Faruque and Ali 2005), this highlights water uncertainties linked to natural events as well as 
transboundary political economies. As noted in Lacombe et al. (2019), one major dimension of drought 
and water shortage in the country is of a hydrological nature, since Bangladesh depends on upstream 
water use in India and other neighboring countries.
Water is clearly intricately linked with broader development in Bangladesh, which, with nearly 160 
million inhabitants (http://data.worldbank.org/country), is among the most densely populated countries 
in the world. Nevertheless, despite also being one of the countries most affected by climatic stresses, 
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Bangladesh has maintained an average annual growth rate of about 6% for more than a decade (Gautam 
et al. 2013). This sustained, accelerated growth has spurred a dramatic decline in poverty incidence from 
58.8% in 1991-1992 to 24.8% in 2015 (World Bank 2015a), and this is expected to decrease to 18.6% by 
the end of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (World Bank 2016b). A significant proportion of poverty reduction 
has occurred among the country’s 70% rural population, and much of this achievement can be attributed 
to agriculture, since 87% of rural people derive at least part of their incomes from agricultural activities 
(Gautam et al. 2013). Although the contribution from agriculture to GDP is expected to decline to 15% 
in 2021, it generates employment for 47.5% of the labor force, and accounts directly and indirectly for 
about one-fourth of total export earnings. It also provides food security for the growing population (GoB 
2013). World Bank (2016b) identified that pro-poor agricultural growth has also stimulated the non-farm 
economy in Bangladesh, whereby a 10% rise in farm incomes stimulates a 6% rise in non-farm incomes. 
Nevertheless, the large national population means that about 46.8 million people still live below 
the poverty line (GoB 2013), while many who now live above this threshold remain highly vulnerable 
to economic and natural shocks (Gautam et al. 2013). While the current growth rate bodes well for the 
country’s aspiration to be an MIC by 2021, it needs to raise annual GDP growth to at least 7.5% (Gautam 
et al. 2013) while maintaining its resilience to multiple shocks, including those linked to climate change. 
Many of these risks linked to climate change have water at their center. This is partly because 80% of the 
country is included in the floodplains of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin, with very low 
elevation and high vulnerability to river flooding. Monsoon rains are expected to intensify while sustained 
dry spells prior to monsoons are likely to increase surface runoff. The risk of river flooding is expected to 
further increase due to higher temperatures that result in increased glacier melt, thereby increasing runoff 
from the neighboring Himalayas into the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. According to Huq and Ayers 
(2008), these changes may also alter the timing of floods, as well as their magnitude, depth, extent and 
duration. This has implications for the seasonality of the hydrological cycle, and potentially a dramatic 
change in land use patterns. The same authors noted that coastal flooding may also increase due to sea-level 
rise and be exacerbated by storm surges. Bangladesh is also prone to drought due to significant variation 
in rainfall across its landmass, and rainfall variability linked to climate change. Consequently, growth 
in the agriculture sector (including livestock and fisheries) is characterized by annual fluctuations as a 
result of environmental shocks, such as floods, droughts and cyclones (Faruque and Ali 2005). Climate 
change is likely to exacerbate this drought risk, both in terms of intensity and frequency linked to higher 
mean temperatures and potentially reduced dry season precipitation (Huq and Ayers 2008). Thus, these 
challenges in water resources management have clear and multiple implications across key sectors driving 
development in the country, including the vulnerable populations, in particular. A third climatic risk, 
and one that demonstrates cumulative impacts of multiple climatic risks, is salinity. Increased saltwater 
intrusion could reduce the availability of freshwater sources, especially during low flow conditions. In 
the coastal regions, this is linked to sea-level rise resulting in saltwater intrusion into the estuaries and 
groundwater. The effects are exacerbated by greater evaporation and evapotranspiration of freshwater as 
temperatures increase, coupled with a greater demand for freshwater in times of water stress. An overall 
increase in temperature is expected to also be marked by greater temperature extremes during the summer 
and winter seasons. This pervasiveness of climatic impacts on water resources is recognized by the National 
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), which highlights water-related impacts of climate change to 
be among the most critical for Bangladesh. Huq and Ayers (2008) concluded that the projected risks of 
climate change are expected to reinforce baseline biogeographical, environmental, socioeconomic and 
demographic stresses already faced by the country. 
In an attempt to provide economic values to these risks, Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) estimated 
that, under a moderate climate change scenario, all sectors depending on water resources would suffer 
and real GDP would fall by 0.78% in 2030. Agriculture is one of the most sensitive sectors to climate 
change, given its exposure to extreme weather events, such as droughts and floods, as well as saltwater 
intrusion, and altered rainfall patterns and temperature. These cumulative impacts are expected to overrun 
the positive impact on the production of natural flood regimes bringing silt and nutrients that increase soil 
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fertility. Consequently, Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) estimated that, under a BAU scenario, due to the 
reduction in yield, paddy production would fall by 1.6% in 2050 and 5.0% in 2100, causing a negative 
impact on real GDP by 0.67% in 2050 and 0.93% in 2100. Further reductions to GDP would occur due 
to impacts on land availability, leading to a fall in real GDP by 0.73% in 2030 and up to 0.93% in 2100 
under the BAU scenario. The negative impacts of land quantity shock on the economy would also manifest 
through an increase in the consumer price index, and a decrease in overall exports and imports. These 
climatic impacts are likely to also affect the fisheries sector, which contributes about 3.5% to GDP and 
provides 80% of daily dietary protein. Of particular relevance to the 260 species of fish in Bangladesh 
will be salinity, since all these species are sensitive to particular saltwater and freshwater conditions (Huq 
and Ayers 2008). Therefore, in addition to the GDP implications of these climatic impacts, food security 
and an undermining of livelihood bases represent other major consequences.
The government produced the National Environment Management Action Plan (NEMAP) in 1995, 
the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) in 2008, NAPA in 2005 (updated 
in 2009), and the National Plan for Disaster Management (NPDM) in 2010. However, no clear, official, 
long-term climate change cost projections exist (GoB 2014), except for some independent estimates. For 
example, modifying food production in marginal areas prone to salinity is expected to cost USD 10 million 
initially, possibly rising threefold by 2030 (Mainuddin et al. 2011). While climate change is likely to 
affect all segments of the population, the poor and marginalized groups stand to be mostly affected. This 
is because unlike the rich and middle-income groups, they lack sufficient resources to invest in climate 
risk reduction (GoB 2012). 
Bhutan
Bhutan is rich in water resources, with total withdrawals in 2008 only being 0.43% of the total annual 
renewable volume of water.2 Almost every valley houses a stream for which the source of water is glacial 
melt or the summer monsoon (or both). The country is highly dependent on this resource, both as an engine 
for economic growth through hydropower production and for livelihood sustenance through agriculture.
It is estimated that hydropower exports make up 25% of the country’s GDP, with an additional 
25% if indirect impacts such as construction are also factored in (World Bank 2014). Around 70% of the 
energy produced is exported to a single buyer, India. While only 5% of Bhutan’s hydropower potential 
is developed at present, this is expected to change due to a plan to generate 10,000 megawatts by 2020, 
mainly financed by loans and grants from India (at a ratio of 70 to 30). However, the agriculture sector, 
accounting for only 12% of GDP, remains the leading source of employment with 62% of the population 
depending on it for their livelihoods (ADB 2014a). The sector is mostly subsistence based, with rice 
(both irrigated and rainfed) being the main crop produced, although the cultivation of other cash crops is 
increasing. Irrigation is mainly from river water and monsoon rain, since the groundwater resources that can 
be developed (and have been developed) are limited due to the mountainous nature of the country. Tourism 
is a sector that has seen growth in recent times, with revenues making up 20% of non-hydropower exports. 
Although Bhutan is sparsely populated, with a population density of 12 persons per square kilometer 
(km2), it is experiencing a rapid growth in population. The country’s population is overwhelmingly rural, 
with only 60% (refer Table 2.1) of the population residing in rural areas. However, efforts to modernize 
the economy have resulted in a high rate of rural to urban migration, with the proportion of the population 
employed in agriculture shrinking in number. There has been a rapid growth in the country’s GDP in the 
past decade, mainly driven by hydropower development. The country’s social and economic well-being 
is measured by the Gross National Happiness Index. Other measures of development consider Bhutan to 
be an LIC, with its ranking of 132 out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index.
2 Data for Bhutan are from the AQUASTAT database of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) (http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/btn/index.stm - accessed on May 27, 2016).
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Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) concluded that, under a BAU scenario, the impact of climate 
change could lead to an annual loss of 1.4% of GDP by 2050, which is expected to increase to 6.6% 
in the long term. The potential risks posed by climate change are already making Bhutan’s hydropower 
investment less attractive (Meenawat and Sovacool 2011). The country’s existing hydropower systems 
are mainly run of river and therefore highly vulnerable to fluctuations in streamflow, damage caused by 
flooding and increased sediment loading, which would be intensified by GLOFs. Masutomi et al. (2009) 
predicted an increase in the productivity of rice cultivation until 2050 (by up to 15.8% depending on the 
scenario), while Gautam et al. (2013) predicted a decline until 2080 by 12.9%. If the predictions made 
by Gautam et al. (2013) were to materialize, it would worsen the current level of food insecurity. Since 
only 8% of the land is cultivable, this not only makes Bhutan a net importer of food at present but also 
highlights its vulnerability to climate change in terms of long-term food production. 
Farmers who depend on subsistence agriculture, including tenants and landless, are the most vulnerable 
sections of the community (Chettri 2003). Since flood damage to crops and irrigation infrastructure are 
expected to worsen in the lowlands, farmers will have to move to higher elevations, where the land is 
steeper, less productive and more dangerous to cultivate. Further, owing to the difficulties involved in 
pumping water to the highlands, most farms and settlements are close to rivers, making them highly 
vulnerable to glacial floods (Mirza and Ahmad 2005). On the broader economy, the role of Bhutan’s water 
resources in sustaining current and future socioeconomic development cannot be overstated, making the 
country extremely vulnerable to the impacts of a changing climate in this sector.
India 
India’s current water consumption is approximately 581 trillion liters out of an estimated 1,122 trillion 
liters of utilizable water, with irrigation accounting for as much as 89% of total consumption (KPMG 
2010). The same source noted that the demand for water is projected to overtake availability very soon, 
and that this is already a reality in some regions of the country. Lal (2005) predicted that India is likely 
to reach a state of water stress before 2025, when per capita availability falls below 1,000 m3. Demand 
assessments suggest a 20% increase by 2020, driven primarily by industrial requirements, which are 
projected to double. Urban demand is expected to also rise rapidly, with 10 million dwellers added to 
the urban population each year (World Bank 2015b). Pollution of rivers restricts the supply of usable 
water (Lal 2005). World Bank (2015b) concluded that limited availability of water is already constraining 
industrial and agricultural performance, whereby the Twelfth Five-Year Plan recognizes water availability 
as being a key constraint to economic growth.
India’s recent growth has been significant, beginning with an agricultural revolution that has taken 
the country from chronic dependence on grain imports to a net exporter of agricultural produce. Irrigation 
is one of the key drivers in agricultural development and poverty reduction, with average poverty rates 
of 25% in irrigated districts compared to 70% in non-irrigated districts (Grey and Sadoff 2007). As noted 
by Lal (2005), agricultural output is primarily governed by the availability of water, making the agrarian 
economy sensitive to the status of water resources and the monsoon, in particular. Surface water and 
groundwater resources also play a vital role in fisheries, livestock production, forestry, energy production 
and industrial activity. Today, growth is driven by further structural changes in the economy. The services 
sector accounted for 57% of GDP in 2012-2013, due largely to the information technology subsector, 
while the industrial sector has consistently contributed around 26% to GDP. In contrast, the agriculture 
sector now contributes only 17% to GDP, but, as with many other South Asian countries, it provides 
employment and livelihoods to more than 50% of the labor force (World Bank 2015b).
Most of India’s population is vulnerable to the adverse impacts of a changing climate. Despite the country’s 
average annual economic growth rate of 7.6% during the last decade (World Bank 2015b), the poverty headcount 
ratio was approximately 21.2% of the population (at USD 1.90 a day [2011 Purchasing Power Parity]) in 2011 
(http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/IND). Moreover, many of India’s newly nonpoor, especially 
in rural areas, remain highly vulnerable to climate shocks that can push them below the poverty line (World 
Bank 2013). Such vulnerability is driven, for example, by the dependence of around 650 million Indians on 
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rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods. Also, around 250 million live along a 7,500-kilometer coastline 
that is at high risk due to sea-level rise and extreme weather events (Garg et al. 2015). 
Therefore, the impacts of climate change on the water sector, as detailed in Paper 1 (Lacombe 
et al. 2019) and summarized in Table 2.5, occur within a context of other drivers of water stress. In 
addition to rapidly increasing water demand, about 10% of India’s total renewable water resources 
that originate from snowmelt faces an uncertain future. Glacier melt is expected to increase under 
changed climate conditions (Lal 2005), with both quantitative and temporal repercussions. India is 
also highly affected by meteorological droughts. While groundwater dominates India’s irrigation and 
provides almost 80% of domestic water (Lal 2005), over-extraction of the resource poses a significant 
challenge for the country’s water resources management (Shah 2008). Furthermore, India is ranked 
the highest in terms of population exposed to climate risks. These natural factors are compounded by 
irrational and inefficient use of water resources (KPMG 2010).
Although the exact impacts of changes in water availability could not be identified, several studies 
confirm that climate change is likely to drive significant economic losses for India. The role of water 
as a driver across several sectors suggests that climatic impacts on water availability will play a central 
role. Chaturvedi (2015) estimated that major food crop losses could reach USD 208 billion and USD 
366 billion in 2050 and 2100, respectively. Moreover, Garg et al. (2015) estimated that the direct losses 
associated with extreme weather events were USD 51 billion, of which floods accounted for almost 76%. 
As the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events are expected to increase under a changing 
climate, the costs associated with these events are also expected to rise significantly in the future.
A few studies have assessed the quantum of finance required for adaptation and their estimates vary 
widely. ADB (2014a) estimated that adaptation actions will require India to invest 0.48% of GDP annually. 
Steinbach et al. (2014) estimated that implementing the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) 
by 2017 would cost USD 38 billion (more than USD 7 billion per year). Another assessment (GoI 2015a) 
suggested that India would need around USD 206 billion (at 2014-2015 prices) between 2015 and 2030 to 
implement adaptation actions in agriculture, forestry, fisheries infrastructure, water resources and ecosystems. 
The same assessment also recognizes that additional investments are likely to be needed for strengthening 
the resilience and disaster management in sectors such as transport infrastructure (roads, bridges and ports) 
and buildings. Further investments would be needed to meet future power generation requirements, which 
Chaturvedi (2015) estimated to be USD 33 billion and USD 123 billion in 2050 and 2100, respectively. 
Garg et al. (2015) estimated that, in real terms, the adaptation gap for India could be over USD 
1 trillion from 2015 to 2030, and this could increase substantially beyond 2030. There are, however, 
limited efforts to assess the impacts of climate change on the national economy, and to prioritize 
climate-related investments within national and sectoral budgets, based on a detailed needs assessment. 
Although national plans such as the Twelfth Five-Year Plan refer to the impacts of climate change, they 
do not provide a detailed analysis of the implications climate change is likely to have on the economy. 
This observation also applies to state-level and sectoral development plans (Steinbach et al. 2014). 
Nepal
Nepal has 225 Bm3 of water available annually, and only 15 Bm3 have been utilized for economic and 
social purposes (WECS 2010). Nepal has approximately 1,200 deep tube wells (DTWs) and 150,000 
surface tube wells to utilize groundwater reserves. It is estimated that the country uses 1.25 Bm3 of 
groundwater for irrigation and 0.297 Bm3 for domestic purposes (Thapa and Sharma 2004).3 With 
groundwater continuing to be used extensively, a proper water management solution is needed to prevent 
the problem of over-extraction of the resource, since irrigation water demand may increase by 185% in 
2025. Since a large portion of Nepal’s population derive their livelihoods from the agriculture sector, 
water management decisions need to be made carefully to avoid significant GDP losses from agriculture. 
3 Mr. Madhav Belbase (member, Nepal National Committee) in personal communication with authors, August 2016.
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Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the world and continues to have setbacks, 
including the earthquake in 2015, which destroyed a large amount of the country’s infrastructure. 
Fortunately, Nepal had strong macroeconomic fundamentals prior to the earthquake, since factors 
such as decreasing public debt and increasing remittances assisted with reducing the debt. Most of 
this economic growth came from remittances, which accounted for 29% of GDP in the fiscal year 
2014/2015 (World Bank 2016g). The primary economic sectors of Nepal are agriculture, industry 
and services, which accounted for 35%, 20% and 45%, respectively, of GDP in 2015. Most of the 
population lives in rural areas and are employed in the agriculture sector. A poverty reduction of 
92% occurred in rural agrarian villages over the past few years, which means that agricultural growth 
is vital for the reduction of poverty. 
Nepal is subjected mostly to GLOFs and landslides, but the country also experiences droughts 
and floods due to climate variability. There is declining snow cover and increased water demand 
due to population growth, economic growth and pressure on increased hydropower generation. It is 
expected that there will be a water deficit due to these factors, which could lead to competition for 
water in the energy, industry, and agriculture sectors (Mirza and Ahmad 2005). An overarching water 
policy is needed to avoid competition between the hydropower and agriculture sectors. According to 
the Economic Impact Assessment (EIA) conducted by the Government of Nepal (GoN), the agriculture 
and hydropower sectors are the most affected (IDS-Nepal, PAC and GCAP 2014). Both these sectors 
are affected by many risks, including an increase in the periods of drought, temperature rise, snowmelt 
and increased runoff. The EIA estimates climate change to have a direct cost to GDP of 1.5% to 2% 
per year (USD 270 million to USD 360 million per year in 2013 prices), rising to a GDP cost of 5% 
per year in certain years (IDS-Nepal, PAC and GCAP 2014). Net agricultural losses in the longer term 
(2070) were estimated to be 0.8% of GDP per year. Water-induced disasters are estimated to cost 0.6% 
to 1.1% of GDP per year, although Nepal had spent approximately USD 580 million between 2010 
and 2011 on mitigating the impacts of such disasters. 
Overall, Nepal’s cost of adaptation was projected as USD 530 million in 2013 prices (IDS-
Nepal, PAC and GCAP 2014). The cost of adaptation for agriculture and irrigation was the highest. 
Hydropower also had a significant projected adaptation cost of USD 1.1 billion (IDS-Nepal, PAC 
and GCAP 2014). This is due to risks such as GLOFs on infrastructure, glacial melt rates on river 
flows, high flows and floods (IDS-Nepal, PAC and GCAP 2014), which may increase sediment 
transport flowing into the dam storage. The populations affected by climate change would be those 
that are already experiencing inequalities (women, poor and rural populations), and climate change 
would magnify these inequalities. To adapt to climate change, Nepal has invested or is investing in 
infrastructure projects in energy and water that would potentially assist with increasing water storage 
and hydropower. With water demand for agriculture and hydropower increasing, additional water 
storage is likely to increase the resilience of Nepal and reduce the competition between these sectors 
in meeting their respective demands for water.
Pakistan
Pakistan has the world’s fourth highest rate of water use. In 2016, the country had a total annual per 
capita water availability of 1,017 m3, which is quite close to the scarcity threshold of 1,000 m3 per 
capita. As a comparison, water availability per capita in 2009 was 1,500 m3. It is the world’s third 
highest water-stressed country and has the highest water intensity, which is the amount of water used (in 
cubic meters) per unit of GDP (Shams 2016). As a result, Pakistan’s economy is very water-intensive. 
As with most South Asian countries, agriculture accounts for a significant portion of Pakistan’s 
GDP (25.3%), with services (53.1%) and industry (20.1%) making up the rest of the economy.4 
4 Data on Pakistan: Country report 2015 by Global Finance (https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/country-data/
pakistan-gdp-country-report - accessed on May 11, 2016).
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Approximately 64% of the country’s population lives in rural areas, and derive their livelihoods either 
directly or indirectly from agriculture-related businesses. The irrigated floodplains along the Indus 
Basin contribute 90% of the country’s crops. Agriculture, which consumes most of the available water, 
is largely untaxed. Additionally, the majority of Pakistan’s farmland is irrigated through canal systems, 
but is underpriced, and recovers only one quarter of annual operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. 
Groundwater is also being rapidly depleted since surface water is insufficient to meet demands (Shams 
2016). Climate change exacerbates the country’s water scarcity issue, and climate change-induced 
disasters also play a role in contaminating and reducing the available water supplies (Shams 2016). 
Pakistan is affected by both floods and droughts, which in turn affect sectors such as agriculture, 
transportation, communication, irrigation and livestock, and hydropower. On average, the negative 
impact of floods (both GLOFs and rainfed floods) on Pakistan’s economy amounts to approximately 
USD 6 billion per year (Shah and Lele 2011). It is difficult to estimate the exact impacts on the water 
sector as an average, because Pakistan has not conducted specific water sector impact assessments. 
However, flood damage assessments have been conducted and these highlight the economic damage 
to each sector (World Bank 2010). For the agriculture sector, economic costs due to water variability 
(changes in snow cover that feed the Indus and Ganges rivers) are expected to affect the country’s 
irrigated crop production (Memon 2014; Mirza and Ahmad 2005), including its key cotton industry.
Pakistan also lacks storage capacity and can hold only 7% of average annual river flows. However, 
the water needs of the country require a capacity equivalent to at least 40% (Sufi et al. 2011). Integrated 
water resources management (IWRM) principles can be applied to improve storage capacity as well 
as improve water management principles (Davis and Hirji 2019).
In conclusion, Pakistan is likely to see increased economic losses from extreme weather events, 
and competition between the hydropower and agriculture sectors to meet water demand. With extreme 
weather events having a significant effect on the country’s agrarian economy, and the importance of 
water to several other sectors, Pakistan will have to do more in terms of adapting to climate change 
for the future. Unfortunately, with the current external and internal security threats facing the country, 
as well as population growth and industrialization, the economic security of Pakistan has been 
questionable. In fairness, the country has invested significantly in energy and water storage, even 
though the budget has not classified it as being related to climate change. Moreover, Pakistan still 
has one of the stronger economies out of the seven countries analyzed in this paper. This means that 
it has the resources to meet increasing water demands and avoid water scarcity. In addition, Pakistan 
can adapt to climate change threats and take advantage of potential benefits, such as increasing the 
diversity of crops grown and becoming more resilient to climate-induced disasters.
Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, irrigation accounts for 88% of total water withdrawals, most of it for rice production.5 
Employing nearly 30% of the total labor force, the agriculture sector is also an important foreign 
exchange earner (World Bank 2016i). Hydropower is an important contributor to electricity generation 
in the country, accounting for 58% of the total generation in 2013 and 37% in 2014 (GoSL 2015). The 
extent to which groundwater contributes to agriculture is unknown, although a significant increase in 
the number of wells has been observed in the past decade, particularly in the dry zone. Groundwater 
has been an important mode of poverty alleviation as well as a source of drinking water (IWMI 2005; 
Panabokke and Perera 2005).
Sri Lanka is classified as an LMIC, experiencing a rapid rate of economic growth at 6.4% (2010-
2015) (World Bank 2016i). Other human development indicators and achievement of the millennium 
development goals (MDGs) are considered to be high. The poverty headcount ratio is approximately 
5 Data on Sri Lanka: FAO’s AQUASTAT database (http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/lka/
index.stm - accessed on May 18, 2016).
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0.7% of the population (at USD 1.90 a day [2011 Purchasing Power Parity]) (http://povertydata.
worldbank.org/poverty/region/SAS). Agriculture, manufacturing and services are the dominant sectors 
of the economy, and account for 8.7%, 28.9%, and 62.4%, respectively, of GDP in 2015 (World Bank 
2016i). 
Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) concluded that, under a BAU scenario, there would be an annual 
loss of 1.2% of GDP by 2050 due to the impacts of climate change in Sri Lanka, which is expected to 
increase to 6.5% in the long term. Studies on the impacts of climate change on agriculture in Sri Lanka 
predict both increases and decreases in yield, depending on the location of production and timescale. 
The impact on agricultural income in the country is expected to vary from -20% to +72% depending on 
the scenario in consideration (Seo et al. 2005). Of the different impacts of climate change, the amount 
and temporal distribution of precipitation are expected to have the highest impact on rice cultivation 
(de Silva et al. 2007; Eriyagama et al. 2010). A study by Wijeratne et al. (2007) found that tea (the 
highest foreign exchange earner) yields are expected to increase at higher elevations and decrease at 
lower elevations with the combined impacts of climate change. Decreased precipitation in the Central 
Highlands is also expected to lead to changes in the catchment for the multipurpose Mahaweli Hydro 
Power Complex, which currently accounts for 59% of the total hydropower capacity. This could also 
lead to challenges and potential competition in water allocation between the agriculture and hydropower 
sectors. Eriyagama et al. (2010) noted that the impact of climate change on groundwater resources in 
Sri Lanka has been the subject of only a limited number of studies.
The contribution of agriculture to the country’s GDP has been decreasing steadily. Further, since 
most feasible large hydropower projects are now developed, provision of electricity in the future 
is likely to come mostly from other sources. Thus, as the economy diversifies gradually and other 
sources of electricity generation expand, the contribution of water-related sectors to economic growth 
may reduce. However, it must be noted that this may not translate to a corresponding decrease in 
the demand for water, since sectors such as agriculture and industry are expected to continue to use 
increasingly high amounts of water. For example, as the economy grows, crops that are high value 
and more water intensive to cultivate may increase in demand. The impact of climate change on the 
water sector in Sri Lanka is likely to be felt more strongly by those dependent on the agriculture 
sector for their livelihoods and food security. Geographically, Eriyagama (2010) revealed that five of 
the 25 districts (Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, Moneragala, Ratnapura and Anuradhapura) are at particular 
risk. These are areas with historically high climatic extremes, but where a dependency on primary 
agriculture is high, along with a low level of socioeconomic assets and infrastructure development.
The costs of implementing adaptation measures in each of the nine sectors are defined in the 
National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change Impacts in Sri Lanka (2015)6 for the next 10 years 
and is estimated to be USD 72.3 million. Sectors for which water-related adaptation measures form 
a significant component of the estimated costs also account for high proportions of the total costs. 
Overall, water-related adaptation measures amount to 65% of the total cost (or USD 47 million). 
However, it must be noted that these costs were estimated only from preliminary consultations held 
with the relevant stakeholders and are thus not complete. Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded 
that they represent underestimations of the actual costs involved. 
6 See Climate Change Secretariat, Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment (http://www.climatechange.
lk/NAP/NationalAdaptationPlan_RevisedFinal.26.10.2015.pdf - accessed on August 1, 2018).
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Chapter 3. Financial Structures and Mechanisms in Climate 
Adaptation
Global Overview 
Financing for adaptation can come from a variety of sources, including private finance, public finance 
and development financial institutions, and as a growing trend in recent times from insurance and 
other risk pooling modalities (Trujillo et al. 2015). This chapter looks at climate financing from major 
funds focusing on adaptation (Table 3.1). The role of multilateral development banks in financing 
adaptation is discussed in Chapter 4. It should be noted, therefore, that there would be a certain degree 
of overlap, as there would also be financial flows between these two sources of adaptation finance. 
Box 3.1 provides a summary of the key findings from this chapter. 
Box 3.1. Key findings on financial structures and mechanisms in climate adaptation.
All countries are challenged with a significant adaptation gap, with no clear bridging 
mechanisms.
Addressing this adaptation gap is likely to require further capacity within in-country 
mechanisms to effectively compete for scarce global funding on climate adaptation. This applies 
even to India and especially Bangladesh, where in-country financing has declined.
The position of improved water resources management in adaptation finance is difficult to 
assess given the crosscutting nature of water resources with other sectors.
Despite water traditionally being a major development sector, it is not one of the leading 
recipients of adaptation financing according to limited data on adaptation finance flows. However, 
this may merely reflect the embedded nature of water resources in several other sectors, whereby 
adaptation investments linked to water are hidden by being integrated into other sectoral 
investments. Were this to be the case, such integration should be seen as a desirable characteristic 
of current adaptation financing.
Disjointed funding mechanisms and underdeveloped structures struggle to match funds to 
priority adaptation actions.
The institutional architecture for systematically incorporating climate finance into climate 
adaptation planning is weak, with the exception of Bangladesh, Nepal and India, where the need for 
a more systematic approach to incorporate climate change considerations into national- and local-
level planning has been recognized. This capacity to better target limited climate finance to specific 
geographies and stakeholder groups seems to be a key need to improve spending effectiveness.
The disconnect between national and local levels in adaptation planning undermines finance 
targeting and accountability.
Adaptation planning processes for the most part are highly centralized and top-down 
processes. This risks missing the poor and other especially vulnerable groups when allocating 
adaptation finance to sectors and geographical areas. Addressing this gap is, therefore, of high 
priority.
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Of the financial flows monitored by Climate Funds Update (http://www.climatefundsupdate.org), 
the greatest attention has been afforded to climate-resilient infrastructure projects (USD 121 million, 
or 40% of allocations), with water and sanitation accounting for 46% of this infrastructure-related 
financing (Nakhooda et al. 2015a). With regard to individual funds, the Pilot Program for Climate 
Resilience (PPCR) of the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds and the Least Developed Countries 
Fund (LDCF) are currently the leading providers of adaptation finance. The United Kingdom, Germany 
and the United States of America are the largest bilateral sources of adaptation finance (Trujillo et 
al. 2015). Both the United Kingdom and Germany also have national initiatives for global climate 
financing, namely, the United Kingdom’s International Climate Fund and Germany’s International 
Climate Initiative. 
Adaptation, however, is underfunded when compared to mitigation, with only 24% of the funding 
monitored by Climate Funds Update being allocated for adaptation. There is expectation that the Green 
Climate Fund, which will distribute 50% of its finances for adaptation, will contribute toward the 
rectification of this imbalance (Trujillo et al. 2015). Major multilateral funding mechanisms focusing 
on adaptation are shown in Table 3.1.
TABLE 3.1. Major multilateral funding mechanisms focusing on adaptation.
Fund Description Funding focus
Multilateral public funds part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) mechanism
Adaptation Fund • Instrument of the Kyoto Protocol  • Over 50% of funding been 
 • Mainly financed from the 2% levy   directed (by 2013) toward 
  on emission reductions from the   agricultural practices 
  Clean Development Mechanism  • 25% of funding toward weather 
  (CDM)  monitoring and early warning 
 • Project approvals in 2014 for   systems (for flood control) 
  adaptation: USD 59 million 
 • Supports subnational and local  
  activity 
Global  • Longest running climate multilateral • Greater proportion of this 
Environment   fund  funding is for interventions on 
Facility (GEF) • During the sixth replenishment of the   energy, low carbon  
  GEF, USD 1.1 billion will support the   technologies, mitigation and 
  climate change focal area (around   renewables 
  one-fourth of the total funds pledged  
  to all GEF activities) 
 • Fund the incremental costs that  
  projects are expected to incur to  
  include considerations related to  
  climate change and the environment  
Least Developed  • Administered by the GEF Secretariat • Support LICs to develop and 
Countries Fund  • Project approvals in 2014 for  implement national adaptation 
(LDCF)  adaptation: USD 139 million  plans of action 
Special Climate  • Administered by the GEF Secretariat • Adaptation remains the main 
Change Fund • Project approvals in 2014 for   area of focus 
  adaptation: USD 85 million  • Assists low-income 
 • Fund interventions related to   developing countries (that are 
(Continued)
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TABLE 3.1. Major multilateral funding mechanisms focusing on adaptation (Continued).
Fund Description Funding focus
  adaptation and mitigation  not least developed countries)   
    to develop and implement  
    national adaptation plans 
Green Climate  • An emerging fund, but one that is • 50% of the funding is allocated 
Fund (GCF)  expected to be a dominant conduit   for mitigation and 50% for 
  for international public finance on   adaptation 
  adaptation • Of adaptation funding, 50% set 
 • Interim administration by the   aside for LICs, small island 
  World Bank  developing states (SIDS) and 
 • Project approvals in 2014 for   countries in Africa 
  adaptation: USD 115 million  • Adaptation focus: resilient 
 • Intends to have a 50-50 balance   livelihoods, ecosystems and 
  between mitigation and adaptation   infrastructure, enhanced 
  investments    well-being, and food and water  
    security
Multilateral public funds that are not part of the UNFCCC mechanism
Pilot Program for  • One of the four programs by the • Works with national 
Climate Resilience   climate investment funds (CIFs),  governments to mainstream 
(PPCR)   administered by the World Bank  climate resilience into 
 • Project approvals in 2014 for   development planning, and 
  adaptation: USD 71 million   operationalize the same
Adaptation for  • Managed by the International Fund • Focuses on poor smallholder 
Smallholder   for Agricultural Development  farmers to improve climate 
Agriculture Program  (IFAD)  resilience and food security, 
 • Project approvals in 2014 for   and reduce greenhouse gas 
  adaptation: USD 83 million   (GHG) emissions
Global Climate  • Evolved from the GCCA fund set up • Vulnerable countries, including 
Change Alliance   by the European Union and will run  SIDs and LICs 
Plus (GCCA+)  from 2015-2020 • Mitigation and adaptation 
 • More than EUR 350 million (nearly  • Focus areas for adaptation 
  USD 400 million) is expected to be   include climate change 
  made available till 2020   mainstreaming and poverty  
    reduction, increasing resilience  
    to climate-related shocks, and  
    sector-based adaptation  
    strategies
Sources: GCCA+ 2012; Nakhooda 2013; Nakhooda et al. 2015a, 2015b; Schalatek et al. 2015; Trujillo and 
Nakhooda 2013; Trujillo et al. 2014, 2015; Thomson 2015; European Commission 2015.
 
Financing of Adaptation by the Multilateral Development Banks
In 2015, the multilateral development banks (MDBs), which include the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDBG) and 
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the World Bank collectively committed USD 25,096 billion in climate financing to LMICs. This figure 
includes the MDBs’ own resources as well as those channeled by these institutions. In 2014, this 
amounted to USD 28,345 billion (AfDB, ADB, EBRD, EIB, IDB and World Bank Group 2015, 2016). 
In 2015, 80% of this finance was allocated for mitigation-related activities, and 20% for adaptation. 
In 2014, this breakdown was 82% for mitigation and 18% for adaptation, indicating a slightly higher 
leaning toward adaptation in 2015 (AfDB, ADB, EBRD, EIB, IDB and World Bank Group 2015, 2016), 
although adaptation remains clearly underrepresented. An individual breakdown of these numbers 
for the two large MDBs providing climate financing to the South Asian region is given in Table 3.2. 
Within the adaptation finance component, the greater proportion of financing (71%) came in the form 
of investment loans with 6% being allocated for policy-based loan and budget support, and 13% for 
grants. In terms of a regional breakdown, South Asia drew the largest proportion (29%) followed by 
Latin America and the Caribbean (21%) and sub-Saharan Africa (19%) (AfDB, ADB, EBRD, EIB, 
IDB and World Bank Group 2016).
The three sectors that drew in the greatest proportions of financing overall are: water and 
wastewater systems (27%); energy, transport and other built environment and infrastructure (24%); and 
crop production and food production (18%). However, it must be noted that there is a wide variation 
if this breakdown is applied to individual regions. The breakdown for South Asia roughly follows the 
pattern described previously (AfDB, ADB, EBRD, EIB, IDB and World Bank Group 2016).
TABLE	3.2.	Climate	financing	of	the	World	Bank	and	Asian	Development	Bank,	2014	and	
2015.
 Multilateral  Adaptation Mitigation Total climate Total climate Total climate 
 development finance,  finance, finance, 2015 finance as a finance as a 
 bank 2015 (USD  2015 (USD (USD millions) share of share of 
  millions) millions)     operations,  operations, 
     2015 (%) 2014 (%)
Asian  356 2,561 2,917 15.3 18 
Development 
Bank  
World Bank 3,393 7,329 10,722 17.9 23
Sources: AfDB, ADB, EBRD, EIB, IDB and World Bank Group 2015, 2016.
World Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan
The Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) 2016 of the World Bank sets out its strategy to meet the 
challenges and opportunities brought on by climate change (World Bank, IFC and MIGA 2016). It 
consists of actions expected to be taken to support countries in this regard, and indicates how the 
organization will build on its comparative advantage, scale up climate action, integrate climate change 
across its operations, and work more closely with other stakeholders. In doing so, the World Bank 
expects to increase the proportion of its financing portfolio that addresses climate change from 21% 
to 28% by 2020, with total financing (the bank’s own resources and other resources) adding up to 
USD 29 billion per year by 2020.
The need to channel more funding for adaptation activities is an issue requiring urgent resolution. 
The CCAP too identifies the need to balance the distribution between mitigation and adaptation 
financing as one of five strategic shifts in future work. Further, considering the amount of resources 
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needed to generate impact at the scale required, the CCAP recognizes the need to have a closer 
interaction with national investment plans and policies, and leverage the private sector. 
Four top-level priorities are laid out to operationalize the plan: (a) support transformational policies 
and institutions; (b) leverage resources; (c) scale up climate action; and (d) align internal processes 
and work with others. The section Scale up climate action lists six high impact areas in which the 
World Bank expects to expand its actions. In this priority, three of the six areas identified (sustainable 
and resilient cities; climate-smart land use, water, and food security; and leaving no one behind) have 
a very direct connection to the water sector, thus underscoring the prominence of sustainable water 
management in the adaptation component of the CCAP (World Bank, IFC and MIGA 2016).
The South Asian region is likely to be vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, through 
sea-level rise, floods and landslides, and its impact on agriculture. To adapt, the sectors that require 
the highest financing are disaster risk management in the urban environment, with activities on flood 
management, coastal management and resilience, and forest management. Climate-smart agriculture 
and water management are also considered priority areas. Of these, disaster risk management in the 
urban environment and climate-smart agriculture are considered priority areas for Bangladesh, India 
and Pakistan; coastal management and resilience for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; forest management 
for India; and water management for all four countries. 
Until now, the greater proportion of the funding by the World Bank with climate co-benefits target 
mitigation. Of the seven countries, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have portfolios with the largest 
climate co-benefits. However, when analyzing the financial flows from 2011, the gap between financing 
for mitigation and financing for adaptation has decreased in the years 2015 and 2016.
Country-level Analysis
Afghanistan
The current financial structure in Afghanistan is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The country tracks its 
foreign aid through the National Budget and Aid Management System. While not divided specifically 
by crosscutting issues such as climate change, it does provide breakdowns by different economic 
sectors. Afghanistan receives a greater percentage of grants than loans. The money is spent primarily 
on infrastructure development, which includes groundwater projects, well monitoring, and mapping of 
water supply systems and irrigation systems. Yet, the amount of aid dedicated to agriculture and rural 
development has been declining from USD 251 million in 2012 to USD 193 million in 2013; and the 
amount dedicated to water has been declining from USD 120 million in 2012 to USD 69 million in 
2013.7 This is in line with wider global aid trends for LDCs (OECD 2014). Since the Government of 
Afghanistan (GoA) relies on aid, the trends in declining global aid is a red flag in terms of maintaining 
current projects and programs, and the capacity to finance climate adaptation measures in the long term. 
Afghanistan’s climate adaptation budget is primarily provided through the financial aid structure, 
which constitutes the majority of aid being delivered outside of the government budget. For instance, 
in 2010/2011, approximately 88% (USD 13.8 billion) in aid was received outside of the government 
budget (known as the external budget), whereas only 12% was received from the core government 
budget (USD 1.9 billion) (World Bank 2012). The external budget is financed through bilateral donors 
as well as military contractors. The core budget is broken down into the operating and development 
budgets. A large portion of the development budget comprises donor-financed programs and projects 
implemented by the government. Direct climate-related investments usually fall under the purview of 
the Ministry for Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) and the Ministry of Energy and Water 
7 For data on Afghanistan’s National Budget and Aid Management Systems, see the Donor Assistance Database 
(http://dadafghanistan.gov.af/dad/ - accessed on April 6, 2016).
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(MoEW). For example, the agriculture and rural development sector received funds amounting to 
approximately USD 1.4 billion in grants in 2012 compared with approximately USD 12 million in 
loans. Similarly, the water sector received approximately USD 363 million in grants8 compared to 
USD 28 million in loans. According to Afghanistan’s national budget for 2015, the funds allocated 
for canalization and water supply decreased by 28% from 2014 to 2015, because some projects were 
discontinued or had funding reduced, such as the access to drinking water project in Samangan (GoA 
2015). There was an increase in funds to MoEW. These funds were divided into integrated water 
resources management (IWRM), irrigation, dam and power projects. This information suggests that 
there may have been a reprioritization of funds to MoEW, but the reasoning is not stated and is unclear. 
The aid received by local communities for climate change or water projects is also not documented 
very well and is hard to track. While aid disbursement is mostly centralized (at the federal level), GoA 
has emphasized the need for local community input in the allocation of project funding in the National 
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). Involving local communities, however, is lacking, due to 
mistrust between the rural communities and GoA. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) introduced a simple 
gender budgeting system into the National Development Framework (NDF). This requires all ministries 
to indicate which of their programs are related to gender and serve as a tracking mechanism for gender 
spending (Strand and Olesen 2005). This tool can be expanded to use with other marginalized groups. 
However, as of 2004, a report published by the GoA was disappointing in terms of its focus on gender 
(Strand and Olesen 2005). While the institutional setup may have been promising, implementation of 
the budgetary system on the ground may not have been conducted correctly. Along with budgetary 
issues, the term gender has been misinterpreted (see Chapter 4). This budgetary tool should be looked 
at further and perhaps implemented with a better understanding of why it failed in the first place. 
Overall, most of Afghanistan’s project funding has been dedicated toward development and is 
not necessarily linked to specific climate change projects. Since Afghanistan already has a database 
that tracks donor funding, it would be beneficial to add climate-related funding as a filter to better 
track adaptation funding. Currently, there is a large disconnect between the nationally received funds 
and those received from local communities. Responding to this disconnect and, to a certain extent, 
the national government’s lack of capacity to distribute funds at a local level, some organizations 
have channeled aid directly to local communities. There is also a large funding gap between climate 
adaptation estimates and funding received. While this is true for most countries analyzed in this 
paper, Afghanistan relies heavily on aid to stimulate its economy in most cases and more than other 
countries. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that aid is being allocated correctly to enable the country 
to become less dependent on foreign aid. 
Bangladesh 
Sources of Adaptation Finance 
Responses to climatic threats in Bangladesh predate the emergence of climate change as an issue 
(GoB 2012). In fact, the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) in 2008 
estimated that government investments alone in addressing climatic impacts have exceeded USD 10 
billion over the last 35 years. Government spending dominates identifiable climate spending, including 
the amount used for adaptation. Available data indicate a growing influence of climate risks across 
sector fund allocations. Another trend has been a noticeable shift in the direction of both external 
and internal financial flows from mitigation to adaptation, given national strategies geared toward 
developing resilience (GoB 2014). In recent years, approximately 97% of spending attributable to 
climate-sensitive activities has been for adaptation, as classified under the six BCCSAP themes, ranging 
8 For data on Afghanistan’s National Budget and Aid Management Systems, see the Donor Assistance Database 
(http://dadafghanistan.gov.af/dad/ - accessed on April 6, 2016).
31
from infrastructure to social protection (GoB 2012). The structure of external finance for adaptation has 
also changed, with two-thirds of foreign aid consisting of loans (GoB 2014). This marked shift away 
from grants has meant that loan funding increased from 58% to 82% of foreign resources between 
the financial years 2009/2010 and 2011/2012 (GoB 2012). Bilateral and multilateral lending will be 
supplemented by international funds, such as the still nascent Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF 
is meant to support enhanced action on adaptation, mitigation, technology development and transfer, 
capacity building and the preparation of national communications by the low-income countries (LICs). 
According to Baboyan et al. (2014), the GCF is expected to become the main conduit of future 
international climate finance for Bangladesh9 and other LICs.10 There are four mechanisms delivering 
climate finance in Bangladesh: 
•  Annual Development Program (ADP) of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB). This is 
the primary source of finance for climate activities. Projects are prepared by the Planning 
Commission (PC) on the basis of detailed proposals and budgets from line ministries. Sectoral 
allocations are made by the PC after the MoF Finance Division determines the total size of 
the ADP. 
•  Non-development budget (NDB) of GoB: Prepared by the Finance Division, it mainly 
finances the recurring costs involved in the functioning of the government, and is intended 
to be fully financed from domestically generated sources. The relevance for climate change 
responses lies in the inclusion of elements such as infrastructure maintenance and other 
standard programs such as crop breeding under various ministries. It is also, importantly, a 
key funder of the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF).
•  Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund (BCCTF). This was established and is fully 
financed by GoB to support the implementation of BCCSAP via allocations from the NDB. 
While 66% of the funds can be spent on activities related to climate change,11 the remaining 
34% has to be used for emergencies. The fund is administered by the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests (MoEF). While annual allocations from 2009 to 2012 remained at BDT 700 
million (approximately USD 890,000 at current exchange rates), this has dropped to BDT 
100 million for the financial year 2015/2016.12 The reasons are unclear, although it was 
always the expectation that GoB would provide initial allocations after which development 
partners would take over (GoB 2014). 
•  Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF). This was set up in 2010 to support 
the implementation of the BCCSAP, and it primarily targets adaptation. Unlike the BCCTF, 
this is entirely donor funded.13 There are funding windows for public sector projects, civil 
society14 and research.15 The Climate Change Unit (CCU) in MoEF coordinates the fund, 
while the World Bank executes a technical assistance portion. Some uncertainty is apparent 
regarding future donor contributions to BCCRF, since the fund has yet to achieve the desired 
momentum, and capacity is needed to disburse funds already committed more quickly (GoB 
2012, 2014).
9 GoB has nominated MoF, Economic Relations Division, as the national designated agency to interface with the GCF.
10 The fund also includes a facility to finance the private sector directly or indirectly on adaptation and mitigation  
 activities (Tashmin 2016), which may spur the entry of new actors into adaptation programs.
11 It is not clear whether these activities cover both adaptation and mitigation measures or are limited to adaptation.
12 See the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust (BCCT) website (http://www.bcct.gov.bd/index.php/trust-fund - 
 accessed on August 3, 2018).
13 A total of USD 188.2 million has been contributed principally by the United Kingdom (USD 96.9 million),   
 European Union (USD 37.6 million), Sweden (USD 19.3 million), Switzerland (USD 12.5 million), United States 
 Agency for International Development (USAID) (USD 13 million), AusAID (USD 7.1 million) and Denmark 
 (USD 1.8 million).
14 Representing 10% of the fund value.
15 Approximately USD 3.2 million.
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Trends in adaptation financing and its distribution
Although around 50% of total development expenditure is resourced by foreign aid (Tashmin 2016), 
according to GoB (2014), over 80% of climate-related activities are financed from domestic resources 
estimated at USD 1 billion a year.16 This domestic finance is sourced mainly from the ADP through 
its financing of programs with a climate dimension. These accounted for, on average, 60% of GoB 
spending on climate dimension projects17 during the period 2010-2014, with the remaining 40% financed 
from the revenue budget (GoB 2014). This suggests that climate-related responses remain mostly 
coupled with broader developmental objectives, constituting one of multiple developmental outcomes. 
Findings in the Climate Fiscal Framework (CFF) (GoB 2014) indicate a significant shift in 
the in-country treatment of climate-oriented funding during the period 2009-2014, suggesting the 
emergence of a greater, broad-based consciousness of the need to address climatic risks. In the financial 
year 2009/2010, for instance, the number of national budget codes with climate relevance increased 
significantly from 24 in the original budget to 115 in the revised budget, concentrated mainly in the 
agriculture and water resources sectors (GoB 2012). Moreover, while in the financial years 2011/2012 
and 2012/2013 only 27% of climate spending was executed under activities classified as “strongly” or 
“significantly” relevant, this percentage almost doubled over the following two fiscal years to 45%. 
This suggests a considerable gain in the integration of climate issues in public expenditure management 
and planning processes. The overlap of these developments with the revision of the BCCSAP in 2009 
implies that the BCCSAP may have had considerable influence over broader development planning, 
although water resources is not within the top recipients of climate-sensitive finance. 
The CPEIR, CFF and Baboyan et al. (2014) agree that climate dimension allocations are driven by 
sectoral policies rather than through direct responses to climate strategy and policies. Relevant sector 
ministries have climate change components and mandates, and receive funds to implement programs 
through the ADP and NDB. MoEF is mandated to implement projects from the BCCTF and BCCRF 
(GoB 2012). While this process disconnect emerges as a key gap in fund allocation, the mapping of 
climate content in government spending (GoB 2012, 2014) does place much of this funding within the 
six themes of BCCSAP, though with unequal distribution. Most funds have relevance to adaptation-
related themes (themes 1-3) and capacity building (theme 6), while mitigation (theme 5) and research 
and development (R&D) (theme 4) have received only 4% and 8%, respectively. This confirms the 
focus on adaptation, Bangladesh being a small global emitter of GHGs (Baboyan et al. 2014).
Areas in Which to Strengthen Adaptation Financing and Reforms under Consideration
Despite the spread of climate finance across a broader sectoral landscape, a lack of connectivity 
among different structures central to harmonized and inclusive adaptation appears to persist. The 
CPEIR and CFF (GoB 2012, 2014; Khan et al. 2013) note a distinct lack of coordination between 
the BCCTF and BCCRF, and highlight that the BCCRF and the PPCR circumvent the formal Public 
Financial Management (PFM) system. Standard project approval guidelines do not apply to projects 
16  A number of other more dispersed and difficult-to-track funding sources operate that may not be fully represented 
in climate finance analyses, including direct donor funding to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local 
organizations, as well as private household investments in local adaptation. There is currently no policy in relation 
to private sector involvement in climate change or any preferred mix of public and private funding or delivery 
modalities (GoB 2012).
17 The Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR) and the Climate Fiscal Framework (CFF) 
measure two figures of climate expenditure: (i) climate dimension expenditure: the total expenditure of any pro-
gram that includes climate elements; and (ii) climate-relevant expenditure: weighted average climate dimension 
expenditure, adjusted based on the level of relevance to climate change of each program. The latter recognizes that 
not all climate-related programs are equally relevant to climate change, and therefore uses this method to assess 
spending according to relevance. Relevance is classified as follows: (i) strongly relevant: 75% and over; (ii) relevant: 
50-74%; (iii) somewhat relevant: 25-49%; and (iv) implicitly relevant: 0-24%. 
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implemented under the BCCTF, which may have originally been necessary in emergency situations. 
Furthermore, the CPEIR found that, on average, around 45% of planned climate-sensitive expenditure 
was not referenced in the Ministry Budget Frameworks (MBFs) of all 37 ministries involved in 
climate spending in the financial year 2011/2012. There is no reference to climate in ministries’ key 
performance frameworks, which remove a significant proportion of the climate-sensitive spending from 
the performance management architecture and disconnects climate policy at an operational level. The 
preceding section indicates increasing attempts to reflect climate activities in sectors. However, this 
appears to occur in an ad hoc manner, and contrary to the principles of harmonization and alignment 
that seek to link climate policy and priorities with diverse sector policies and planning processes. 
Therefore, CPEIR and CFF recommend bringing these activities within the ADP. This would 
ensure they fall within the regular monitoring framework of the Implementation Monitoring and 
Evaluation Division (IMED), and strengthen the Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF), which is 
the policy implementation framework used by the GoB. This brings the policy planning and budgeting 
processes together by matching financial resources with intended policy outcomes in a performance, 
accountability and governance framework that includes performance indicators. The benefits for climate 
adaptation would include (a) more predictable funding to enable ministries as implementers to plan 
over 3 years; (b) improved transparency in the allocation and use of resources; (c) explicit ministry 
ownership of climate programs and achievement of their objectives; and (d) increased emphasis 
on service delivery by linking budget inputs to desired outcomes in the performance management 
framework. An important element recommended by the CFF is to introduce a “climate change marker” 
in the MTBF. This has already been done for gender and poverty to track ministry plans and budgets 
in terms of explicit objectives, activities and allocations, and reporting against these. 
The CFF further recommends inclusion of a brief description of the six thematic areas, and 
44 projects and programs of the BCCSAP in the Budget Call Circular 1 guidelines (GoB 2014).18 
Coordination is also needed between the Finance Division of MoF and the PC in funding the ADP, 
and between the Finance Division and MoEF with respect to the BCCTF and BCCRF. This would 
also ensure that climate activities are reflected in the budget frameworks of relevant ministries and 
divisions, subject to government accountability and outcome frameworks, and support a single system 
for financing climate actions. It would also help to link climate fund management with allocations for 
operationalizing the National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction (NSAPR).
The disconnect between planning, allocation and oversight between the central and local 
governments is another key area that needs attention. While there are no climate change-specific funds 
available to Union Parishads19 (UPs), they receive climate-relevant funds from (a) central government, 
(b) donors, (c) local government’s locally generated revenue, (d) household spending, and (e) private 
funds. In fact, local governments receive the second highest climate allocations compared to other 
ministries, reaching over USD 3 billion between 2011 and 2014 (Baboyan et al. 2014). While some 
donor funds use the national system to channel funds to UPs, most donors channel funds directly to 
NGOs, bypassing government systems. Most often, central government funds are usually allocated 
to zilas (districts) and upazilas20 for further allocation to UPs. However, both government and donor 
funding mechanisms are characterized by the limited involvement of, or autonomy for, UPs in 
the planning and budgeting of these funds. Consequently, local planning and budgeting is a linear 
operational process whereby UPs implement the directives of the central government. This, together 
with the fact that NGOs operate outside the Joint Country Strategy (JCS) framework, leaves scope for 
potential overlap and duplication among government development programs. This presents a challenge 
in tracking climate expenditure and aligning efforts to address climate change in a more integrated 
manner (GoB 2012). 
18 See Appendix 5 in GoB (2014) for the recommended circular.
19 Subunits of districts, and the lowest tier of regional administration in Bangladesh.
20 Subunits of districts, and the second lowest tier of regional administration in Bangladesh, above UPs.
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The CFF recommends establishing a climate fiscal cell in the Finance Division to strengthen climate 
finance coordination and management. The CFF also recommends a set of climate codes designed to (a) 
track climate change expenditure for policy analysis and reporting, and (b) estimate long-term climate 
finance needs by identifying potential climate-related public expenditure across government ministries. 
According to Baboyan et al. (2014), GoB has committed to implementing the CFF recommendations, 
with support from several development partners, including the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), through the 
Inclusive Budgeting and Financing for Climate Resilience (IBFCR) project.
Bangladesh’s engagement in addressing climatic risks—be it a focus on extreme weather 
events such as floods and cyclones—came well before climate change became a global agenda, 
which affords it a unique position. It helps explain the considerable progress made both in terms of 
financing climate adaptation and the significant steps taken to institutionalize its climate response 
within the formal planning and budgeting mechanism. The recent shift in financing from mitigation 
to adaptation further suggests a conscious expansion in the scope of Bangladesh’s climate response 
to include the systemic shifts likely to occur under climate change, such as rainfall variation and 
salinity intrusion. The fact that the agriculture sector is the largest recipient of climate finance is 
thus no surprise: the plant breeding programs to address salinity intrusion, drought and inundation 
are examples of investments with direct relationships to water resources. An important point of 
weakness, however, is the sector-oriented allocation that seemingly does not facilitate the cross-
sector coordination that may be needed to address the multidimensional drivers of specific risks. In 
the water sector, this would also entail highlighting the need for integrated management approaches. 
Nevertheless, initiatives such as the CPEIR and CFF illustrate the significant in-country motivation 
and capacity for cycles of review and improvement within the overall financing system. The recent 
decline in government budgetary allocations for the BCCTF is a concern, especially since national 
funds have been the mainstay of adaptation efforts thus far, and the expected flow of funds from 
development partners to the BCCRF has not yet materialized. Why exactly allocations to BCCTF 
have fallen so significantly is also not clear, but it appears to create a danger of underfunding 
climate-explicit activities in the future. 
Bhutan
In line with the NAPA sector priorities, Bhutan’s key adaptation projects are estimated to cost 
approximately USD 7.5 million. This is equivalent to 7.5% of the total official development assistance 
(ODA) flow into the country, thus giving the financial feasibility of these projects a high rating (Saito 
2013). All of these projects have an association with the water sector, with six focusing on disaster 
mitigation and management, and three dealing with variations in water availability in various sectors 
(agriculture, forestry and water supply) (NEC 2006). This further clarifies the significant connections 
between the water sector and adaptation planning.
Projects that explicitly promote climate adaptation in the water sector have been mainly funded 
by multilateral sources. This was mainly (86%) in the form of grants. Following the trend seen in 
the NAPA, disaster prevention and management is the leading objective, followed by increasing food 
security and mainstreaming adaptation. Direct government spending that explicitly mentions climate 
change is proportionally small. There are, however, many avenues of spending, especially in the 
renewable natural resources, energy and urban development, and housing and amenities sectors, which 
indirectly contribute to adaptation in the water sector. Around 26% of the spending on major activities 
in the national budget of 2015-2016 is in the renewable natural resources sector (a large proportion 
on the development of irrigation systems); 32% is in the housing sector (a large proportion on flood 
protection structures); and 5% on the energy sector (early warning systems). These can be considered 
as contributing to adaptation in the water sector (Ministry of Finance 2015). 
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The Bhutan Trust Fund for Environmental Conservation (2016)21 is an initiative to channel funding 
from multilateral and bilateral sources toward environmental conservation projects (including climate 
adaptation) by Bhutanese locals and organizations. It is an endowment fund in which the principal 
capital is kept intact and its investment income is used as the source of funds. 
Efforts to mainstream climate change considerations into financial planning include both 
governmental and nongovernmental initiatives. A mainstreaming reference group has been set up 
by the Royal Government of Bhutan. It is tasked with mainstreaming the incorporation of gender, 
environment, climate change, disaster risk reduction and poverty considerations into governmental 
planning cycles (Government of Bhutan 2013).
The Performance-based Climate Change Adaptation Grants program by the United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF) aims to mainstream adaptation considerations into the development cycle 
of local governments (UNCDF 2012). It will do this by providing the additional financing needed 
for projects to include adaptation considerations. In Bhutan, one-third of environmental spending 
in the national budget occurs at the local level, indicating that significant fiscal decentralization of 
environmental spending is occurring already (Bird et al. 2012). 
Another initiative to mainstream adaptation considerations into different sectors involves the Sector 
Adaptation Plan of Action (SAPA). Since the NAPA functioned as an overarching tool, the government 
needed a more specific plan for the renewable natural resource (RNR) sector, which supports the 
livelihoods of around 57% of the population. This led to the creation of an RNR SAPA in 2013, with 
a second version introduced in 2016. The main objectives of the SAPA are to mainstream the risks and 
vulnerabilities associated with climate change and the actions under the adaptation plan into the plans and 
programs that come under the sector. It is also expected to mobilize resources for the implementation of 
related programs. The Policy and Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MoAF) 
is the main institution responsible for operationalizing the SAPA (Government of Bhutan 2016).
Up to now, measures to build adaptive capacity by governmental and NGO sources have placed 
greater focus on natural disaster mitigation and management. This has been followed by food security, 
with other sectors such as energy also receiving a certain level of attention. These align strongly with 
the adaptation needs identified in the NAPA. Taking into account the vulnerability of the country to 
natural disasters related to GLOFs, it is not surprising that natural disaster mitigation and management 
has received the highest focus. However, both hydropower and agriculture, two sectors that are 
important contributors to economic development and livelihood security, are also extremely vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change. It is not clear if present and future development of these sectors, 
and the financing of this development, will account for the need to build adaptive capacity against 
the projected impacts of climate change.
India
Sources of Adaptation Finance 
India’s climate actions have so far been largely financed from domestic resources (GoI 2015a), driven 
by consistent commitments through the annual union budgets toward public spending on climate 
adaptation. According to Garg et al. (2015), international financing constitutes only about 3.4% of 
national resource commitments toward climate change, amounting to INR 306 billion (USD 4.7 billion) 
received under current internationally funded projects.22 While the overall national budget outlay 
quadrupled from 2003-2004 to 2014-2015, development- and adaptation-related spending increased by a 
factor of five. This suggests a steady increase in the percentage of domestic spending on climate action. 
21 See Bhutan Trust Fund for Environmental Conservation website. Available at http://www.bhutantrustfund.bt 
(accessed on August 6, 2018).
22 The highest number of projects is supported by ADB (66%) followed by the World Bank (33%) and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) (1%) (Garg et al. 2015).
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Trends in Adaptation Financing and Its Distribution
In value terms, public spending on adaptation in 2013-2014 was INR 2,130 billion (USD 32.75 billion), 
which is 12% of the budget or about 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) (Garg et al. 2015). This is 
significantly higher than the 1.45% in 2000-2001 and 1.7% in 2006-2007 (Ganguly and Panda 2009). 
State governments contributed a further INR 3,100 billion (USD 47.6 billion) through their state 
budgets for similar activities in 2013-2014 (Garg et al. 2015). Further spending on adaptation in the 
same year took the form of 21 central government schemes directly related to adaptation, amounting 
to INR 740 billion (USD 11.37 billion), or 0.7% of GDP. Therefore, total spending on adaptation in 
2013-2014 was INR 5,970 billion (around USD 91.8 billion). 
Garg et al. (2015) identified 30 key ministries to which the Government of India (GoI) is 
consistently committing resources through the annual union budgets toward public spending on 
adaptation. About 50% of these funds are consumed by the ministries of Rural Development; 
Agriculture and Farmers Welfare; and Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, with only 7% 
going to the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation.
Current GoI spending on adaptation appears to be significantly lower compared to the cumulative 
direct and indirect adaptation spending in past years. GoI’s budget provision of INR 3.5 billion (USD 
52.8 million) for the fiscal years 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 is an order of magnitude lower. Given 
an estimated requirement of INR 181.5 crores for the fiscal year 2017/2018 (GoI 2015b), current 
allocations only represent a fraction of the financing necessary for addressing climatic risks. Similarly, 
while INR 1 billion (USD 16 million) was originally allocated for a National Adaptation Fund (NAF) 
in the 2014-2015 budget, this has been revised to INR 100 million (USD 1.6 million) in the 2015-2016 
budget23 (Sharma et al. 2015).
One reason for this reduction in central allocations may be because the State Action Plans 
on Climate Change (SAPCC) are developed by each state to capture state-specific needs in the 
implementation of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). Of the SAPCC activities, 
70% to 75% is related to adaptation and the remainder to mitigation, given its focus on sustainable 
development for the state and protection of the most vulnerable populations. In the face of a changing 
climate, this represents a significant step to bringing financial allocation decisions closer to the most 
vulnerable geographies and people. The total finance requirement of SAPCC until 2030 is estimated 
at INR 10,950 billion (USD 168 billion), about three times the current expenditure, and will clearly 
require additional financial resources (Garg et al. 2015). In terms of adaptation, agriculture accounts 
for about 83% of the estimated costs, followed by forests (9.6%) and the water sector trailing with 
just 4.6%. This figure is surprisingly low considering the centrality of water resources in supporting 
many productive sectors and the vulnerability of the water sector to climate change. 
Overall, existing climate finance volumes are insufficient to meet the USD 38 billion funding 
necessary to implement the NAPCC, let alone the far greater amount needed for the SAPCC. While 
there is no comprehensive plan for bridging this gap, GoI has established two dedicated funds at the 
national level for mobilizing financing: (a) National Clean Environment Fund (NCEF) in 2010, used for 
financing clean energy within the mitigation domain24 (GoI 2015a); and (b) National Adaptation Fund 
(NAF) in 2015. The NAF supports scaling up adaptation interventions in the SAPCC in accordance 
with the NAPCC, especially in sectors such as agriculture, water and forestry. Spending under the 
NAF will be in addition to sectoral spending by the respective ministries (GoI 2015a). GoI has also 
allocated funds to several national missions under the NAPCC. Here, too, the allocation to water is 
notable for being one of the lowest among the missions, and is in contrast to the USD 129 billion 
overall investment required to maintain the support of the water sector to economic development 
23 The NAF has been turned into a mission to be managed by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate 
Change (MoEFCC) instead of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA).
24 Includes a carbon tax worth USD 2.7 billion in 2014-2015.
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(KPMG 2010). Allocations to the water sector are higher when considering only external adaptation 
finance, in which water-related actions represent 20% of all such finance, according to Krishnaswamy 
et al. (2014), covering a topical and geographical range.
Areas in Which Adaptation Financing Needs Strengthening
The funding challenge is exacerbated by a highly fragmented but crowded landscape of international 
climate finance (Steinbach et al. 2014). This contributes to the difficulty faced by countries such as 
India in developing an efficient, targeted climate financing plan that can help meet national climate 
response goals. Delays in disbursement and project implementation are other related barriers to 
accessing international climate finance. Consequently, while India has attracted significant international 
funding compared to many other LMICs, these volumes are relatively small compared to the country’s 
future adaptation and mitigation needs. One underlying factor may be the transaction costs and levels of 
coordination within India’s bureaucracy needed to respond to the requirements of each funding source. 
With respect to in-country financing, current structural arrangements are described as being 
“dispersed and fragmentary” by Sharma et al. (2015, 2), allowing for neither efficiency nor 
accountability. This situation is despite the ostensible existence of several institutional mechanisms, 
which have been established specifically for climate action coordination (described in Chapter 4). 
The same authors believe that this stems from a top-down and inflexible approach to planning with 
centrally sponsored schemes and tied funding. This top-down approach is said to characterize the 
central government’s role as a “donor” in the manner in which it delivers funds to the states and to 
local governments through predetermined adaptation goals and targets. This leaves little room for 
devolved decision making and local ownership around adaptation priorities and approaches. It is further 
claimed that the SAPCC were also prepared without inputs from local governments or communities,25 
and are therefore likely to be tied to achieving predetermined adaptation goals and targets without 
the flexibility to adapt them to local circumstances. This example suggests that climate governance, 
including adaptation planning and implementation in India, bypasses the process of devolution26 that 
has been central to development efforts in the past two decades (Sharma et al. 2015). Consequently, 
climate finance appears not to be systematically mainstreamed into national and state budgets, since 
most development policies and programs view climate outcomes as co-benefits rather than as explicit 
objectives (Steinbach et al. 2014). 
Therefore, from a climate finance readiness standpoint, planning and financial management 
arrangements are key components of readiness (Steinbach et al. 2014). GoI recognizes that efforts to 
bridge the funding gap must be based on an approach that combines public, private and international 
sources of finance, and ensures their efficient utilization (Sharma et al. 2015). Yet, GoI currently has no 
unified strategy to raise the necessary funds from these various sources and to coordinate the delivery 
of the NAPCC and the SAPCC priorities.
Creation of the Climate Finance Unit (CFU) at MoF is a step toward addressing this core 
weakness. However, CFU will need to be strengthened, if it is to support key national nodal agencies 
in mainstreaming domestic and international action on climate change, particularly on issues related 
to financing (Steinbach et al. 2014). Linking the MoEFCC, CFU, line ministries and states is likely 
to be critical, if domestic budget allocations and foreign aid are to be systematically and explicitly 
allocated and tracked within the NAPCC and the SAPCC priorities. This “blending” of national and 
international sources is already a primary goal for climate governance mechanisms set up in other 
LICs, such as the BCCTF (Sharma et al. 2015).
25 The process was coordinated by MoEFCC and the state environment departments (Sharma et al. 2015).
26 The Indian Constitution was amended in 1993 to devolve powers of local governance to Panchayat Raj Institutions 
(PRIs) in rural areas and urban local bodies in urban areas. Given that climate change impacts are likely to be very 
localized and need localized responses, local governance and devolved decision making will be critical.
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Another dimension in meeting future climate finance challenges is likely to be increasing the 
hitherto limited engagement with the private sector. This is a key need with respect to climate change 
decision making and coordinating a national financing strategy that encourages private sector investment 
in climate-related activities (Steinbach et al. 2014). Current challenges go beyond limited engagement, 
given the limited capacity of development finance institutions (DFIs) to implement climate-related 
projects beyond a narrow range of themes, sectors and geographies in India. These constraints inhibit 
a pipeline of bankable projects that could increase climate-related investment linked to the NAPCC 
and the SAPCC. Were they to be better linked and able to generate bankable projects, Indian DFIs 
would need to increase their capacity in meeting international fiduciary standards,27 and social and 
environmental safeguards (Steinbach et al. 2014; Varma et al. 2015).
In summary, despite the existence of climate adaptation plans at national and state level, a 
significant adaptation gap remains for India to tackle. The NAPCC is not backed by a coherent national 
climate finance strategy and, consequently, it is difficult for GoI to assess exactly how much funding 
is available. Also, it is not clear who is meant to benefit from national and international financial 
allocations or whose needs are being prioritized (Sharma et al. 2015; Steinbach et al. 2014). A focus on 
domestic governance and capacity building arrangements for accessing climate finance, and to ensure 
more effective, efficient and accountable spending thus emerges as a priority for India. It is unlikely 
that under current arrangements, the poorest and most vulnerable will be able to either access climate 
finance or be allowed sufficient flexibility to tailor locally relevant solutions (Sharma et al. 2015). 
Therefore, an Indian National Climate Fund (INCF) is proposed (Sharma et al. 2015). Such a fund 
would pool climate finance from national and international sources, and coordinate its disbursement to 
line agencies, and the state and local levels, through a single mechanism with representation from all 
relevant sectors and levels (states, districts, panchayats), communities and nongovernmental experts. 
Nepal
Sources of and Trends in Adaptation Finance
As of 2011, the Government of Nepal’s (GoN’s) expenditure favored adaptation over mitigation, with 
76% of budget allocation going toward adaptation (GoN, NPC, UNDP, UNEP and CDDE 2011). While 
the government is one of the primary funders of climate adaptation programs (amounting to 44% 
of total climate funds), current trends also show an increase in donor contributions and a reduction 
in government support (Sharma 2014). In general, adaptation projects are supported by multilateral 
organizations and donors, whereas bilateral donors handle both adaptation and mitigation projects. In 
2014, 91% of donor funding for Nepal’s climate adaptation came from grants (Sharma 2014). This 
is in contrast to global trends to support climate adaptation through loans. It is unclear if this was a 
direct policy decision linked to civil societies and media objection to the loans as a violation of the 
UNFCCC agreements (Regmi and Bhandari 2012). Under the UNFCCC agreements, high-income 
countries (HICs) agree to assist with funding for climate change programs, since it was agreed that 
these countries were primarily responsible for climate change due to consumption patterns. While 
loans constitute financial assistance, it is still money that needs to be paid back, and there has been 
significant opposition to this concept.
Areas Where Adaptation Financing Needs Strengthening
In 2012, the government introduced budget codes for climate-related projects into the budget planning 
system, which would enable the relevant ministries to prioritize, allocate and track investments that 
would reduce the negative impacts of climate change (Sharma 2014). The codes categorized climate 
change initiatives as highly relevant, relevant or neutral by looking at the percentage of how much 
27 Sound financial management, transparency, independence and professional standards.
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funding and other factors (risks) were allocated to climate-related activities per project. Nepal’s poor 
water management practices and lack of transparency with funding allocations at the federal level 
have led to a level of distrust among some international funders. Therefore, at the federal level, there 
needs to be an institutional change by the ministries to ensure greater transparency with allocation of 
funds and better water management practices. 
In practice, however, financial planning and allocation for adaptation appears to suffer from a 
disconnect between a NAPA-driven, top-down approach, on the one hand, and a more bottom-up 
process envisaged by the Local Adaptation Plans for Action (LAPA) and development plans, on the 
other. From the 124 projects planned at the local level, only 12 have been implemented (Karanjit et al. 
2014). One of the reasons for poor implementation could be because only 11.4% of the total climate 
budget was in fact allocated to local governments as of the fiscal year 2013/2014 (Karanjit et al. 2014). 
This is despite the 80% target set for local-level climate financing. Other reasons for the discrepancy 
between locally implemented and planned projects could be that the formal and actual distribution of 
funds differed significantly due to transparency issues (Regmi and Bhandari 2012). However, LAPA 
have proved to be quite beneficial, and are an important institutional framework for tackling climate 
change issues in rural areas in the future. For further information on LAPA, refer to the “Nepal” section 
in Chapter 4. The lack of transparency in funding allocations by GoN has hindered the ability to track 
financing. For example, it is unclear whether the remaining 88.6% of the total climate budget is used 
at national level and for what type of activities. The currently centralized finance governing structure 
has resulted in a large disconnect between the local communities and the government. For instance, 
while local governments include gender equity and social inclusion next to sanitation, disaster risk 
reduction and climate change considerations, only 1% of the allocated annual budget of local bodies 
is directed toward gender equity and social inclusion (Karanjit et al. 2014). 
The disconnect between the local and national governments regarding priorities of climate change 
budget allocation is one of the largest hindrances to effective climate change financing in Nepal. 
For example, while agricultural and irrigation development are considered as top priorities by the 
local government, both activities are poorly funded (Baral and Chhetri 2014), resulting in increased 
vulnerability to climate change. Similar to those of other South Asian countries, the gap between the 
finances required for climate adaptation and funding received is also large. Moreover, despite the 
NAPA explicitly stating energy, water and public health as priorities for climate adaptation, Nepal 
lacks any funding directly related to climate adaptation for the respective sectors. See Box 3.2 about 
decision making in Nepal’s hydropower sector.
Pakistan
As of the fiscal year 2013/2014, climate change-related expenses amounted to 6% of the total national 
budget (USD 1.8 billion) (UNDP 2015). This is an increase of approximately USD 500 million from the 
fiscal year 2012/2013. Adaptation expenditure focused 30% on water resources, 19% on disaster and 
risk preparedness, 14% on transportation, and 35% on health and social services. At the federal level, 
expenditure on mitigation-related climate spending is higher than adaptation spending, while spending 
on adaptation appears to be higher at the provincial level. The higher expenditure on mitigation at 
the federal level arises from Pakistan’s spending on energy-related projects (55%), whereas funding 
is more diverse at the local level (UNDP 2015). 
Converting climate change projects into budget prioritization agendas remains a challenge, despite 
the fact that the National Climate Change Plan (NCCP) and implementation framework are in place. 
In practice, budget allocations for climate adaptation focus on large-scale investment projects such 
as hydropower (UNDP 2015), with very little focus on other aspects of climate adaptation. Sectoral 
ministries generally pay little attention to the NCCP and are driven primarily by their own key sector 
policies, which limits the central positioning of climate adaptation in the MTBF budget ceiling (UNDP 
2015). This also compromises any local climate adaptation funding, because funding prioritizes national
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Box 3.2. Decision making in the hydropower sector in Nepal.
The vulnerability of the hydropower sector in Nepal to climate change, adaptation options and 
ways to operationalize these options were looked at in a study by Basnyat et al. (2017). The study 
finds that Nepal’s hydropower sector experiences high climatic variability, resulting in economic 
losses for both the operators of the plant and the economy. Smaller, run-of-river projects are 
expected to be especially impacted by hydrometeorological variability. However, when compared 
to the projected long-term variations in temperature and precipitation, climate-induced hazards 
in the form of sediment, extreme floods and geohazards, such as glacial lake outburst floods 
(GLOFs), were found to be the bigger threat, leading to faster depreciation and damages to the 
plants. A shortage of reliable hydrometeorological and sediment data was a major challenge in 
assessing the vulnerability of the sector.
A key finding of Basnyat et al. (2017) is that while climate change would certainly have an 
impact on the hydropower sector, it would be overshadowed by the issues and uncertainties in 
the institutional and regulatory climate. While climate variability, institutional and regulatory 
issues, and pricing have an impact on the economic sustainability of existing plants, the tariffs 
received or the discount rate and rate of return (ROR) for plants planned for the next 20 years 
were more significant concerns. For plants constructed after 20 years, it is expected that the 
impacts of climate change would become a more important concern.
For current plants, low-regret options—especially nontechnical options and capacity building 
(such as improved data collection and availability, early warning systems, low-cost structural 
modifications, sediment management and insurance)—were suggested as adaptation options. For 
plants planned for the future, climate-smart designs are recommended, which would consider the 
need to balance between the costs for adaptation incurred at present and the uncertainty regarding 
the benefits expected in the future. Further, the need for the institutional system around the 
hydropower sector to prepare for the impacts of climate change is reiterated. 
The findings of Basnyat et al. (2017) are reflected in a separate study conducted by Bonzanigo 
et al. (2015) on the Upper Arun Hydropower Project (UAHP) and Koshi Basin Hydropower 
Development in Nepal. The study employs the decision tree framework to assess the climate 
change risks of the prefeasibility 335-megawatt design of the UAHP project and to conduct basin-
scale analysis of hydropower investment. The study finds that the currently planned 335-megawatt 
design of the UAHP is able to withstand a wide range of the climate change impacts considered. 
In fact, the study suggests that the capacity of the UAHP be further increased to 1,000 megawatts, 
since this would be the optimal design to take advantage of the increased river flow during the wet 
season (increased flow is projected as a short-term impact of climate change), while being robust 
enough for dry-season production. However, with the increased capacity, non-climate factors such 
as the price of electricity and capital costs would become important in determining the economic 
performance of the plant. These non-climate factors would become determining factors, if the price 
of electricity does not increase significantly beyond current rates and if construction costs rose 
by up to 50% due to delays in implementation. These findings are also seconded by Bonzanigo 
et al. (2015), who looked at different portfolios for hydropower investment.
 
over local needs. For the most part, water-related projects are not categorized as climate change-
related projects and fall under the development umbrella, and are specifically related to either energy, 
water or disaster risk reduction (DRR). Pakistan is heavily dependent on dams and canal linings as 
the primary defense against climate change events. The government argues that more water storage is 
needed to combat climate change. The dams also increased hydropower output and irrigation capacity.
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Reservoir construction is an integral part of IWRM in Pakistan (Shah and Lele 2011). Construction 
of dams enables water management in terms of supply, floodwaters and wastewater. 
Groundwater is also being used extensively in farming practices to improve crop yields and reduce 
the amount of withdrawals from surface water sources. While there may not be explicit reference to 
climate adaptation in the financing of these projects, these have clear adaptive functions in light of 
restricted surface water resources, whether or not linked to climate change. However, since the private 
financing of more than 20,000 tube wells in the region has affected the natural ecosystem, by the 
desertification of lands and drying up of high-value fruit orchards (Qureshi et al. 2010), the future role 
of groundwater in climate adaptation will need careful reflection and planning. 
There is a need to link both national and provincial governments to establish common financial 
protocols and improve communication mechanisms. Integrating climate adaptation into the budgetary 
and planning process is also a potential entry point. These linkages and integration are crucial to ensure 
that climate adaptation expenditure aligns with the priorities of local governments and key stakeholders. 
IWRM is required at all levels, including improving canal water management, adopting high-efficiency 
irrigation systems, improving drought forecasting, increasing water shortage and improving regulations. 
Unfortunately, the costs of these implementations have not been estimated in their entirety. While the 
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) is conducting assessments on additional water 
storage, monetary values are currently difficult to ascertain.
Sri Lanka
Sources of and Trends in Adaptation Finance
Existing financial structures for climate adaptation in Sri Lanka take the form of government 
investments, and bilateral and multilateral grants and loans. Government expenditure explicitly targeting 
adaptation in the water sector is low, and private sector involvement is notably absent for direct 
adaptation activities. The projects that directly target adaptation are financed mainly by international 
funding sources and focus on many different areas. Among the projects studied from 2009 onwards, 
around USD 88 million (27%) has been disbursed through grants and USD 238 million (73%) through 
loans. Projects financed by grants can be considered as contributing to “soft” adaptation measures. 
With projects for which a greater proportion of the funding is through loans, a large segment of the 
finance is apportioned for infrastructure development.
A major proportion of governmental expenditure that contributes to water-related adaptation28 
can be classified as contributing indirectly to adaptation29 through allocations for rehabilitation of 
irrigation schemes, groundwater monitoring, and disaster mitigation and management. A significant 
fund of USD 434 million was allocated for the development of water storage and distribution systems 
to provide water for agriculture, hydropower, and domestic and industrial use. Agricultural communities 
that depend on precipitation or irrigation from minor tanks are at particular risk from climate change. 
Therefore, the large allocations to develop water storage and distribution facilities could assist in 
alleviating part of this problem. However, these structures are not necessarily built to consider predicted 
future impacts of climate change, and hence may not be responsive to these impacts.
Following the trend seen in the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), adaptive capacities in the 
food security, water resources, coastal and marine, human health and infrastructure, ecosystem and 
biodiversity sectors are developed through direct adaptation measures. Indirect measures contribute 
to the human health and infrastructure sectors, and significantly to the water sector. The focus on the 
water sector has concurrent benefits for food security, and the energy, technology and industry (ETI) 
sectors. However, adaptive capacities related to enhancing the resilience of agricultural systems or 
28 Identified from the main projects in the national budget allocations for 2016.
29 Although adaptation is not a main or explicit objective of expenditure, it could be a co-benefit.
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ETI systems to extreme weather events and disasters do not appear to attract high levels of funding. 
Further, the proportions of the adaptive costs attributed to the priority sectors of the NAP are not 
reflected in the actual financing received by these sectors.
Areas in Which Adaptation Financing Needs Strengthening
The current pattern of financial allocation for climate adaptation does not correspond to the costs 
estimated in the NAP. Adaptation projects initiated by international donors target a variety of sectors. 
In contrast, the proportion of government spending that can be considered as contributing to climate 
adaptation is largely on developing and improving water storage and distribution infrastructure, 
with disaster prevention and management being the next priority. While this is not surprising, 
considering current contributions made by the agriculture and hydropower sectors to the country’s 
economic performance, long-term adaptation measures, including sustainable groundwater harnessing 
(Karunaratne and Pathmarajah 2002), would require knowledge development and generation across 
sectors and scales.
The Climate Change Secretariat (CCS), under the Ministry of Mahaweli Development 
and Environment (MoMDE), is the main governmental body coordinating the flow of funding 
from multilateral and bilateral sources to the relevant governmental entities. The process of 
monitoring has not yet been systemized, although NAP suggests the formation of climate 
change cells in the relevant ministries and implementing entities for this purpose. One of 
the main challenges involved in sourcing financing from the many international climate 
adaptation funds is a lack of knowledge and experience on how these can be tapped into. 
The need for institutional and technical capacity to meet the standards required in procedures 
for requesting finance (for example, proposal writing) is considered a challenge faced by the 
secretariat in procuring funds. 
Current Trends of Existing Financial Structures and Mechanisms
All Countries Are Challenged with a Significant Adaptation Gap with No Clear Bridging 
Mechanisms 
Despite patchy assessments of financial impacts of climate change and adaptation costs, 
information on current external funding flows and in-country spending makes it clear that a 
significant financing effort is required if the adaptation plans and priorities are to be fully and 
effectively implemented. While all the countries depend, to some extent, on external funding, 
they also exhibit a high dependency, with the exception of Bangladesh and India. While this 
is not surprising given the much smaller economies of the small countries in the region, it 
implies that adaptation costs are likely to increase since external funding has shifted from 
grants to loans. This is especially the case for countries such as Afghanistan and Nepal, where 
grants currently make up a significant portion of external climate-related financing for both 
adaptation and mitigation. Even in Bangladesh and India, where adaptation financing has been 
strongly driven by government spending, significant reductions in government allocations 
for adaptation in current budgets suggest that this trend may be changing. Addressing this 
is likely to require further capacity within in-country mechanisms to effectively navigate 
bilateral, multilateral and private funding, and to compete for scarce global funding for 
climate adaptation. The role of the private sector in providing credit and insurance facilities 
should also be looked into and considered as one of the many approaches through which this 
funding gap could be filled.
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The Position of Improved Water Resources Management in Adaptation Finance is Difficult to 
Assess Given the Crosscutting Nature of Water Resources with Other Sectors
Financing data specifically about adaptation measures in the water sector was hard to locate. Water 
fails to feature in the top-funded sectors, and lists were generally dominated by agriculture in most 
of the countries. However, the water sector has strong overlaps with other sectors that do receive 
funding, such as agriculture. It is, therefore, challenging to make a distinction between investments 
from adaptation funds and overall sector spending in the water sector. Given the deep hydrological 
histories, even cultures, of many South Asian countries, and the dominant role water plays in their 
economies, water is often allocated large amounts of government funding. Therefore, low allocations of 
adaptation finance to water does not necessarily mean that good water resources management will not 
contribute to adaptation. In fact, major investments in water infrastructure and associated institutions, 
many of which predate climate change consciousness, may be nevertheless considered to represent 
forms of continuous adaptation. 
Disjointed Funding Mechanisms and Underdeveloped Structures Struggle to Match Funds to 
Priority Adaptation Actions 
The institutional architecture for incorporating climate finance into climate adaptation planning 
is still evolving in the region, with the exceptions of Bangladesh, India and Nepal. While some 
funds are multi-sectoral, others are sector specific. Adaptation measures are driven mainly through 
indirect funding, in which climate change responses appear to be co-benefits or windfalls of broader 
sectoral and multi-sectoral development investments. While integration of adaptation financing into 
sectoral spending is desirable, it is unclear whether the current arrangements represent a systematic 
approach to doing so. Initiatives driven by other sectoral imperatives, such as the estimated 165,000 
deep tube wells (DTWs) in Bangladesh (Winston et al. 2013) to increase food security and meet the 
growing demand for supplementary irrigation attributed to climate change, may also lead to important 
externalities. In this case, in addition to concerns over groundwater tables, access to DTWs for some 
communities and not others (in the Rajshahi District) appears to have intensified the water insecurity 
of farmers relying on shallow tube wells (STWs) as aquifer levels drop below their reach, especially 
in the dry season (de Silva and Leder 2016). A more integrated approach to linking climate adaptation 
with sector spending thus appears to be needed, if sector spending is to effectively address countries’ 
climate risks and adaptation needs. 
There is, however, some progress in attempting to identify climate financing and efforts needed 
in better linking finance with planning in different countries. The clearest examples are the two major 
evaluations of structural weaknesses in climate finance spending in Bangladesh commissioned by 
the MoF, which provides detailed means of addressing key weaknesses. Other examples include the 
Climate Expenditure Report commissioned in Pakistan in 2015 to identify adaptation and mitigation 
spending as well as the relevant governmental ministries responsible for financing, though there is 
as yet little movement with respect to institutional adjustments to achieve better finance-planning 
linkage. One positive example is in Bhutan, where the Mainstreaming Reference Groups aim to more 
systematically incorporate climate change considerations into national and local planning. Overall, 
however, the majority of funds generating adaptation capacity in each country cannot be clearly 
identified, making any assessment of spending on climate finance, including in the water sector, only 
approximate. It also means that most adaptation results arise out of multipurpose investments not 
directly related to adaptation.
While risks are expressed in terms of specific climate change impacts, current assessments of 
climate finance focus on sectors. This poses challenges to attempts to understand the extent to which 
funding is being directed to address specific risks. The water sector is a good example, since it plays 
a central role in a range of risks, including flooding, drought, and changes to groundwater quantity 
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and quality. Improvements in finance tracking mechanisms, therefore, may also need to consider a 
risk-based approach as opposed to a sectoral approach. In addition, in view of the large gaps between 
available finance and estimated investments required for effective adaptation, utilizing all available 
funding sources, especially through engaging the private sector, is essential. 
The Disconnect between National and Local Levels in Adaptation Planning Undermines Finance 
Targeting and Accountability
A majority of climate finance flows and attempts to improve adaptation planning have occurred at a 
national level, and appear to represent, for the most part, highly centralized and top-down processes, 
although Nepal and India have introduced subnational planning. A major gap in these approaches is 
the limited engagement between central and local government with respect to decision making on 
adaptation planning and financial flows. This center-local disconnect is a key issue, given that it is the 
poorer and otherwise marginalized segments of country populations that are likely to be worst affected, 
due to their greater exposure to climate change and shortage of assets to undertake their own adaptation 
measures. Bringing both local government as well as other representatives of local communities into 
planning processes, backed by legislation and capacity building, is therefore a priority action. This 
also recognizes that several functions constitutionally assigned to local government bodies are directly 
or indirectly related to building adaptive capacity. Additionally, the attempts by some of the countries 
(India and Nepal) to introduce basin-level planning and management not only brings to light how 
water sector planning and management could contribute to climate adaptation but also highlights the 
need to develop adaptation measures specifically for the water sector. 
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Chapter 4. Institutional Perspectives on Climate Adaptation
Sectoral Fragmentation and Its Implications for Climate Adaptation: Country-level Analysis 
This chapter discusses the current institutional frameworks in climate adaptation in each of the seven 
countries in South Asia selected for this study. This will include assessing how these frameworks 
correspond to integrated water resources management (IWRM) both theoretically and in its actual 
implementation, and the implications this has for water resources management. Box 4.1 provides a 
summary of the key findings from this chapter. 
Box 4.1. Key findings on institutional structure mechanisms in climate adaptation 
Centralized, top-down management approach does not automatically lead to holistic climate 
adaptation.
Across the seven countries, institutional frameworks for climate adaptation need to be streamlined 
with existing government structures across scales, while also allowing space for local authorities 
and the wider society to be involved in decision-making processes pertaining to water resources 
management and climate adaptation. 
To be meaningful, mainstreaming climate adaptation into national development programs 
needs to be accompanied with full integration of climate components into planned and ongoing 
development efforts. 
All seven countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) 
mainstream climate adaptation into their respective national development programs. Yet, 
unless climate components are fully integrated into planned and ongoing development efforts, 
mainstreaming climate adaptation will continue to be an add-on rather than a holistic program 
nested in national governments’ development planning and program.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan prioritizes climate risks mainly in relation to the agriculture sector and desertification. This 
is evidenced from the positioning of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) as 
the country’s national focal point for climate adaptation, under both the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD). 
Institutional frameworks for climate adaptation rely on the institutional setup for disaster management, 
embodied in the National Disaster Management Committee (NDMC) as the apex body. This is chaired 
by the second vice president with the participation of all the relevant ministries, United Nations 
representatives, and other relevant stakeholders. The Afghanistan National Disaster Management 
Authority (ANDMA) is the principal executing body and nodal agency at national level acting as 
the secretariat for the NDMC. It coordinates all aspects related to disaster mitigation, preparedness 
and response. At provincial level, Provincial Disaster Management Committees (PDMCs) act as the 
extended arms of the NDMC. The PDMCs are the vital link between the NDMC, provinces, districts 
and local levels. Both at the central and provincial levels, ANDMA lacks the capacity (both material 
and human) to lead prevention, response and operationalization of post-disaster recovery activities. 
ANDMA has provincial directorates in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Yet, the capacity of directorates 
differs among provinces depending on the availability of staff, level of operational resources, security 
and terrain. This weak institutional capacity suggests major challenges in tackling flash and riverine 
floods, a widespread natural hazard in Afghanistan.
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Water resources management does not directly feature in Afghanistan’s climate adaptation 
measures. Similarly, the need for IWRM is not always linked to the need to establish holistic institutions 
on climate adaptation. While water resources management is partly included as a priority area, mainly 
in the context of irrigation, this is derived largely from its positioning as one of the supporting factors 
in agricultural production. It is not necessarily linked to water resources management in a broader sense 
(for example, incorporating flood protection measures as well as issues of groundwater depletion). The 
central positioning of the agriculture sector in climate adaptation corresponds with drought, landslides 
and groundwater depletion as major climate risks, as identified in Paper 1 (Lacombe et al. 2019). It is 
unclear whether the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) also links these risks with the wider context 
of water resources management, especially in relation to how it might reduce or exacerbate specific 
climate risks and vice versa.
The Water Sector Policy established in 2004 created the Supreme Council for Water Affairs 
Management. The council is chaired by the first vice president, and the respective heads of the line 
ministries are its members (Mahmoodi 2008). While the Supreme Council can (in theory) be regarded as 
a formal inter-ministerial coordination body in water resources management, there is no clear guideline 
as to how the council will promote IWRM principles in relation to the defined plans and programs of 
the different sector ministries. Formally, the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) is in charge of 
IWRM implementation through the formation of river basin and sub-river basin agencies. It reports 
to the Supreme Council for Water Affairs (Mahmoodi 2008), though the relationship between MoEW 
and other sector ministries is not clearly defined. 
While water resources management is incorporated into the formal mandates, responsibilities 
and development plans of different sector ministries, the question remains as to how water resources 
planning and management are conducted both formally and in practice. For instance, while MoEW 
will lead the planning process with energy issues, it is unclear as to how the process will include the 
roles and development plans of other ministries in different aspects of water resources management, 
including domestic use, health and industry. 
In practice, while river basin organizations (RBOs) are envisaged to promote the application 
of IWRM, such application took place only on a project basis (such as in the Amu Darya River 
Basin). Little effective implementation of IWRM principles has taken place in practice. This is 
shown by Afghanistan’s mismanagement of groundwater resources (Habib 2014). The contamination 
of groundwater resources by industry has caused severe health risks, which is due, in part, to poor 
wastewater management. Although Afghanistan has the Groundwater Development Policy, it is 
poorly implemented and the lack of enforcement by institutions responsible, primarily MoEW, has 
caused severe groundwater depletion in some parts of the country (Habib 2014). In addition, while 
water users’ associations (WUAs) have been formed and established in various irrigation systems in 
the country, it is unclear how WUAs’ envisaged role in irrigation system management is linked to 
the wider context of water resources management, not to mention that many of these WUAs became 
inactive after their formation.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan play much the same role as they do in 
other low-income countries (LICs), working closely with rural communities in capacity development 
and assisting the government with project implementation. During the war, NGOs had to ally with 
existing government structures to assist rural villages with water resource issues when the central 
government could not (GoA 2008). Therefore, NGOs now have a close working relationship with the 
rural community in Afghanistan. The activities that NGOs carry out include stakeholder participation 
in water resources management, especially at the field level, and assisting with developing community 
development councils and WUAs with conservation programs and water usage techniques at a broader 
level (GoA 2008). NGOs are uniquely positioned in Afghanistan to help with the implementation of 
IWRM programs, especially in the rural sector. The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program is 
directly implemented by NGOs. The program aims to prevent waterborne diseases by providing potable 
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water to rural villages. In addition, it assists with capacity building of service delivery, and operation 
and maintenance (O&M) of water supply and sanitation facilities (GoA 2008). For specific project 
information, further research is needed on the ground. 
Afghanistan and Iran are members of the Helmand River Delta Commission, which measures 
and divides the river flows between the two countries. Further information on the commission is 
provided in Chapter 5. Lacking an inter-ministerial coordination body, cross-sectoral collaboration 
takes place mainly on an ad hoc basis through development programs such as the Comprehensive 
Agriculture and Rural Development Facility (CARDF), which involves both MAIL and Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MoRRD). Consequently, while IWRM is essential, water 
resources management continues to be directed through sectoral approaches, though not specifically 
targeted to address the problem of the lack of cross-sectoral coordination. Referring to Afghanistan’s 
major climate risks (including landslides, riverine and flash floods, droughts, groundwater depletion), 
linking water, agricultural, energy and land agencies would increase the government’s capacity to 
develop more holistic adaptation measures to deal with systemic implications from climate change. 
In the context of climate adaptation, ANDMA can serve as a potential entry point to harvest more 
structural and robust inter-ministerial coordination for adaptation formulation and implementation. This 
process will, however, inevitably require stronger capacity building efforts and significant fine-tuning 
with MoEW’s role in relation to water-specific adaptation measures.
Bangladesh
The Government of Bangladesh took a broader institutional approach in climate adaptation through 
the incorporation of the water sector as an integral part of the country’s adaptation strategies, but 
without sufficiently emphasizing the need for IWRM or trying to address the current challenges for 
its implementation. Institutionally, the government established a Climate Change Cell (CCC) in 2004 
to build capacity and promote climate-resilient development. The CCC refers to the water sector and 
ways in which the CCC will be linked to other institutions involved in water resources management. 
As part of the shift in disaster management practices toward preparedness and risk reduction rather 
than relief efforts (Tanner et al. 2007), CCC received support from the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) through the Comprehensive Disaster Management Program (CDMP). For its 
day-to-day functioning, CCC is hosted by the Department of Environment (DoE), which acts as the 
national focal point on climate adaptation, under the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF). 
CCC’s formal mandate includes preparing technical papers for MoEF to support international 
negotiations, identifying sectors vulnerable to climate change in Bangladesh, and formulating climate 
adaptation guidelines and training modules for relevant sector ministries. A Climate Change Knowledge 
Network (CCKN) was established, which is active in the dissemination of research findings of CCC 
and other line agencies on climate change issues. Based on the recent community-based adaptation 
project Reducing vulnerability to climate change, CCC is developing a series of guidelines for the 
emerging community risk assessment processes created under CDMP (Rahman et al. 2010). During its 
early years, CCC focused on facilitating cross-sectoral coordination among sector ministries through 
establishing climate focal points in each relevant ministry and providing basic training on climate issues. 
Established by the government after Bangladesh signed and ratified the UNFCCC, MoEF (through 
its technical arms CCC and DoE) is the lead institution for work on climate change. Institutionally, this 
reflects the government’s approach to tackle climate adaptation from a broader development perspective 
by linking it with environmental aspects and not necessarily focusing specifically on water resources 
management. While this is very much in line with the high risks associated with riverine and coastal 
flooding, and storm and cyclone impacts the country frequently faces (see Paper 1: Lacombe et al. 
[2019]), one could also argue that these risks are strongly linked with water resources management. 
Nevertheless, the current institutional setup for climate adaptation does not focus specifically on 
adaptation measures for the water sector. While this lack of specific focus might be linked to the 
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inability of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC) to effectively implement IWRM, it also 
poses a risk for furthering the current problem of groundwater salinization and over-extraction. 
Bangladesh combined an environmental emphasis with disaster management in its adaptation 
strategies, which are in line with the major climate risks identified in Paper 1 (Lacombe et al. 2019), 
especially those pertaining to storms and cyclones, and coastal floods. For example, while MoEF acts 
as the national focal point for climate adaptation, the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management 
(MoFDM) also plays an important role in positioning disaster risk reduction as a bottom-up strategy 
for climate adaptation. As stated in the Corporate Plan 2005-2009 of MoFDM, the mission of the 
ministry is “to achieve a paradigm shift in national disaster management strategies from conventional 
response and recovery to a more comprehensive risk reduction culture, and to promote food security 
as an important factor in ensuring the resilience of the communities to hazards” (MoFDM 2005).
Under CDMP, an existing institutional framework was adapted toward the positioning of climate 
adaptation as a cross-sectoral issue, which requires inter-ministerial coordination. CDMP demonstrates 
a process through which a country such as Bangladesh can integrate and address climate-related risks 
and disasters within a comprehensive management framework. The CDMP framework is built from 
an assessment of risks at the community level through sector and cross-sectoral analysis. Bangladesh 
also has many national think tanks and research institutes, which include the Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies (BCAS), Center for Environmental and Geographic Information Services (CEGIS), 
and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS). 
While Bangladesh approaches climate adaptation from a cross-sectoral perspective, it is unclear 
whether this will enable it to tackle groundwater salinization and depletion effectively. With almost 
80% of the total cultivated area irrigated with groundwater (Qureshi et al. 2014) and partially because 
of ineffective IWRM, Bangladesh faces groundwater over-extraction and water quality issues. The 
Groundwater Management Ordinance (1985), operationalized by the Ministry of Local Government, 
Rural Development and Co-operatives (MoLGRDC), and the Bangladesh Water Act (2013) attempt 
to use licensing to regulate the installation of new wells. However, enforcement and accountability 
have proven to be difficult in rural areas, and efforts to date to regulate groundwater usage have not 
borne fruit (even though Bangladesh has a comprehensive institutional structure in water resources 
management). 
The NWRC was established in 1983 as an inter-ministerial coordination body chaired by the 
prime minister and comprising 47 members. These members include government ministries, water 
management authorities and academics, as well as representatives from development agencies. The 
NWRC coordinates water-related policies. Most decisions on national water management are taken by 
the executive committee of the NWRC, which is chaired by the minister of water resources (the lead 
government agency for IWRM formulation and implementation). This institutional setup highlights 
the important leadership of the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) in shaping the cross-sectoral 
coordination between different sector ministries across scales. However, the relationship between 
MoWR and these sector ministries remains very broadly defined. For example, while the NWRC’s 
main task is to facilitate the coordination of water-related policies, it is unclear how it could ensure such 
facilitation, especially when MoWR’s role in the formulation of such policies is not clearly defined. 
The Water Resources Planning Organization (WARPO), under MoWR, is responsible for planning 
both groundwater and surface water development, while the Bangladesh Water Development Board 
(BWDB) and MoLGRDC are responsible for operationalizing this development. However, it is felt that 
the mandate of the BWDB does not still have a concrete definition, therefore encumbering its functions. 
Water management organizations (WMOs) in Bangladesh are organized into two main groups: 
those following (i) the Comilla Model, and (ii) other models. The first category consists of the large 
majority of WMOs, largely due to governmental push to increase irrigation cover. The Comilla 
Model provides access to credit and other agricultural inputs as well as training to organize two-
tiered cooperative systems. The Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation and BWDB were 
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responsible for the development of the Comilla Model for groundwater and surface water irrigation 
(de Silva 2012). Such participatory management in Bangladesh has, however, been criticized for not 
succeeding in promoting more inclusive participation in management, and moreover for resulting in 
the replication of existing institutional structures. 
While IWRM has been adopted in the national policies for more than a decade, in practice, 
sectoral decision making prevails in water resources management. As stated by Rouillard et al. (2014, 
520), “Responsibilities and powers for the construction and management of different types of water 
infrastructure remain fragmented between several ministries and agencies, and achieving policy 
integration remains challenging because the decisions of coordinating bodies are loosely binding.” The 
NWRC’s current lack of power to direct the development plan and activities of sector ministries is rooted 
in the fact that, while NWRC is assigned with the coordinating role, sectoral development budgets are 
channeled directly to sector ministries and not through the NWRC. Thus, while hydrological boundaries 
were considered under the IWRM approach through catchment planning, planning responsibilities are 
maintained in the NWRC and WARPO, often with little connection with the development plans and 
activities of sector ministries. An exception to this status quo appears to be the coordination within 
the water sector as well as with other sectors made possible in the Barind area of northern Bangladesh 
through the Barind Multipurpose Development Agency (BMDA). With its wide-ranging umbrella of 
powers covering this drought-prone area, this purpose-specific agency addresses all facets of water 
management, including augmenting surface water supplies and exploiting groundwater as sources 
of irrigation and domestic water, while also promoting water savings through crop diversification, 
new seed varieties and other water-saving technologies (see Box 4.2). Internationally, a Joint Rivers 
Commission (JRC) was established in 1972, which provided the institutional arena for maintaining a 
dialogue between Bangladesh and India on Ganges River management. In practice, however, JRC’s 
decisions are non-binding recommendations to be considered for ratification by both governments 
(Das Gupta et al. 2005). Hence, in times of water scarcity, disputes can continue with respect to water 
sharing because JRC cannot direct and oblige relevant sector ministries to follow its recommendations 
(Chowdhury 2010; Rahaman and Varis 2009). 
Crucial in the positioning of climate adaptation as a cross-sectoral issue (despite the lack of 
clear and concrete adaptation strategies for the water sector) is the incorporation of climate issues 
in the country’s national planning strategy. The General Economic Division (GED) of the Planning 
Commission (PC), under the Ministry of Planning (MoPl), has initiated a process to enhance its 
institutional capacity to facilitate the incorporation of climate issues in the planning processes. PC is 
in charge of preparing short- and long-term national plans for the economic and social development 
of the country, as well as the ADP. The incorporation of climate adaptation into these plans provides a 
strategic entry point to link climate adaptation with relevant sectoral development plans and activities. 
Over the past years, through donor-assisted projects such as the Poverty, Environment and 
Climate Change Mainstreaming (PECM) project, funded by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), climate adaptation 
has increasingly become significant in terms of national planning. All macro and perspective plans, 
including the Perspective Plan and the National Sustainable Development Plan, acknowledge BCCSAP 
and include its climate change strategy. The long-term (50-100 years) holistic Delta Plan 2100 now 
under development includes adaptation as a critical component in the planning process. All macro 
and perspective planning, including BCCSAP, have also been incorporated into the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan (2016-2020). 
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Box 4.2. Toward Integrated Water Resources Management under the BMDA. 
The BMDA was established in January 1992 as a semiautonomous, legal entity under the Ministry 
of Agriculture (MoA) to develop an integrated approach to address the significant climatic and 
other biophysical drivers of poverty, and low agricultural production in the Barind Tract. Spread 
across northern Bangladesh (mainly Rajshahi, Dinajpur, Rangpur and Bogra districts) and India’s 
West Bengal, this drought-prone area is characterized by a dry climate with comparatively high 
temperatures, low rainfall and limited surface water supplies. These conditions belie the fact 
that the Barind area constitutes one of the largest irrigated areas in Bangladesh, due to the vast 
adoption of shallow tube wells (STWs) and, more recently, government investments in deep tube 
wells (DTWs). Nevertheless, increasing seasonal groundwater abstraction has led to growing 
concerns over groundwater tables, and the installation of further DTWs has been suspended until 
the condition of the groundwater resource is better understood. 
In addition to farmer investments in groundwater pumping through STWs, the conversion of the 
Barind area into a major food producer over the past decades has been the goal of the BMDA. 
To achieve this, unlike most other agencies, it is empowered to take action across sectors within 
the Barind area, and is a point of sectoral convergence. This is reflected by the composition of 
its board, which includes representatives from the agriculture sector and the deputy commissioner 
of the districts covered, and in the broad range of activities it is empowered to undertake. This 
includes optimizing surface water supplies through renovation or building storage, water transfers 
between rivers, and pumping from rivers and canals to support irrigation and domestic water 
supplies. It concurrently develops groundwater resources through electric DTWs, mainly for 
irrigation but often also linked to domestic water supplies depending on groundwater availability. 
Domestic water is further supplied through community dug wells, which also support homestead 
and field vegetable cultivation. Large afforestation attempts to dampen the impacts of climate 
change and improve soil management, while providing additional sources of food and other forest 
products to local communities. These measures are supplemented with a range of programs seeking 
to curtail the demand for irrigation mainly through crop diversification with the introduction of low 
water-consuming crops, new drought-tolerant crop varieties and the adoption of land management 
methods such as zero tillage and bunding, linked to farmer training. Water from many DTWs 
is now conveyed through underground pipes to minimize evaporation losses. Recognizing that 
these programs can succeed only if markets provide farmers with sufficient incentives, BMDA 
also develops agro-based industries in the area and constructs roads to improve market access. 
Efforts to increase the economic returns from water also include the re-excavation of ponds and 
seasonal wetlands for fish culture and irrigation. Many of these activities are operated with other 
sector agencies under BMDA’s umbrella authority.
The results indicate an increased irrigation coverage, especially in the main boro rice season, 
as well as availability of supplementary irrigation for aman rice, particularly during the drought 
season. Where much of the land was cropped only during the rainy season, a three-crop calendar 
is now common. This intensification in rice cropping and increased yields due to better access to 
irrigation have resulted in an additional estimated 5 million metric tons of food grains per year in 
areas supplied by BMDA-established DTWs. The water saved by using buried pipes to convey 
groundwater to fields is estimated to have enabled an additional 20,000 metric tons of food grain 
production annually (BMDA 2015).
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Bangladesh is one of the most advanced countries in climate adaptation in South Asia regarding 
institutional frameworks and arrangements. In the government’s strategy to mainstream climate 
adaptation as an integral part of its development planning and activities, a key element is how it 
tackles the problem of sectoral fragmentation through centralized funding mechanisms to address 
climate issues. While CCC provides an entry point for cross-sectoral approaches in climate adaptation, 
it was the incorporation of climate issues into the national development planning strategy and budget 
that enabled Bangladesh to implement its climate adaptation strategies without too great a reliance 
on donor support. Thus, the country’s successful attempt to mainstream climate adaptation is not 
about forming a new inter-ministerial coordination body. Rather, it was achieved through forming the 
CCC, assigning MoEF as the lead government ministry in climate adaptation, and positioning GED 
to provide centralized funding mechanisms to support climate adaptation plans and activities. From 
the perspective of water resources management, Bangladesh’s ability to reduce climate risks would 
be defined by the incorporation of water-related climate adaptation activities into the overall strategy, 
through further fine-tuning of development plans and programs of MoEF and NWRC. For example, 
increased climate risks in relation to the steady decline in groundwater recharge is likely to need 
immediate action to identify effective measures to stop groundwater over-exploitation. This in turn 
stands to reduce the country’s ability to increase food security and reduce poverty, if left unaddressed. 
Institutionally, this trade-off between regulating groundwater use and adverse impacts on food security 
highlights the need to develop incentives for different government agencies working on water-related 
issues to coordinate their efforts. 
Bhutan
Following the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, Bhutan ratified UNFCCC in 1995. The 
National Environment Commission Secretariat (NECS) became the national focal point for climate 
change activities in the country. As a technical arm of the National Environment Commission (NEC), 
the secretariat is responsible for policies, regulations and directives formulated by the NEC and for 
administering the provisions of the National Environment Protection Act (NEPA). In 2011, the NEC 
established a Climate Change Unit (CCU) and created a high-level national climate change committee 
called the Multi-Sectoral Technical Committee on Climate Change (MSTCCC) to serve as a forum to 
coordinate all climate change-related activities in the country. MSTCCC members are selected from 
relevant government ministries. 
The NEC today has the status of an autonomous, high-level inter-ministerial coordination body 
representing the highest decision making on all matters related to the protection, conservation and 
improvement of the natural environment. As the National Focal Agency, NEC is mandated with the 
responsibility for policies, plans and guidelines for environmental protection, sustainable development 
and proper utilization of natural resources, including recommendations on ratification of bilateral and 
multilateral instruments, and regulation of emission limits. While NEC could in theory act as the 
umbrella institution for IWRM, in practice, the positioning of water resources management in NEC’s 
mandate is far from central and hardly underpinned. 
Provisionally, NEC has the mandate to coordinate water-related issues among relevant sectoral 
ministries and other government agencies. In line with this coordination role, NEC proposed to establish 
the Bhutan Water Authority (BWA) to implement IWRM. Ideally, the authority would formulate 
guidelines for sustainable water use among the different stakeholders, including private sector actors. 
Yet, while the government envisioned the adoption and application of IWRM, this and the proposed 
plan to form and establish BWA have yet to materialize. The delay is most probably linked to the fact 
that the establishment of BWA would consequently confuse the role of NEC as the formal coordinating 
body in water resources management. Moreover, it is unclear as to which government agency or sector 
ministry would be responsible for BWA formation, since Bhutan does not have a separate ministry 
focusing on water resources management (apart from water management for agricultural purposes). 
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In practice, water resources development continues to be directed through sectoral decision-making 
structures and processes, often overlapping or in parallel with each other. While this lack of cross-
sectoral coordination does not seem to matter in terms of the water availability issue, such coordination 
is imminent in relation to the government’s plan to develop hydropower dams and how it might affect 
the country’s vulnerability in relation to glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs). 
Locally, WUAs were formed and established in line with the National Irrigation Policy in the 
1980s, which required rural households to maintain the sections of the irrigation canal they used and 
raise funds for this purpose. In practice, however, the organizational development of WUAs has had 
mixed results, with many becoming inactive after their formation. In some cases, WUAs become 
inactive because the government focuses their organizational development mainly on collecting 
irrigation service fees from farmers and conducting canal maintenance, without linking these functions 
with improved water service provision to farmers’ fields. In other cases, WUAs stop functioning 
because farmers do not see how they can benefit from it, especially if they do not experience a water 
scarcity issue.
NEC is the highest decision-making body for environmental management, established under 
NEPA. It is an inter-ministerial coordination body, chaired by the prime minister, with four to five high 
officials representing relevant sectoral ministries (for example, minister level or equivalent) nominated 
by the chair and three representatives from civil society. Internationally, NEC is the national climate 
focal point for UNFCCC and the designated national authority (DNA) for the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol. 
Other ministries also have water-related climate adaptation mandates. These ministries include the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (MoAF), the Department of Hydropower and Power Systems and 
Department of Hydrometeorology Services in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Department of 
Disaster Management within the Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs (MoHCA). Theoretically, this 
diversity of institutions linked to water will enable the government to tackle specific climate risks such 
as drought and groundwater depletion (see Paper 1: Lacombe et al. [2019]) from a sectoral perspective, 
especially when related to agricultural development. With regard to climate adaptation for the water 
sector, this involvement of agencies outside of the water sector will partially fill the current gap in 
water-specific adaptation measures as well as the current ineffective application of IWRM. While 
these formal mandates are a good starting point for climate adaptation measures to be effective, they 
also need to be accompanied by stronger cross-sectoral coordination between the relevant ministries. 
Similar to that of Bangladesh, the Bhutan case study clearly illustrates how the government links 
climate adaptation with environmental management, through the appointment of NEC as the national 
focal point to direct and coordinate climate-related issues. The difference is that, unlike in Bangladesh, 
in Bhutan, NEC is in charge of both climate adaptation and water resources management. Institutionally, 
NEC provides an organizational umbrella to link climate adaptation and water resources management in 
a more integrated way. This is in line with the central positioning of GLOFs, flash floods and landslides 
as major climate risks the country is facing (see Paper 1: Lacombe et al. [2019]). Moreover, while the 
government has positioned NEC as an inter-ministerial coordination body, it has also linked this with 
project management units for implementation of climate adaptation as part of the development plans, 
activities and sector ministries. While the linkage has enabled NEC to gain decision-making authority 
in directing and coordinating climate adaptation responses in the country, NEC’s role is also closely 
linked with the availability of donor funds for climate adaptation (Bisht 2013). 
India
The national response to climate change emerged through the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), and 
manifested in the creation of the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change (PMCCC) in 2007. PMCCC 
was to also provide overall guidance on actions related to climate change taken by nodal ministries and 
other agencies, as well as reviewing the progress and implementation of each of the eight “missions” in 
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the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). Further, under the direction of NAPCC, each 
of the nodal ministries was required to submit comprehensive mission documents detailing objectives, 
implementation strategies, timelines, and monitoring and evaluation criteria to PMCCC. 
In practice, however, PMCCC’s role as the main coordinating entity overseeing all climate policies 
in India at a central level remains unclear. PMCCC is challenged with overseeing the implementation 
of adaptation plans within and across the different states. For example, at the state level, there is very 
little evidence on how the defined adaptation plans have commenced. Despite the central government’s 
continuous efforts to convene nodal states to provide updates on their plans, there are very few 
examples of coordinated and concerted efforts to implement the plan in any state. While some of the 
adaptation actions listed in the plans are possibly being implemented, this is likely to be more as a 
side effect of other preplanned initiatives, such as the modification of an existing irrigation program 
to increase its coverage. 
Nevertheless, reconstitution of PMCCC by the government in 2014 indicates a renewed focus on 
its functions and the need to revive its coordinating role around issues of climate change. Following the 
reconstitution, PMCCC was assigned to (a) coordinate national action plans for assessment, adaptation 
and mitigation of climate change; (b) advise the government on proactive measures that can be taken 
to deal with climate change challenges; and (c) facilitate inter-ministerial coordination and guide policy 
formulation in relevant areas. While the MoEFCC would assist the PMO in facilitating the work, the 
PMCCC could also obtain assistance as required from any relevant government ministry. Prior to the 
PMCCC reconstitution, MoEFCC acted as the main coordinating entity under the NAPCC, and the 
nodal ministry is required to liaise and coordinate its proposed and ongoing activities with MoEFCC. 
Internationally, the PMCCC would act as a high-level decision-making body to provide guidance on 
climate negotiations. In theory, relevant sectoral ministries would submit their development plans 
related to climate adaptation to PMCCC. PMCCC would also review and report on these development 
plans on a regular basis. 
PMCCC coordinates national action for assessment, adaptation and mitigation of climate change, 
but without specific emphasis on how such coordination can address current challenges in IWRM 
application. India adopted basic principles and approaches for IWRM in 1995 through the creation of 
the Integrated Watershed Management Program (IWMP). The NWRC, chaired by the prime minister, 
is formally responsible for inter-ministerial coordination. In practice, however, inter-ministerial 
coordination is hampered by the council’s lack of decision-making power to direct the development 
plans and activities of sectoral ministries, since sectoral development budgets are channeled directly 
to each sectoral ministry and not through the council. 
While an IWRM approach is implied in India’s water resources management policies and 
guidelines, in practice, sectoral ministries direct sectoral development activities often without much 
collaboration. For example, while the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare (MoAFW) is in 
charge of agricultural development, its plans and activities to promote agricultural development are 
not always linked with groundwater over-extraction. Sectoral fragmentation persists in water resources 
management, but this does not mean that the government does not see the need for cross-sectoral 
coordination, as evidenced in the 2012 Water Policy. The question is how to create incentives that 
motivate sectoral ministries toward such coordination in relation to the potential costs and benefits of 
water resources management and adaptation. 
MoWR helps shape water resources management in the country. Two crucial departments—
the Department of Land Resources (DoLR) and the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation 
(DoA&C)—and MoWR have been engaged in implementing schemes and programs for the holistic 
development of land, drought proofing, irrigation and flood control at a central level. MoWR has 
also focused on the management and regulation of groundwater sources through its groundwater 
management and regulation scheme. It carries out groundwater management studies as well as 
groundwater exploration through geophysical studies. 
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With regard to river basin management in India, most of the rivers are interstate. States are given 
authority through the constitution to develop water resources within state boundaries, while the central 
government has the authority to develop interstate rivers. Current river basin management in India 
centers largely around infrastructure development and conflict resolution, and has yet to evolve to 
include more basin-wide integrated approaches to management. At present, river basin organizations 
(RBOs) are largely top-down in nature with limited stakeholder participation. 
Through the River Boards Act 1956, the parliament has the authority to develop interstate river 
basin boards and authorities, though this initiative has to be collectively requested by the states 
involved. Until now, no such request has been made, and it is felt that the states perceive such an 
initiative as a potential loss of power, hence their reluctance. The establishment of entities by the 
central government to deal with interstate river issues up until now has, therefore, been independent 
of this Act. However, most interstate water resources have already been tapped into, and most future 
projects in India are likely to be largely interstate in nature, thereby increasing the necessity for such 
interstate river basin boards. Internationally, the country played a prominent role in the formulation 
and signing of the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. 
In common with those in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, participatory irrigation management (PIM) 
models in India have had a top-down origin. MoWR started fostering farmer participation in 1985 
through a centrally sponsored Command Area Development (CAD) program. Since then, MoWR has 
promoted PIM through a legal model that states have then used to design PIM acts of their own, a 
practice adopted by 17 states up to now. As in other countries, in India, the PIM model faces challenges, 
including a lack of resources and support, and an unclear legal and policy environment.
At present, MoEFCC houses both the CCU as well as the National Mission for Green India. The 
unit comprises members from relevant sectoral ministries, including the Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MoNRE), Ministry of Power (MoP), Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MoST), Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR), Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD), 
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), and the Ministry of External Affairs (MoEA) (Dubash and Joseph 2016). 
While the relevant sector ministries are well represented in the CCU, the envisioned inter-ministerial 
coordination platform is placed under MoEFCC. This implies MoEFCC’s institutional ability to direct 
and coordinate climate adaptation across sectors is through its access to CCU. However, MoEFCC’s 
ability to control the unit will be influenced by its ability to ensure sector ministries’ involvement and 
commitment, and enable its effective functioning. 
India’s National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) has been accredited 
as a national implementing entity (NIE) for the Adaptation Fund created under the UNFCCC. In its 
capacity as an NIE, NABARD has generated several feasible projects on climate change adaptation in 
diverse agro-climatic regions and livelihood sectors, five of which have been submitted as proposals 
to the Adaptation Fund. Additionally, NABARD is implementing several developmental projects 
to promote sustainable livelihoods through natural resource management. These include watershed 
development and sustainable livelihoods for tribal communities, which are helping to build climate 
change resilience and the adaptive capacities of rural communities. 
In 2009, the government also formed the Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment (INCCA) 
to enhance knowledge about the impacts of climate change at national and subnational levels. INCCA 
comprises 127 institutions and has been conceptualized as a network-based scientific program designed 
to (a) assess the drivers and implications of climate change through scientific research; (b) prepare 
climate change assessments once every 2 years; (c) develop decision support systems; and (d) build 
capacity toward the management of climate change-related risks and opportunities. Recently, the 
government has also set up the National Institute for Climate Change Studies and Actions (NICCSA) 
under its Climate Change Action Program (CCAP) of the MoEF. The NICCSA will conduct analytical 
studies on scientific, environmental and economic development, and technological issues related to 
climate change, though direct influence of these studies remains to be seen. 
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Existing institutional frameworks for climate adaptation in India incorporate both institutional 
arrangements to ensure cross-sectoral coordination and financial mechanisms for climate adaptation 
policy implementation. The central government has been quite successful in dealing with sectoral 
fragmentation in its climate adaptation responses, through centralized budget allocation under NABARD 
as well as the establishment of an inter-ministerial platform to facilitate coordination (under MoEFCC). 
Nevertheless, two important questions remain: How can this financial and institutional platform be 
translated at the state level? How can cross-sectoral mechanisms for climate adaptation help address 
sectoral fragmentation in the water sector, so that water resources management forms an integral part of 
the country’s adaptation strategies? The latter question is of high importance not only because droughts 
and groundwater depletion have been identified as major climate risks facing the country (see Paper 
1: Lacombe et al. [2019]), but also because irrigation and flood control are key to the government’s 
development strategies to increase agricultural productivity and promote national economic growth. 
Nepal
In the context of climate adaptation, Nepal’s Climate Change Council is a high-level, inter-ministerial 
coordination body chaired by the prime minister, with the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment (MoSTE) functioning as the council secretariat. Formed in 2009, prior to the 15th 
Conference of the Parties (COP 15), the council’s task is to provide high-level policy and strategic 
oversight, and coordinate financial and technical support to climate-related programs and projects, 
as well as ensuring that Nepal benefits from climate-related international negotiations and decisions. 
It comprises 25 members, including 11 ministers and eight technical experts nominated by the 
government. MoSTE is the designated focal point and lead ministry for implementing the provisions of 
the UNFCCC; it coordinates the implementation of climate adaptation activities across sectors and donor 
agencies. Institutionally, this reveals how the Government of Nepal (GoN) positions climate adaptation 
as a broader issue pertaining to environmental challenges, beyond water resources management alone. 
While the current institutional structure shows Nepal’s comprehensive approach to climate 
adaptation, in practice, MoSTE has little presence outside its administrative headquarters in Kathmandu, 
and has been working on how to increase its organizational capacity so that it can coordinate and 
implement climate adaptation at a subnational level. The Division of Hydrology and Meteorology under 
MoSTE collects and disseminates hydrological and meteorological information on water resources, 
agriculture, energy and other development activities. Yet, it is unclear how this information is conveyed 
or is being used as a starting point for policy discussion. 
MoSTE is equipped with a joint secretary and Climate Change Program Steering Committee 
(CCPSC), with the latter chaired by the minister and the National Planning Commission (NPC). 
MoSTE reports directly to the Multi-stakeholder Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee 
(MCCICC) and CCPSC, which then reports to the Climate Change Council. In practice, however, 
though MoSTE is supposed to coordinate climate adaptation activities in the country through its Climate 
Change Management Division, different implementing agencies (for example, relevant ministries and 
NGOs) work mainly with the respective donors. 
Formed in 2009, the MCCICC comprises representatives from government agencies, NGOs, 
private sector actors, academics and international donors. The National Adaptation Programme of 
Action (NAPA) thematic working group coordinators are also on the MCCICC. Functioning as the 
MCCICC Secretariat is the Climate Change Management Division under MoSTE. The MCCICC’s task 
is to coordinate climate change activities by providing a venue in which needs are identified and taken 
into account in the formulation of financing strategies by the government and international donors, as 
well as in implementing collaborative programs across sectors. In practice, however, MCCICC has not 
been effective in fulfilling this role as evidenced by its infrequent stakeholder meetings. 
The National Climate Change and Knowledge Management Center (NCCKMC) was formed 
through close collaboration between the Nepal Academy of Science and Technology (NAST) and 
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MoSTE in 2010. NCCKMC is part of institutional arrangements falling under NAPA and is supported 
by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), DFID, Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) and UNDP. Based in NAST, the NCCKMC’s mission is to generate and manage climate-related 
knowledge in Nepal, and provide an institutional platform to coordinate and facilitate knowledge 
exchange and capacity building to a wide range of stakeholders. NCCKMC faces funding challenges 
to fulfill its tasks, especially because MoSTE was unable to maintain its initial development investment 
as envisaged under the NAPA. Next to NCCKMC, various organizations, including national and 
international NGOs, formed Climate Change Network Nepal. It is a forum that aims to raise awareness 
on climate change, coordinate and advocate effective action for mitigation and adaptation measures, and 
establish an information-sharing platform on climate adaptation through community-based networks. 
According to the NAPA for Nepal, Local Adaptation Plans for Action (LAPA) were created to 
assist with tackling climate change issues from the bottom up, and LAPA are meant to be flexible, 
inclusive and responsive to change. The village development committee (VDC) and the municipality 
have been characterized as the most suitable units of LAPA. Integration of these units would ensure 
both a top-down and bottom-up approach for an adaptation plan. Since 2013, the Nepal Climate 
Change Support Program (NCCSP) has implemented approximately 100 LAPA in 90 VDCs and seven 
municipalities across 14 districts, mostly in the mid- and far-western regions of Nepal. The steps for 
LAPA implementation are as follows: (a) climate change sensitization; (b) vulnerability and adaptation 
assessment; (c) prioritization of adaptation options; (d) LAPA formulation; (e) LAPA integration into 
the planning process; (f) LAPA implementation; and (g) LAPA progress assessment. 
Adaptation actions in LAPA come under six thematic areas: (a) agriculture, livestock and food 
security; (b) forest management and biodiversity; (c) alternative energy; (d) climate-induced hazards 
and physical infrastructure; (e) human resource capacity development and livelihoods; and (f) human 
health. The LAPA process has benefitted more than 500,000 people either directly or indirectly in 
Nepal. Additionally, it has gained recognition for its success in addressing climate change issues at the 
village level. The LAPA process is successful because it has a strong participatory approach adopted at 
the planning and implementation phases. Currently, DFID and the European Union provide financial 
support, while UNDP provides technical support. For its success, however, the LAPA process still has 
challenges it needs to overcome. For instance, implementation of programs in the upper hill terrain 
is quite difficult due to the remoteness, and harsh weather conditions allow only a few months to 
work. These challenges can be overcome by having a different implementation approach and delivery 
mechanism, which includes robust monitoring and a quality control mechanism. Another challenge is 
that LAPA under the current directive have many small activities implemented over scattered areas. 
This requires a large monitoring effort, and the impact of these implementations is not substantial 
from a climate change perspective. This challenge can be overcome by intervening on a larger scale, 
which cuts across geographical boundaries. 
It is unclear, however, as to how the established institutional setup in climate adaptation would 
be able to tackle the problem of sectoral fragmentation, which had continuously impeded IWRM 
application. Partially driven by the global agenda on IWRM, the National Water Plan (2005) states 
the importance of IWRM principles and the notion of river basin management to ensure that water 
resources development is undertaken in an effective and sustainable manner. Initially, the MoWR 
and the Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS) were identified as the main government 
institutions responsible for promoting IWRM implementation. In 2009, however, MoWR was split into 
two ministries: the Ministry of Irrigation (MoI) and the Ministry of Energy (MoE). For this reason, 
WECS was located under MoWR and later under MoE. 
WECS, formed in 1981, is the permanent secretariat of the Water and Energy Commission 
(WEC), established in 1975 with the objective of “developing the water and energy resources in an 
integrated and accelerated manner” (ADB 2004, 4). The establishment of WECS was largely driven 
by the government’s objective to be well-equipped in negotiating transboundary water and energy 
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issues with India, notably through the creation of an integrated and centralized environmental database 
system for information related to water resources development and management (WECS 2010). In its 
early days, the role of WECS was envisioned as providing other government ministries with review 
and technical reports related to the development plans of sectoral ministries, and provision of design 
guidelines. Following the development of the National Water Plan (NWP), the role of WECS was 
oriented increasingly toward the formulation of policies and legal frameworks to promote IWRM, and 
toward cross-sectoral coordination.
There is considerable confusion, however, over what the role and mandate of WECS are, as well 
as marked disagreement on what they should be. International donor representatives believe that the 
role of WECS lies in the coordination of water planning. Some sectoral ministries, however, perceive 
that WECS should solely provide technical expertise to them, while civil society organizations perceive 
WECS as a government body in charge of IWRM implementation—without actually defining what 
IWRM implementation entails (Suhardiman et al. 2015). Following NWP’s formulation in 2005, WECS 
developed a draft policy that outlined the institutional frameworks that need to be developed toward 
the realization of IWRM. However, the policy was never approved because of MoE’s objection. The 
policy was drafted notably to give legal backup to WECS to review and approve development plans 
and activities of sectoral ministries. 
Following this major setback, WECS has been unable to fulfill its role in promoting cross-sector 
coordination, as outlined in the NWP. Lacking the legal backup to ensure sectoral ministries’ compliance 
with the principles of IWRM (for example, sharing its development plan and activities with WECS 
and other sectoral ministries), WECS continues to struggle to find an institutional niche where it can 
add value for sector ministries. 
WUAs have been formed on water-related projects and aligned with the national irrigation policy. 
While WUA representatives have been involved in the overall consultation and discussion process 
of the national irrigation policy, WUA members’ accountability to farmers needs to be addressed to 
ensure greater inclusion (Howarth et al. 2004). 
In 2008, the government was in charge of taking stock of all groundwater resources, and for 
making the necessary policy and institutional arrangements for the sustainable use of this resource. 
As of 2011, however, groundwater is still a relatively unregulated resource and, therefore, in need 
of proper management and utilization (Kansakar 2011). A draft Act on Groundwater Regulation has 
been prepared and sent to parliament for approval. According to the draft, a regulatory body called the 
Groundwater Board will be established to regulate, manage and provide licenses to different users. If 
IWRM principles were implemented, WUAs would be the organizations at the local level responsible 
for proper management of water resources in river basins. GoN is still the primary manager of water at 
the national level, and should therefore be included in any discussions on large-scale IWRM projects. 
The national and international NGO sectors in Nepal play a major role in building capacities 
of rural and urban populations to tackle climate change problems. They conduct research, assist the 
national government with policy-making decisions on the environment, and provide an avenue for work 
that the national government or the private sector wouldn’t have the resources to provide. A significant 
number of NGOs in Nepal are dedicated to environmental education. However, organizations such 
as the Nepal Wetlands Society and the Local Initiatives for Biodiversity, Research and Development 
are oriented toward accessing resources to better respond to climate change impacts. NGOs are also 
involved with implementing LAPA. As defined in the LAPA process, NGOs are vital for coordination 
of stakeholders, field research and education of community members. Through analysis, this includes 
everything from working to implement IWRM principles in villages to disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
and prevention of GLOFs. Unfortunately, specific information on local-level NGOs and project 
implementation needs to be investigated further on the ground, since the information is not readily 
available. It is recommended that working with NGOs in Nepal is moved forward with climate change 
adaptation priorities. 
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Integrated river basin management programs have been initiated in Nepal mainly through NGOs 
with government support. The Koshi River Basin is one of the three largest river basins in Nepal and 
includes seven major rivers. Additionally, the Koshi River is one of the major contributors to the Ganges 
River and thus has regional significance. With an IWRM approach in mind, the Koshi River Basin 
Management (KRBM) program was initiated as part of the National Water Plan for Nepal in 2005 
(ICIMOD 2016a). The KRBM program attempts to improve the regional coordination management 
of the river basin. The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), the 
Australian government, ADAPT-Nepal and GoN are the main supporters of the KRBM program. 
There are other organizations also involved. A focal issue is gender and inequality, and their links to 
drivers of change and integrated river basin management. Additionally, the program looks to employ 
incentive-based mechanisms to improve water-use efficiency and productivity. ICIMOD seems to be 
taking the lead role in gender-related programs in the Koshi Basin. ICIMOD has focused on better 
roles of marginalized farmers and women in irrigation, sustainable intensification of stable crops, 
training for women farmers, and low-cost livelihood technologies (ICIMOD 2016b). Furthermore, in 
a conference organized by ICIMOD, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Irrigation 
(the coordinator of the Koshi River Basin) stated the need for having more gender equity discussions 
on topics focusing on empowerment (decision making, economic), and capacity development in new 
agricultural technologies (ICIMOD 2016b). For specific implementation of gender-related water 
programs, specific in-country fieldwork needs to be conducted. 
The Nepal case study illustrates the government’s main strategy to form a (new) inter-ministerial 
coordination platform as an institutional means to address the problem of sectoral fragmentation, 
both with regard to water resources management and climate adaptation. This institutional framing 
corresponds very well to the major climate risks facing the country (such as GLOFs, flash floods, 
landslides and droughts). These risks suggest the need for an integrated approach to climate 
adaptation. In practice, however, current institutional arrangements and linkages for both water 
resources management and climate adaptation remain scattered due to powerful sectoral ministerial 
resistance to accepting the role of WECS as a regulating body, as well as a lack of sufficient funding 
and organizational capacity to implement climate adaptation programs through MoSTE. Nepal has 
established the required institutional setup for a holistic and integrated approach to water resources 
management and climate adaptation. Yet, the question remains as to how to make such structures work 
in strengthening the country’s adaptation capacity, in general, and with regard to the water sector, in 
particular. Central in ensuring effective functioning of IWRM is the role of incentives for various 
sector ministries to get involved in the proposed coordination efforts. 
Pakistan
The Cabinet Committee on Climate Change was formulated in 1995 to provide a policy coordination 
forum for climate change. This was later changed to the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change 
(PMCCC) in 2004. This also aimed to establish a high-level inter-ministerial linkage and proved to be 
extremely effective in initiating the country’s entry into the global carbon market, but less on water-
related climate adaptation. The PMCCC is chaired by the prime minister, with several ministers as its 
members, including the minister for the Ministry of Environment (MoEn) and the deputy chairman 
of the Planning Commission. An important direction given by PMCCC in the wake of major climate 
change concerns is the need to focus on water and food security issues, though the institutional setup 
and mechanisms to do this were never clearly outlined. In recent years, however, the PMCCC has been 
inactive due to unreliable funding for the implementation of climate adaptation programs and lack of 
staffing capacity. There is considerable merit in reactivating and utilizing the PMCCC to provide a 
forum for integrating climate change into mainstream policy making.
In 2011, when the MoEn was devolved to the provincial authorities, responsibility for climate change 
was handed over to the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform. In October 2011, four new ministries 
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were set up to absorb the departments that were leftover from the devolution, including the Ministry of 
National Disaster Management (MoNDM). This was renamed the Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC) 
in April 2012, elevating the issue to cabinet level. MoCC has the mandate to coordinate climate change 
issues with relevant agencies and institutions. The National Climate Change Plan (NCCP) Committee was 
established to ensure effective implementation of the climate policy and oversee progress in this regard. 
MoCC was downgraded to a Climate Change Division (CCD) in 2013 working under the Prime 
Minister’s Office. The CCD is the main federal institution responsible for planning activities and 
formulating policies associated with environmental protection, pollution and resource conservation. It is 
responsible for implementing the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, coordinating the activities of 
other federal ministries, and acting as the secretariat for the Pakistan Environmental Protection Council 
(PEPC). It also deals with agreements reached with other countries and international organizations in 
the field of environment. In addition, the Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency comes under its 
administrative control. CCD, under the Prime Minister’s Office, leads federal climate change actions 
and hosts the CDM cell. It also leads efforts to address climate challenges with relevant federal 
ministries, such as Water and Power, National Food Security and Research, Science and Technology, 
and Planning and Development. The CCD also works with agencies such as the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA), Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, and the National Institute 
of Oceanography. In 2015, the CCD regained its status as a ministry. 
The Ministry of Water and Power (MoWP) plays a lead role in water resources management in 
Pakistan, but it is unclear how this role is linked to the country’s climate adaptation program. It is 
responsible for the national distribution of water and management of multipurpose reservoirs on the 
Indus River and its tributaries. At present, Pakistan does not have a water resources policy, though one 
is being developed. Like India, Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960, which stipulates basic 
rules in water distribution and sharing between the two countries. At the local level, the government 
has formed and established WUAs to increase farmers’ involvement in irrigation system management. 
In practice, however, WUA organizational development has mixed results, with some WUAs becoming 
inactive after its formation, and others functioning merely on an ad hoc basis when they have to resolve 
water conflicts between farmers during periods of water scarcity. 
NGOs in Pakistan are doing a significant amount of work when it comes to water and climate 
change. The role of national and international NGOs in the country is to sometimes assist the national 
government in the implementation of climate adaptation projects, but also to assist with field research 
and on-the-ground implementation through their own organizations. There are over 15 NGOs that 
are specifically dedicated to environmental protection. Some of these organizations include, but are 
not limited to, the Pakistan Environmentalists Association, Society for Conservation and Protection 
of Environment (SCOPE), the Pakistan Institute for Environment-Development Action Research 
(PIEDAR), and the Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD). 
Currently, LEAD Pakistan is working on climate change, environmental management and social capital 
development projects. A notable climate change project is working on the Design and Development of 
Water Sector LAPA through the British High Commission. Although further information on this project is 
unavailable, this is very similar to what Nepal has done with its LAPA. PIEDAR has worked on projects to 
increase irrigation efficiency and protect local water bodies. However, as of recently, there have been no notable 
projects recorded. To gain a better understanding of Pakistan’s vibrant NGO sector, further research needs to 
be conducted on the ground to identify what is being implemented. Since these NGOs work closely with the 
government and provide valuable information to anyone wanting to work in Pakistan on climate change and 
water management, it is vital that these NGOs are included in any stakeholder discussion. Pakistan is a member 
of the Indus Water Commission along with India. It is critical to note that there are a number of opportunities 
in developing the Indus Basin Water Treaty with regard to gender equality, knowledge, technology, and the 
capacities of the respective in-country institutions to better address the needs of their own country and the basin 
itself. The Indus Water Commission and the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) are discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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Pakistan has also developed an online gender database to address goal 5 of the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Government of Punjab has set up an online Gender 
Management Information System (GMIS) to keep track of project implementation for addressing 
gender issues. GMIS has six thematic areas: health, governance, education, economic participation and 
opportunities, demographics, legal rights and violence against women (Ahmed 2016). The database 
is supposed to assist decision makers and planners in preparing gender-responsive budgets and urban 
planning, and addressing other fields related to status and issues of gender, particularly women. The 
database revealed a clear lack of participation by women in the workforce, particularly in decision-
making roles (Ahmed 2016). In addition, the projects that were supposed to be implemented with 
a specific focus on the advancement of livelihoods for women had either not been implemented or 
had been poorly implemented. The institutions and support systems to assist women either lack the 
capacity to do so or are redundant (Ahmed 2016). While the database was not meant to address the 
water sector specifically, it should be noted that it does track gender through a number of other sectors, 
and the water sector is at least indirectly associated with most of these sectors. Specifically addressing 
environmental issues related to gender might be challenging. However, if gender empowerment is to be 
addressed in the water sector then taking a holistic approach across multiple sectors might prove more 
beneficial than a singular sector view. The lack of participation by women in decision-making roles, 
for instance, affects decisions made by WUAs and is skewed to a more male-dominated approach. 
This would show that the issue of gender is not a technical water problem, but perhaps an institutional 
or cultural problem that needs to be addressed at a different level. 
Current institutional frameworks for climate adaptation in Pakistan show how the government 
aims to tackle the problem of sector fragmentation through the positioning of its climate change 
institutional platform at cabinet level under the Prime Minister’s Office. However, such measures 
must reference how earlier attempts to establish such platforms for IWRM have not been effective in 
terms of its application. While such positioning could theoretically ensure cross-sectoral coordination 
for climate adaptation programs, in practice, implementation of such programs is often directed by 
relevant sectoral ministries and depends largely on how donors channel climate adaptation funds. While 
the organizational transformation of MoNDM into MoCC reveals the close linkage between climate 
adaptation and disaster management in the institutional framing of Pakistan’s climate adaptation, the 
question remains as to how water resources management can be positioned as an integral part of the 
country’s adaptation strategies. Since drought, groundwater depletion and salinization are among key 
climate risks facing the country (see Paper 1: Lacombe [2019]), institutional strengthening should 
focus on developing measures for water allocation and prioritization across the different sectors, as 
well as linking surface water and groundwater planning and management.
Sri Lanka
Within the context of climate adaptation, Sri Lanka has a Climate Change Secretariat (CCS), which 
was established in 2008 under the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment (MoMDE). 
The secretariat provides a platform to address climate change issues at the national level, both in terms 
of information sharing and facilitating policy actions, and to serve as an overarching institutional 
mechanism on climate change responses. Internationally, it liaises with the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
In line with the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan of Sri Lanka, the CCS is the responsible 
government agency to coordinate climate adaptation in the country. This is a huge task, especially since 
cross-sectoral coordination is severely lacking for the water-related sectors alone. Ideally, a national working 
group (NWG) would be set up to support CCS in the implementation of climate adaptation programs 
across the different sectors. As envisioned in the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan, NWG would 
function as a consortium of national government ministries, research institutes (such as the Department 
of Meteorology, Disaster Management Centre, National Science Foundation), and NGO representatives 
coordinated by CCS staff members. In practice, however, NWG was not established until now. 
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Other nongovernmental actors such as NGOs and universities are key players in incorporating 
climate change considerations into water resources management in Sri Lanka. An example of this 
is the Water and Climate Resilience Programme (WACREP) by the Sri Lanka Water Partnership. 
The program aims to promote technology options and best practices while strengthening capacities 
among different levels of water managers and users, including farmer organizations (FOs) and other 
community-based organizations. 
Water governance in Sri Lanka is still largely based on management systems put in place during 
British colonial rule and determined by administrative- and land-based boundaries. At present, there 
are nearly 51 Acts and over 40 agencies involved in governing and managing the water resources of 
the country, many of which are restricted to certain functions or subsectors. As a result, there is heavy 
duplication, fragmentation and overlap in the institutional setup in Sri Lanka’s water sector.
Lacking an inter-ministerial coordination body and institutional arrangements to facilitate cross-
sectoral collaboration, water resources development decisions are taken by each sectoral ministry, often 
without any connection with each other, although coordinated at the national planning and budget 
allocation level. Up to now, attempts to put in place an overarching water policy or Act have been 
unsuccessful, in part due to a lack of political backing. Besides, while Sri Lanka is equipped with 
a government ministry in charge of water resources management (Ministry of Irrigation and Water 
Resources Management [MoIWRM]), the ministry’s strong focus on irrigation tends to narrow the scope 
and boundary of water resources management into water planning and development predominantly for 
the agriculture sector, in addition to water supply for domestic use. A continued emphasis on developing 
irrigation systems means that irrigation institutions enjoy a position of privilege in the current system.
The Water Resources Board was established with the objective of advising the MoIWRM on 
different aspects of water resources management in the country, including the design of integrated 
management plans, prioritization of objectives in the case of river basin and trans-river basin projects, 
and the coordination of different government entities working in the sector. However, recently, the focus 
of the board appears to have shifted from encompassing the entire water sector to mainly that related 
to groundwater research, monitoring and development. Despite its role in groundwater management, 
however, the board does not seem to be involved in working on linkages between groundwater and 
surface water.
Currently, the state is in charge of interprovincial rivers and irrigation schemes, while the 
management of the same within the nine provinces has been devolved to the provincial councils. 
Other aspects of the water sector that come under the purview of the provincial councils include 
health, water supply and sanitation, and environmental protection. In practice, however, the devolution 
of these functions has not been fully realized, with both the central government and the provincial 
councils being involved in the provision of these services. For example, the Department of Agrarian 
Development under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) still plays an important role in the management 
of minor irrigation systems.
In Sri Lanka, the O&M of irrigation schemes is jointly undertaken with FOs under the Participatory 
Irrigation System Management program. FOs that are registered with the Department of Agrarian 
Development are considered legal entities. While such PIM has faced several challenges, a study by 
Samad and Vermillion (1999) found that, in cases where management was transferred to FOs and these 
irrigation structures were rehabilitated by the government, significant increases in yield were observed.
Under existing institutional frameworks, the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL) under 
MoMDE, the Central Environmental Authority (CEA), and the Coast Conservation Department (CCD) 
could potentially play an important role in climate adaptation in the water sector. MASL is an RBO 
responsible for the Mahaweli Development Scheme, which seeks to develop the Mahaweli River Basin 
to meet the country’s irrigation and hydropower needs. MASL as a model for a developing RBO is 
discussed in Box 4.3.  In addition, MoIWRM is responsible for the management of all water resources 
in the country, with the main focus on the development and management of large- and medium-
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scale irrigation systems, in which the Irrigation Management Division is in charge of overall system 
management. Here, climate adaptation programs and activities are strongly rooted in the construction 
and rehabilitation of physical irrigation infrastructure to improve storage capacity. 
Box 4.3. MASL as an example of an evolving RBO.
MASL was established under the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka Act No. 23 of 1979 to implement 
the Mahaweli River Development Scheme.a It was envisaged that the authority would develop the 
Mahaweli River Basin as well as other associated river basins to meet the country’s irrigation and 
hydropower needs. The Mahaweli River Basin encompasses roughly one-fifth of Sri Lanka’s land 
area. At present, the area covered by the scheme includes 39% of the country and 60% of the total 
irrigable area.b Thus, MASL manages a significant proportion of the country’s land and water resources. 
Within its areas of operation, MASL is vested with umbrella powers. It is responsible for the 
construction and operation of infrastructure for the purpose of irrigation and agriculture, and for the 
construction of hydropower plants. MASL is also responsible for the settlement and resettlement 
of communities and socioeconomic development in the basin. The Mahaweli Authority of Sri 
Lanka Act also provides MASL with the broader function of watershed management of the area. 
MASL is authorized to raise finances for its work through activities such as acquiring shares in 
other organizations and other forms of investments.a
The Mahaweli Development project has been and continues to be a major area of focus for the allocation of 
public finance in the water sector. In the national budgets of the year 2015/2016, 29% of the total allocation 
to the different ministries in the water sector has been to the MoMDE, of which 83% is to MASL.c The 
President of Sri Lanka is the minister of MoMDE, which illustrates the project’s political importance. 
The Water Management Secretariat of MASL coordinates the allocation of water between sectors 
through meetings held weekly and at the beginning of each cultivation season. Representatives 
from the Irrigation Department, Ceylon Electricity Board, National Water Supply and Drainage 
Board (NWSDB), and MASL decide on how much water is allocated to the sectors. 
The Bulk Water Allocation Model tested in the 1990s by MASL has yielded positive results 
regarding water allocation on the other end of the supply chain. Under this model, the amount 
of water issued to a user through a distributary canal is fixed at the beginning of the cultivation 
season. Thus, a particular user would have a legal right over this quantity of water, providing an 
incentive for using it efficiently, thus contributing to water management. It is felt that this could 
help overcome some of the challenges faced by PIM, which suffers from a lack of ownership 
of responsibilities for the maintenance of irrigation systems by WUAs (Aheeyar et al. 2012).
Thus, MASL is an example of a basin-level planning institution, which has the potential to evolve into 
a working example of IWRM. A future challenge is ensuring that the political and financial significance 
given to the project and MASL, which has been a key driver of its success, is balanced by an approach 
in which decision making is truly participatory, involving institutions and communities at all levels.
Notes:
a For information on the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka Act, visit the website of the Mahaweli Authority of        
  Sri Lanka (http://mahaweli.gov.lk/en/pdf/Act&Gazettes/Mahaweli%20ACT.pdf).
b For information on the Master Plan, visit the website of the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (http://mahaweli. 
  gov.lk/en/mp.html).
c For information on Budget Estimates 2016, Volume 3, visit the website of the Government of Sri Lanka,  
  Department of National Budget, Ministry of Finance (http://www.treasury.gov.lk/documents/10181/161077/ 
  bdgtestmates2016E-vol3.pdf/70ac63a4-6255-409c-bdff-3a5c9e78fd60).
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While the Sri Lankan government has attempted to facilitate cross-sectoral coordination and 
collaboration for climate adaptation through the formation of CCS, current institutional frameworks and 
arrangements on climate adaptation remain on the periphery since sectoral decision-making structures 
and mechanisms prevail. CCS’s lack of capacity, in terms of budget and staffing, is also an issue. The 
formation of CCS does not automatically result in the establishment of an inter-ministerial, coordination 
platform for climate adaptation. In contrast, sectoral ministries continue to operate almost in parallel 
to each other, because they often do not see how they would benefit from cross-sectoral coordination, 
not to mention potential implications of such coordination in terms of sector ministries’ budget 
allocations. While some ministries play some role in climate adaptation, this has happened mainly 
through donor-funded project activities, with little cross-sectoral interlinkages and connections. The 
government approaches climate adaptation in the water sector mainly through irrigation infrastructure 
development and rehabilitation to increase water storage capacity as a means of ensuring food security. 
Since droughts, and groundwater salinization and depletion are major climate risks for the country, a 
more central positioning of the water sector in climate adaptation strategies is required. Institutionally, 
efforts to strengthen cross-sectoral coordination can begin through the promotion of direct collaboration 
(for example, through joint programs and projects) between relevant sectoral ministries. At a country 
level, and for the water sector specifically, climate adaptation highlights the need for IWRM, since 
holistic adaptation measures would require integrated water resources planning and management 
across the different sectors. The next subsection discusses the current institutional frameworks in water 
resources management in each of the seven countries in South Asia selected for this study, how this 
corresponds to IWRM both theoretically and in its actual implementation, and the implications this 
has for approaches to climate adaptation. 
Current Trends of Existing Institutional Frameworks
Centralized Approach Does Not Automatically Lead to Holistic Climate Adaptation
Across the seven countries, institutional frameworks for climate adaptation follow a centralized 
approach, with one or more government agencies charged with leading, preparing and formulating 
climate adaptation programs at the national level. This is most evident in India, where the national 
response around climate change emerged through the Prime Minister’s Office, with the creation 
of PMCCC in 2007. Similarly, GoN formed the Climate Change Council in 2009 as the national 
coordinating body to ensure effective implementation of climate adaptation policies. Though Nepal 
has also formulated its LAPA, which involves a bottom-up approach to climate adaptation planning, 
in practice, adaptation planning through NAPA continues to dominate LAPA (Nagoda 2015). It must 
be noted that Pakistan too has begun to take initiatives with regard to employing LAPAs. In Bhutan, 
the NEC, an inter-ministerial body chaired by the prime minister, is in charge of formulating climate 
adaptation programs. In Bangladesh, MoEF is leading the country’s climate adaptation program, 
collaborating with other ministries and international financial institutions, through its CCC. The same 
can be said with regard to Sri Lanka and Afghanistan through their positioning of CCS under MoMDE 
and the CEA under the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment, respectively, as lead 
government agencies. Finally, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) has renamed the former Ministry 
of National Disaster Management (MoNDM) to the Ministry of Climate Change (MoCC), and made 
the latter the leading government agency in climate adaptation.
Driven by global climate policy discussions, national governments have appointed relevant sectoral 
ministries (for example, MoSTE in Nepal, MoEF in Bangladesh) or formed new inter-ministerial bodies 
to lead program implementation as an ad hoc response (Dubash and Joseph 2016) to institutionalization. 
In practice, while the institutional structures for climate adaptation are in place, more needs to be done 
to improve the overall performance and institutional effectiveness of these bodies, both at ministerial 
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and inter-ministerial levels. Most of the countries have established their respective institutional set up 
for climate adaptation (e.g., either through an inter-ministerial, decision-making platform or sector 
ministry leadership, or a combination of both). However, how such setups would address the existing 
challenges of cross-sectoral integration and collaboration (for example, overlapping roles and areas 
of responsibility between the different sector ministries and the established inter-ministerial bodies) 
remains unclear. Similarly, while the establishment of this institutional setup is a good start to tackle 
climate adaptation, in many countries, it remains unclear as to how such a setup could ensure effective 
implementation of climate adaptation programs on the ground. For example, in Sri Lanka, Bhutan, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the leading government agencies on climate adaptation have hardly any 
capacity (in terms of staffing and budget) to monitor program implementation on the ground. In 
India, state governments directed the formulation of their State Action Plans on Climate Change 
(SAPCC) almost entirely toward the NAPCC. This left little space for discussion on how these plans 
could be best implemented within the current institutional structure, not to mention that formulation 
and implementation of climate adaptation programs continue to be directed by centralized funding 
mechanisms (both from donors and the government’s budget). This brings to light not only the need 
to increase the overall capacity and performance of government agencies across sectors and scales, 
and especially those linked to climate adaptation (such as monitoring and evaluation), but also, to a 
certain extent, the need for budgetary reform on how funding for climate adaptation can be channeled 
most effectively. 
Institutionally, a centralized approach to climate adaptation does not automatically result in 
strong institutional rooting or accommodate the inclusion of local coping strategies or immediate entry 
points to scale up these strategies as an integral part of the country’s climate adaptation programs. In 
Nepal, the government established MCCICC in 2009, followed by the formation of the NCCKMC 
under NAST in 2010. While MCCICC’s membership includes international NGOs, academics, private 
sector actors and international financial institutions, next to representatives from relevant government 
ministries, it remains a nationally centered institution with very little connection to local communities. 
Similarly, while NCCKMC works toward a knowledge platform, which can be very useful for climate 
adaptation across scales, it is unclear how local communities, especially those who would be most 
affected by climate variability, such as women and the poorest, could access such a platform (Nagoda 
2015). Refer to Paper 2 (Davis and Hirji 2019) on the importance of local action to support climate 
change adaptation. Local communities, NGOs and research organizations must be an integral part of 
the institutional landscape in climate adaptation. Across the seven countries, WUAs can be used as a 
starting point for better understanding of institutional arrangements of farmers’ adaptation strategies. 
For instance, understanding when WUAs and farmers decide to change the water delivery schedule 
to deal with climate variability is a pertinent part of the larger design and development of climate 
adaptation programs. In addition, the establishment of BCAS, CEGIS and BIDS in Bangladesh could 
potentially contribute to the provision of scientific information on climate adaptation. At present, 
WUAs and FOs are rarely consulted when formulating adaptation strategies. 
Furthermore, while water resources management is implied in the overall institutional frameworks 
for climate adaptation, institutional measures for adaptation are not always directly linked with the need 
for IWRM. For example, while Pakistan positions MoCC as the leading agency for climate adaptation, 
it is unclear whether this institutional measure will integrate water resources management sufficiently 
in the country’s climate adaptation. Similarly, Bangladesh and Bhutan have taken a more integrated 
institutional approach toward climate adaptation, driven by a strong emphasis on environmental aspects 
of climate change. However, the question remains as to whether such integration will also adequately 
incorporate water bodies (such as NWRC) in climate adaptation.
 
 
65
Institutional Challenges of, and Opportunities for, Mainstreaming Climate Adaptation into 
National Development Programs
All seven countries mainstream climate adaptation into their respective national development programs 
(see Paper 2 [Davis and Hirji 2019] on policy mainstreaming in climate adaptation). In Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, climate adaptation programs form an integral part of 
development objectives to enhance food security and reduce poverty, involving the relevant sectors 
(water, agriculture, forest, health, transport). Climate adaptation programs are also closely linked with 
risk prevention and disaster management in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as well as 
with environmental issues (problems of desertification, in particular) in Afghanistan. 
Strategies to mainstream climate adaptation are partly rooted in the dependency of governments to 
external funding agencies for support in financing climate adaptation programs (OECD 2009; Sharma 
2011). Lacking any financial resources to implement these programs is an overarching problem. Five 
of the seven countries’ governments (with the exception of Bangladesh and India, which have put 
significant internal revenues into climate adaptation) have “incorporated” climate adaptation as part of 
their national development strategies in poverty reduction through activities such as improved health 
systems, water and sanitation, agricultural development, and housing and infrastructure. 
While mainstreaming climate adaptation into national development programs can be viewed 
as a first step in seriously tackling climate issues (Agrawala 2004; Ayers et al. 2014), we argue 
that unless climate components are fully integrated into planned and ongoing development efforts, 
mainstreaming climate adaptation will continue to be an add-on rather than a holistic program nested 
in national governments’ development planning and program. Key element to support such integration 
is climate-oriented capacity building efforts, both institutionally and programmatically. For example, 
in Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the absence of a strong climate adaptation program 
is not only due to the lack of funding but also related to very low institutional capacity to implement 
such programs across scales, with most government staff involved having little knowledge on climate 
adaptation issues and approaches. 
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Chapter 5. The Need for Regional Cooperation
The importance of regional cooperation and coordination is reflected in the transboundary nature of 
many countries’ water resources that are expected to be impacted by climate change. The predicted 
glacial retreat in the Himalayas would affect water availability for agriculture, domestic use, hydropower 
and industry, on which some 400 million people across the Indo-Gangetic and Brahmaputra basins in 
Nepal, India and Bangladesh depend (Mirza and Ahmad 2005). In fact, World Bank (2009) recognized 
that the most severe climate threats (such as glacier retreat and sea-level rise) transcend national 
boundaries, and lists cooperation on international rivers and river basins as a priority for the region.
Along with other climatic impacts that undermine water availability, climate change could 
intensify existing tensions and create new conflicts over the sharing of transboundary rivers. This 
could arise both within a country (as in the case of the Sindh and Punjab provinces in Pakistan over 
the Indus; as well as between states in India) and between countries. The fact that 97% of Bangladesh’s 
freshwater flows come through India is indicative of the limits posed by transboundary factors on the 
adaptive space available to individual countries. Bangladesh and India have 54 transnational rivers, 
but agreements exist only for a few specific rivers—for example, a 30-year old treaty over the Ganges. 
Even in situations where water-sharing agreements exist, as in the case of the Indus Waters Treaty, 
potential future reductions in water flow could lead to the need for renegotiated terms of allocations 
(Mirza and Ahmad 2005). Five treaties currently exist between the South Asian nations: the Indus 
Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan (1960); the treaties between India and Nepal on the Kosi 
(1954), Gandaki (1959) and Mahakali (1996) rivers; and the Ganges Water Sharing treaty between 
India and Bangladesh (1996) (Prasai and Surie 2015).
While regional cooperation is critical for climate adaptation, efforts to promote regional adaptation 
will have to consider existing asymmetries in economic and political power, geography, resource 
endowments, skills, institutional capacities and country priorities. Central to these dynamics is India, 
which is likely to play a key role in future regional cooperation for climate adaptation, especially with 
regard to the water and energy sectors. In addition to its economic and political influence, India’s 
geographical positioning—a midstream state in many ways—provides it with a central role with 
respect to lower and upper riparian countries. With several major rivers flowing through its territory, 
how India controls flows in response to increasing national demands for energy and food for its 
growing population and economic ambitions will have major consequences for other states (Bhaduri 
and Barbier 2008). To date, India has taken a bilateral approach to developing formal cooperation, a 
feature in its treaties with Pakistan (Indus Waters Treaty 1960), Bangladesh (India Bangladesh Water 
Sharing Treaty 1996) and Nepal (Mahakali River Treaty 1996) (Ranjan 2015). 
Within this context, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has initiated 
many regional cooperation agreements, some directly on climate change and others on related topics 
such as the environment and disaster management. Of these, the Dhaka Declaration and SAARC 
Action Plan on Climate Change (2008), and the Thimphu Statement on Climate Change (SAARC 
2010) are considered to be important milestones in the association’s response to climate change. 
SAARC has established several regional centers that provide an institutional framework within 
SAARC to address climate-related risks and vulnerabilities. This includes the Disaster Management 
Center, the Meteorological Research Center, the Coastal Zone Management Center, and the Forestry 
Center. These promote cooperation in monitoring, data generation and sharing, better preparedness, 
capacity building, and ultimately identifying and developing priorities for action to be taken by member 
countries (Das and Bandyopadhyay 2015). This framework thereby provides the technical capacity and 
cross-country links for implementing the Dhaka Declaration and the SAARC Action Plan on Climate 
Change (2009-2011), which focuses on seven thematic areas of cooperation: adaptation, mitigation, 
technology transfer, finance and investment, education and awareness, management of impacts and 
risks, and capacity building for international negotiations. 
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The Thimphu Statement on Climate Change recognizes that South Asia is expected to be heavily 
impacted by climate change, thus necessitating a regional response. It focuses on four initiatives that 
correspond to key drivers of climate vulnerability in South Asia. Two of these are an Intergovernmental 
Monsoon Initiative and an Intergovernmental Mountain Initiative on mountain ecosystems, particularly 
glaciers. By assigning implementation of these initiatives to one of the regional centers, the statement 
identifies institutional leads to take these initiatives forward. As such, this arrangement provides a 
sensible mechanism to drive action on the ground.
Despite these significant planning efforts for building regional response to climate change, the 
reality remains that neither the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change nor the Thimphu Declaration 
have resulted in change on the ground (Majaw 2012; Thapa 2013). The Thimphu Statement does not 
go far enough in providing direction, for example, to the implementing centers on what it specifically 
wants them to achieve. It stops short of defining specific targets the initiatives are to achieve (Thapa 
2013). Furthermore, articulation of the initiatives and lead institutions are not backed by a financing 
strategy, nor is it understood how the centers will liaise with national governments and other in-country 
stakeholders on whom they depend on for implementation. In fact, while the Thimphu Declaration 
entrusts implementation to the centers, SAARC’s authority to enforce compliance by its member states 
remains limited to encouraging them to act (Thapa 2013). This limitation is embedded in the SAARC 
Charter, which requires collective agreement from all member states. There is also no compulsion on 
member states to ensure their national laws and programs articulate the vision embodied in SAARC 
statements (Thapa 2013). 
These fundamental structural issues within SAARC appear to be compounded by diverse national 
prerogatives shaping countries’ willingness to subordinate its positions in the overall climate politics. 
India, for instance, no longer identifies with the agenda of the low-income countries (LICs). This has 
also made it difficult for SAARC to present a unified position in multilateral negotiations (Thapa 
2013), thereby explaining why the association has played a relatively small role in climate change 
policy making in the region (Majaw 2012). A remedy suggested by Thapa (2013) is for SAARC 
statements and plans to display greater flexibility to accommodate differences among its members, 
with consensus on obligations based around a base standard and ensure that all member states at least 
meet that standard (Thapa 2013).
Similar to SAARC, the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) was 
formed in 1982 with the aim of developing regional cooperation among South Asian nations that 
would build national capacity to manage issues related to the environment (http://www.sacep.org/). 
SACEP includes all the countries mentioned in this report. SACEP’s activities include working on 
institutional strengthening for conservation of biodiversity, capacity building, environmental information 
and assessment, and education and awareness. With the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), SACEP works toward the improvement of the legal and institutional framework to address 
environmental issues in the region (http://www.sacep.org/). SACEP works with the South Asian Seas 
Programme (SASP) to protect marine and coastal environments in its member countries. While there 
is no specific focus on water or integrated water resources management (IWRM), the activities that 
SACEP encompasses will no doubt include legal and institutional issues concerning regional water 
problems. Therefore, SACEP should be seen as a partner to assist with regional cooperation in climate 
change activities. 
However, while there is agreement on the need to respond to climate change at a regional 
scale, there is as yet no settlement on how these agreements are to be financed. Considering the 
financing gap faced by all the countries in implementing national plans of action, funding from other 
sources would be required for these initiatives to be successfully implemented. Consequently, while 
there are other region-wide initiatives that contribute to adaptation, including the South Asia Water 
Initiative (SAWI) by the World Bank, and Mangroves for the Future (MFF) by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 
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formal government-driven arrangements remain at a nascent stage with no clear pathway for scaling 
existing bilateral approaches to a truly regional platform.
An important distinction in this cooperation appears to be a framing of adaptation (and mitigation) 
in terms of flooding, as opposed to water scarcity expected in many shared river basins. It is proposed 
that the dynamics of cooperation over water scarcity are quite different, requiring upstream riparians 
to forgo a percentage of growth in favor of growth in downstream riparians. The previous discussion 
on the prevalence of bilateral approaches to water sharing in river basins suggests that the approach 
to dealing with too much and too little water are quite opposite, in which the former is marked by 
regional collaboration, while the latter by bilateral negotiations. Das and Bandyopadhyay (2015) thus 
believed it is crucial that SAARC focuses more explicitly on the intraregional differences that exist 
between its member states, with the resolution of political tensions between India and Pakistan, in 
particular, an essential prerequisite. 
One way forward suggested by Das and Bandyopadhyay (2015) is to focus on broader economic 
cooperation, drawing lessons from the success of European economic integration that helped diffuse 
the political tensions prevalent in Europe prior to integration. This is a view shared by World Bank 
(2009), which sees increased economic cooperation as a potential catalyst for resolving political and 
social differences, and for reducing a number of underlying causes of vulnerability to climate change, 
especially for the poor, by increasing growth, reducing inequality and increasing energy trade. 
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Chapter 6. Key Findings and Recommendations
The findings in this chapter bring out a common theme highlighting the mainly structural nature of 
existing challenges faced by financial mechanisms and institutional frameworks in promoting integrated 
responses to climatic risks, which demand the opposite to current sectoral institutional structures and 
culture (Box 6.1). The concept of integrated water resources management (IWRM) has, for some 
time, more integrated approaches within the water sector, quite independently of climate adaptation 
thinking. The persisting gap between policies that adopt IWRM (see Paper 2 [Davis and Hirji 2019]) 
and institutional disconnects that impede it in practice demonstrates the difficulties in building integrated 
and deliberative responses to developmental challenges in practice. 
 Box 6.1. Adaptation finance and institutions. 
Adaptation finance
•  All countries are challenged with a significant adaptation funding gap, with no clear bridging  
 mechanisms.
•  Strategies to mainstream climate adaptation are partly rooted in the dependency of  
 governments to external funding agencies for support in financing adaptation programs.
 ○  Strengthening in-country capacity is needed to navigate a dense landscape of different  
  external funds in a competitive funding environment. 
•  Whether an emphasis is placed on improved water resources management as a priority area  
 for adaptation finance is difficult to assess based on this desk study alone.
 ○  While integration of water resources management into other sectors for explicit climate  
  adaptation is important, existing data suggest much of this integration is not captured in  
  national systems.
•  Disjointed funding mechanisms and underdeveloped structures struggle to match funds to  
 priority adaptation actions.
 ○  The majority of funds generating adaptation capacity in each country cannot be clearly  
  identified, making any assessment of spending on climate finance, including in the water  
  sector, only approximate.
 ○  The water sector falls outside of the top-funded sectors for climate adaptation.
 ○  Most adaptation results arise out of multipurpose investments not directly related to  
  adaptation. The extent to which these results are intended (planned for) is not clear. Such  
  planning would indicate a desirable integration of adaptation across sectors.
•  The disconnect between national and local levels in adaptation planning undermines finance  
 targeting and accountability, potentially further marginalizing the more vulnerable groups  
 and sectors.
•  An area seemingly relatively untapped is in-country private sector financing specifically for  
 adaptation.
(continued)
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   Box 6.1. Adaptation finance and institutions. (Continued)
Institutions
•  A centralized approach to adaptation planning does not automatically lead to holistic climate  
 adaptation.
•  Sectoral fragmentation is present among all countries.
  ○  Fundamental structural weaknesses are reflected throughout the institutional continuum,  
  from patchy cost assessments of climatic risks to disjointed fund allocation, and an almost  
  complete absence of mechanisms to track adaptation investments.
 ○  Although national coordinating entities for adaptation exist in nearly all countries, most   
  struggle to drive a cooperative and comprehensive approach to adaptation. 
 ○  Making national coordinating entities more effective will require a re-imagining of their  
  roles, structure and composition that provides a more challenging and empowering  
  mandate.
 ○  Entrenched sectoral competition is nevertheless likely to pose major challenges to the  
  performance of re-imagined national coordinating bodies.
•  While the institutional structures for climate adaptation are in place, more needs to be done to  
 improve the overall performance and institutional effectiveness of these bodies, both at  
 ministerial and inter-ministerial levels. 
•  In addition to greater cross-sectoral cooperation, more emphasis is needed on giving local  
 stakeholders, including local government and marginalized communities, a more explicit  
 voice in centralized planning processes. 
•  Policy makers need to strengthen the role of local communities, nongovernmental  
 organizations (NGOs) and research organizations as an integral part of the institutional  
 landscape in climate adaptation as well as, to a certain extent, the need for budgetary reform  
 on how funding for climate adaptation can be channeled most effectively. 
Finding 1: Water resources are a fundamental driver of economic development and other 
aspects of well-being across the region. The high vulnerability of water resources to climate 
change creates a strong argument for improved and more IWRM as an explicit adaptation 
response.
As demonstrated in Chapter 2 (as well as in Table 2.2), water is among several common themes 
characterizing the development context across the region. Its impact as an enabling resource across 
several key sectors, such as agriculture, energy production and industry, is clear, with a variation in 
this mix from one country to another. In Nepal and Bhutan, for instance, hydropower generation is 
the primary economic driver, and it is the sector that has also powered development in Sri Lanka 
until recent diversification of energy sources. Despite differing contributions in economic terms, 
agriculture remains fundamental in terms of food security, nutrition and employment, given the majority 
of rural populations in all the countries. Here, too, water is key, with surface water or groundwater 
being prominent in different countries. In many countries, such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and India, 
groundwater is an important driver of rural poverty reduction and food security. Pakistan’s position as 
the largest cotton exporter in the world means that this element of agriculture alone plays a significant 
role in the rural as well as national economy. 
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This central role played by water can become a major risk, given the many climate change impacts 
expressed as quantitative or temporal dimensions of water availability: several types of flooding, 
drought, salinity and storm surges, with direct and indirect impacts on surface water and groundwater. 
These, in turn, stand to undermine major economic and other key developmental systems. However, 
the extent to which water is prioritized in funding allocations is unclear. Identifiable fund allocations 
for water have been small in many countries. However, the crosscutting nature of the resources most 
likely means significant investments remain hidden in other sectoral investments, such as agriculture 
in Bangladesh, and irrigation and hydropower infrastructure in Bhutan, Nepal, India and Sri Lanka.
Recommendations 
Water resources and its integrated management should become a primary entry point to adaptation 
planning at country and subnational levels, and for donors and other international adaptation financiers. 
Improving IWRM should be seen as a primary adaptation in itself, recognizing the potential to merge 
risk management with generating multifaceted developmental benefits.
Better coordination is needed between institutions that work on demand-side management and those 
that work on the supply side. This is especially challenging since demand-side management may involve 
sectors that may not have an evident link to the management of water resources, but still influence water 
extraction and usage. For instance, economic policies such as subsidies that aim to improve performance 
in the food production and energy sectors can have undesirable consequences for the water sector. These 
consequences might include inefficient water use through the cultivation of crops that consume a lot of 
water or the employment of inefficient irrigation techniques. For example, energy subsidies that aim to 
promote greater levels of irrigation to increase food security can lead to the over-extraction of groundwater 
and then to a decrease in the water table. Subsidies to stimulate increased biofuel production as a solution 
to greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation can lead to the cultivation of water-intensive crops in regions that 
are already water stressed, thereby increasing levels of water scarcity. A more holistic view of the system 
is needed for institutions to better understand the linkages between supply- and demand-side planning, 
and the trade-offs that arise. At a conceptual level, the water-energy-food-environment nexus framework 
is an approach that can be adopted to provide such a perspective.
Finding 2: Current knowledge of financial implications of climate risks, and existing 
institutional structures and capacities appear to be insufficient for understanding the climate 
risks, adaptation priorities and financing needs for specific geographies and populations.
As seen from Chapter 2, current calculations of costs induced through climate change appear to exist for 
some sectors but not others in each country. This suggests the absence of a concerted effort to produce 
a comprehensive assessment of costs associated with the full range of climatic risks. Many existing cost 
estimates are expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), and do not automatically 
disaggregate the unequal distribution of these costs between specific population groups and geographies. 
This macroeconomic orientation suggests that such analyses are not underpinned by a more integrated 
framework that also places value on where in the landscape and populations these costs are likely to arise. 
This includes disaggregating costs for the water sector among wider estimates of costs due to climate 
change impacts. This is partly the result of the specific nature of the water sector, intersecting as it does 
with all forms of human activity. It is also because typical projects on climate change adaptation cut 
across multiple sectors, making it difficult to isolate components related specifically to water (and related 
financing). Some countries, such as Pakistan and Nepal, have conducted flood-related cost assessments 
in terms of risk, though there are many other factors that are not assessed. These include groundwater 
depletion and salinization, which also emerge as important water-related risks (see Table 2.5 in Chapter 2).
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The overarching reason for the absence of a more geographically and demographically nuanced 
appreciation of costs and adaptation needs associated with climate risks, appears to be the disjointed 
and scattered financial mechanisms across economic sectors and administrative levels, which result in 
incomplete cost estimates of specific and cumulative climate risks and associated adaptation costs. This 
causes uncoordinated fund channeling for climate adaptation across the different sectors and levels. It 
also impedes the ability to track allocations and spending, and to hold funding recipients accountable for 
their adaptation goals. Innovations in Bangladesh, such as the proposed climate change marker, may offer 
a road map for other countries in terms of mainstreaming climate funds. It is the closest to making the 
important transition to climate finance becoming an integral and explicit part of budgetary processes. If 
the most recent recommendations for structural reforms to existing mechanisms are implemented, they 
will likely establish a comprehensive oversight mechanism that can enable the government to track the 
impacts of climate finance spending. This could create an environment of greater accountability on climate 
expenditure and provide support to stronger learning on future adaptation priorities. The possibility that 
further reforms may involve the use of a climate adaptation marker—an existing innovation for tracking 
and accounting for spending on poverty reduction and gender—is of particular interest in terms of potential 
replication in other countries included in this study. Notably, the World Bank appears to recognize the 
importance of such a marker of “coding methodology” in its financing operations to enable more accurate 
tracking and accounting of adaptation co-benefits (World Bank, IFC and MIGA 2016).
Recommendations 
•  Expand the costing of climatic risks from their impacts on GDP to a range of social indicators 
that also reflect the unequal distribution of impacts across different parts of a country and 
groups of people, focusing especially on women and the poorer segments of populations. 
Adaptation must be fundamentally sensitive to the vulnerabilities of people (and their natural 
environments), and thus regional vulnerability maps linked to demographic data can help 
articulate this human dimension in parallel with assessments in economic terms.
•  To expand the understanding of climatic risks from economic to socioeconomic, the costs 
of specific and cumulative climatic risks should capture variations across different parts of 
each country. This can better inform the climate financing required and identify geographical 
hot spots where adaptation spending is most needed. 
•  To address the adaptation funding gaps faced by all the countries, and given the external aid 
dependency of especially the smaller economies—and the crowded space in international 
climate finance—capacity building within the national climate cells or similar institutions 
must specifically create and retain specialists in fund raising.
•  In addition to looking externally for funds, greater effort and skills are necessary to explore 
in-country sources of finance, especially through engagement with the private sector. 
Approaches could include public-private partnerships (PPPs) and incentives for adaptation 
in broader national and subregional fiscal budgets and policy development. 
The emergence of index-based insurance schemes is an innovative approach to developing effective 
safety nets for low-income, flood-prone communities. Whereas traditionally, flood-risk management has 
focused on engineered responses, such as dams and flood walls, with compensation often an ad hoc 
response after the flood event, the insurance schemes systematically secure funds for compensation before 
a flood. Such measures typically involve organizations and experts from central and state government 
bodies, private insurance firms, community-based organizations and NGOs. One example is the ongoing 
Remote sensing innovations for index-based flood insurance project, implemented by the International 
Water Management Institute (IWMI) and with the involvement of government agencies, development 
banks, insurance agencies, local NGOs, and farmers in India and Bangladesh (http://ibfi.iwmi.org/). 
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IWMI estimates that, if the solutions proposed by the project are scaled up, by 2025, INR 10 billion in 
flood insurance can be delivered to approximately 1 million farmers through strong PPP business models. 
Another advantage of these models, according to their proponents (for example, Patankar and Sarkar 
[2015]), is that they can accommodate the poorer farmer classes with even less than 1 hectare of land, 
whereas traditional insurance works best for smaller numbers of larger farm units and high-value crops.
Most of the large farming populations in the seven countries meet a key criterion for the 
workability of these schemes. However, a number of other criteria may require institutional, policy 
and infrastructure investments before such schemes become feasible. These include enabling policy 
frameworks; ideally openness toward and experience with PPP approaches; banking networks for rapid 
and cost-effective distribution; a sufficient network of weather stations with historical data; and the 
long-term commitment from reinsurers (Patankar and Sarkar 2015).
Finding 3: Despite coordinating institutions for adaptation being in place, the lack of 
connective tissue critical for effective cross-sectoral coordination remains an important 
practical gap for more sectorally integrated adaptation responses. 
Climate adaptation, in general, and those related to water resources management, in particular, require 
complex and widespread institutional action and coordinated efforts at different scales. As such, inter-
ministerial coordination and cross-sectoral collaboration are essential for the formulation of holistic 
adaptation programs and their effective implementation (Adger et al. 2005; Thomas and Twyman 
2005; Urwin and Jordan 2008). This speaks to the greater levels of responsiveness needed in the face 
of multiple and cumulative climate risks, and to recognize differentiated needs across geographies 
and human communities in a manner that supports better bottom-up information flows on needs, 
results and impact. Bringing countries’ response capabilities up to such a level is important, given that 
adaptation involves iterative learning over time, which depends on feedback loops. The current status, 
however, seems to be characterized by a business-as-usual (BAU) approach that plays into embedded 
political economies and sectoral egoism (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). The challenge of bureaucratic 
competition as institutional traps in climate adaptation and their implications for adaptation programs 
across scales is well documented (de Oliveira 2009; Koch et al. 2007; Lebel et al. 2011). 
There is little evidence that existing climate institutions can overcome entrenched sectoral 
approaches to development planning. 
Across the seven countries, institutional frameworks for climate adaptation have been designed through 
either the formation of inter-ministerial bodies or sectoral leadership or a combination. While there is no 
silver bullet on the type of institutional frameworks for climate adaptation, these frameworks are based 
on two interrelated assumptions: (a) cross-sectoral collaboration will take place in climate adaptation 
efforts, despite challenges of IWRM application in the water sector; and (b) existing institutional 
frameworks have the capacity (in terms of budget, staffing and knowledge) to implement holistic climate 
adaptation programs on the ground, and thus support cross-sectoral collaboration. In practice, however, 
the application of climate adaptation is hindered by various factors, ranging from overlapping tasks 
and responsibilities to sectoral competition in terms of mandates and budget allocation. At the heart 
of these issues lies the practical disparities in influence between agencies vested with climate response 
coordination and other sectors that are expected to cooperate. In India, this is most apparent in how 
the role of the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change (PMCCC) remains unclear with regard to 
inter-ministerial coordination, while the authority of the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate 
Change (MoEFCC) to effect the necessary cooperation has been questioned by Sharma et al. (2015). In 
Nepal, both the Ministry of Energy (MoE) and the Ministry of Irrigation (MoI) could proceed with their 
plans to build hydropower and irrigation dams, respectively, without any consultation with the Climate 
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Change Secretariat (CCS) located under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MoSTE). 
This is because they do not need any approval from the secretariat to proceed with the plans. In Sri 
Lanka, the formation of the CCS does not automatically result in the establishment of an inter-ministerial 
coordination platform, since the CCS operates on the periphery and sectoral ministries continue to drive 
sector development. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bhutan, lack of inter-ministerial coordination is often 
exacerbated by the lack of government capacity to implement adaptation programs on the ground. 
Most climate coordinating agencies, therefore, appear to be principally conduits for securing 
external funding. 
While funding mechanisms for climate adaptation (through both internal central government revenues 
and external donor funds) could act as initial or temporary institutional “glue” to facilitate inter-
ministerial coordination, there is a need to go beyond simply a financing approach. In Bhutan, the 
National Economic Commission’s (NEC’s) functioning is limited to developing climate adaptation 
program activities and allocating donor funds for climate adaptation across relevant sectoral ministries. 
While doing this, it lacks an institutional mechanism to ensure effective inter-ministerial relationships 
and joint efforts in the development and implementation of projects. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are in charge of 
the allocation of climate adaptation funds to other relevant sectoral ministries. At the same time, they 
have very little influence to ensure inter-ministerial coordination through the different projects. In 
India, centralized fund disbursement from the center to different states does not seem to encourage 
cross-sectoral collaboration, given the predominantly sectoral approach in the National Action Plan on 
Climate Change (NAPCC) and State Action Plans on Climate Change (SAPCC) formulation processes. 
Another key challenge in developing appropriate climate adaptation measures is the gap between 
knowledge generation and knowledge adoption in policy decisions. For example, while there is an 
extensive network of systems for agrometeorological and hydrometeorological data collection involving 
three governmental departments in Sri Lanka, access to the data collected and dissemination of this 
information is noninstitutionalized (Aheeyar 2012). Additionally, these data are not always linked 
to each other. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the typology of institutional approaches in climate 
adaptation as well as their strengths and weaknesses.
While one approach to address the politics of sectoral coordination is discussed later in this 
chapter, a less complex and thus more attainable future objective should be investments in developing 
human capacities. This is critical if national climate coordinating bodies are to be transformed from 
administrative to strategic entities capable of pushing through a coherent and integrated vision for 
adaptation. This report and other analyses can provide the basis for developing performance criteria 
against which to conduct a comprehensive needs assessment that will provide a structure to training 
and other capacity development investments.
Establishing cooperation networks by leveraging climate funding can help overcome sectoral 
political economies.
The crucial role of networks in shaping alliance formation in climate adaptation has been noted widely 
(Ostrom 2010; Thynne 2008). The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) stands out as a role model. Despite 
the absence of any formal inter-ministerial, decision-making body to coordinate climate adaptation, 
GoB has developed an extensive adaptation program with significant involvement from relevant sector 
ministries and other government agencies. The ability of Bangladesh to continue to improve its adaptation 
strategies and programs is linked to several factors. First, and most critically, GoB positioned climate 
adaptation as a national development priority, while focusing on establishing policy networks with 
international donors. This helps overcome the lack of formal coordination mechanisms, mainly through 
the provision of funds as key incentives for sector ministries to be involved in climate adaptation programs.
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TABLE 6.1. Typology of institutional approaches in climate adaptation. 
 Type of  Strengths Weaknesses Study countries 
 institutional  
 framework 
Cross-sectoral  • Theoretically, it provides • Often unable to Afghanistan, 
collaboration   the institutional setup for  overcome the problem Bhutan 
through the   holistic program development,  of sectoral 
establishment of   planning and implementation  fragmentation 
an inter- • In theory, it can address • Malfunctioning due to 
ministerial   climate adaptation more  lack of a decision- 
coordinating   effectively (e.g., less  making authority to 
body  overlapping between various   direct and enforce 
  government agencies)  sectoral ministries’  
    conduct 
Combined inter- • Facilitate the formation of • Requires a lot of fine- Bangladesh, 
ministerial   networks for cross-sectoral  tuning (across scales) India, Nepal, 
coordinating   collaboration  to form solid, strategic Pakistan 
body with  • Facilitate the development  alliances between 
sectoral   of adaptive institutional  relevant bodies 
leadership  frameworks, based on how  • Requires clear division 
  relevant bodies perceive and   of tasks and 
  negotiate their roles and   responsibilities 
  interface   
Sectoral  • Direct access to decision- • Sectoral approach to Sri Lanka 
leadership  making authority to plan,   climate adaptation may 
  direct and implement climate   not be sufficient to 
  adaptation  address widespread,  
    cross-sectoral implications 
    of climate change 
Government  • Continuous channeling of • Requires more time Bangladesh, 
revenue and   funds could increase the  and effort for fine- India 
project fund   program’s sustainability  tuning in terms of 
as main     financial 
financial source    mechanisms selected,  
    division of tasks,  
    activities selected, etc.
   • Requires strong  
    commitment from both  
    the government and  
    international donors
   • Unclear prioritization  
    of climate adaptation  
    measures, since they  
    are often implied in the  
    government’s national  
    development programs 
(Continued)
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TABLE 6.1. Typology of institutional approaches in climate adaptation. (Continued)
 Type of  Strengths Weaknesses Study countries 
 institutional  
 framework
Project fund  • Direct implementation of • Dependency on aid Afghanistan, 
as main   climate adaptation activities  often results in the Bhutan, Nepal, 
financial source  through various government   program’s Sri Lanka 
  agencies and NGOs  unsustainability 
 • Effective implementation of   (ends after funds 
  climate adaptation through the   are fully allocated)  
  project management unit  • Parallel projects  
    may not be effective  
    to address cross- 
    sectoral implications  
    of climate change 
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.
Second, the way the Department of Environment under MoEF, as the lead agency for climate 
adaptation, has formed strategic alliances (partly through funding agreements) with government 
agencies and other actors as a means of facilitating cross-sectoral collaboration helps tackle the 
problem of bureaucratic competition. Here, since cross-sectoral collaboration is harnessed at 
departmental level, instead of ministerial level, it presents much less threats at the institutional level. 
Third, GoB’s ability to advance its climate adaptation programs cannot be viewed apart from how the 
government allocated sufficient funds from its central budget to fund climate adaptation programs, while 
combining this with donor funding. Unlike other project-oriented programs with external donor funds, 
MoF also supported the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) through its 
non-development budget to cover regular expenses, such as salaries, wages and training for programs 
delivering climate-responsive activities. Similarly, the Planning Commission of Bangladesh financed 
plans related to infrastructure development for climate adaptation purposes (Alam et al. 2011). 
With the exception of Bangladesh, collective action from government agencies to institutionally 
strengthen climate adaptation approaches across sectors appears to be relatively weak. Although Sri 
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan have coordination bodies, they seem to lack the right networks, 
strategic alliances and access to significant funds for climate adaptation. These newly formed bodies 
sometimes cease to function and may simply exist on paper, or provide mainly administrative rather 
than strategic functions. The National Climate Change Plan Committee in Pakistan, which meets 
biannually to report to PMCCC, is an example. 
Recommendations
•  Adaptation finance must be understood as a continuum from securing funds to their strategic 
allocation and performance monitoring. Investments are needed to build connectivity in 
institutions, and planning and accountability processes that ensure national and subnational 
budget allocation mechanisms, which make possible targeted and accountable adaptation 
spending. To this end, the climate change marker in fiscal reporting being considered by 
GoB may provide one mechanism for other countries to adapt and adopt. Lessons from the 
already operational markers for poverty and gender in Bangladesh could be instructive.
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•  The targeting of adaptation finance can be improved by strengthening center-periphery lines 
of communication on adaptation priorities as well as local knowledge and capacities to adapt. 
This process can help strengthen institutional capacities of countries to ensure adaptation is 
not only effective but also accountable to especially the most vulnerable, and as such should 
also contribute to strengthening good governance in the countries. These efforts would link 
closely to the more geographically and demographically nuanced mapping of climatic risks.
•  Addressing institutional fragmentation is likely to require major strengthening of the climate 
cell or similar bodies. This may involve strengthening their legal mandate and powers for 
convening, coordinating and improving the caliber of staffing and capacity building. These 
changes must elevate these key entities from being administrative to strategic agents of 
change.
Finding 4: Current institutional frameworks do not promote deliberative decision making 
capable of achieving informed, inclusive and accountable climate adaptation.
Deliberative decision making in relation to climate adaptation (Ayers 2011; Huq and Khan 2006) and 
IWRM implementation, in particular, can strengthen current approaches by including a greater set of 
voices in the building of consensus around what actions to take. This includes the voices of the poorest 
and most marginalized groups who are frequently the most vulnerable to climate change impacts. At 
a broad scale, this includes the majority of the country populations who still depend on agriculture 
for employment and food security. At a finer scale, examples include small-scale farmers across the 
region, especially in countries such as Bhutan, with limited arable land due to its biogeography, and 
Bangladesh, due to its population density. Other groups include those in coastal areas that are vulnerable 
to storm surges and salinity intrusion, which impact food production and drinking water availability. 
Many of these groups already experience inequalities and therefore possess the least adaptive capacities. 
Currently, ongoing policy discussions on climate adaptation, in general, and IWRM, in particular, fail 
significantly to put local communities and marginalized groups into the overall shaping of adaptation 
strategies. Central to the challenge of adaptation—and the ability of societies to adapt—is the notion 
of collective action (Adger 2003, 387). 
The role of local communities and informal institutional arrangements in transforming coping 
strategies to sustainable adaptive capacity has been raised in recent discussions on climate adaptation 
(Berman et al. 2012) across the seven countries. However, local communities continue to be positioned 
as recipients of (nationally defined) adaptation programs rather than as actors capable of articulating 
context-specific needs and shaping their own adaption measures. Examples of local communities across 
the seven countries using local strategies to cope with climate variability are numerous (Birkenholtz 
2014; Chhetri and Easterling 2010; Chhetri et al. 2012; Rotberg 2013), and demonstrate the significant 
human capital that currently remains mostly untapped by adaptation decision making and planning. 
Therefore, government agencies’ development strategies must be linked to climate adaptation 
through the formulation and implementation of adaptation measures in the water sector—institutionally 
and financially—with local communities’ strategies to cope with climate change. Climate-smart villages, 
in which researchers documented local villagers’ adaptation strategies in agricultural development and 
water use, can be considered as a starting point to build this linkage. To be effective, current institutional 
frameworks need to be oriented toward adaptive institution building, enabling existing institutions to 
react and respond more rapidly and flexibly to emerging climate trends and development demands. 
While the inclusion of the respective ministries in charge of local government in central decision-
making bodies is noted, what is lacking is an explicit mechanism to reflect adaptation needs from the 
ground upward. This would enable planning, allocation and tracking of climate funding to support 
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priority needs more effectively and efficiently, and to ensure accountability in the conversion of funds 
into results. These center-local linkages are key not only for identifying context-specific adaptation 
strategies but also for highlighting the centrality of water resources management in climate adaptation. 
Recommendations
•  Strengthen the development process of subnational adaptation plans in countries in which 
these already exist, and consider introducing the same in other countries. Such processes 
should make use of broader decentralization procedures and associated institutions.
•  More studies are necessary of existing experiences of decentralized adaptation planning 
and implementation, such as the Local Adaptation Plans for Action (LAPA) plans in Nepal. 
Resulting lessons will provide important knowledge both for improving these processes, and 
guidance for countries planning to follow suit. 
•  Decentralized planning must be closely linked to the more nuanced assessments of climatic 
risk. These assessments, and associated maps and databases should form points of departure 
for regional planning.
•  To ensure coordination between the center and regions, regional plans and key focal entities 
must be granted equal space within centralized adaptation planning bodies. This move 
should also assist in coordinating fund allocation that may need to pull together sectoral 
and geographical priorities.
•  More emphasis on decentralized planning may also help navigate the political economies 
arising from institutional fragmentation, by decentralizing planning and bringing a more 
diverse range of actors including NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) into 
the process.
Finding 5: Given the strong transboundary nature of climatic risks, serious efforts are needed 
to promote greater regional cooperation.
According to Chapter 5, it is clear that the biogeography of South Asia makes effective regional 
cooperation an inescapable necessity. As such, minimizing transboundary impacts can have a major 
impact on the efficacy of country-level adaptation investments, with the exception of Sri Lanka, 
given its island nation status. Water assumes a central position in defining a number of the key 
transboundary elements in climate risks, in light of the major significance of transboundary rivers 
in the region, and their origins in glaciers located in several focal countries. What is apparent is a 
distribution in the points of leverage across most countries depending on where transboundary rivers 
originate and flow through. In this geographical perspective, it could be argued that Bangladesh is 
particularly disadvantaged, given its riparian status and extremely high dependence on transboundary 
flows for surface water supplies. Another critical source of differentiation arises from the diverse 
economic and political influence of each country. India can be seen as the dominant economic and 
political actor shaping current transboundary cooperation mechanisms, especially with respect to the 
sharing of water in transboundary rivers. One option for transcending a distinctly bilateral flavor to 
existing transboundary treaties could be to focus on the glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) issue, 
which may bring a larger number of countries into the dialogue. Such broader threats would also be 
more appropriate issues to highlight within well-established broader cooperation frameworks, such as 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
Across the seven countries, respective governments have created institutions to deal with climate change 
issues, either through forming inter-ministerial coordinating bodies or by assigning the responsibility to 
tackle climate-related issues to specific sector ministries, but without strong emphasis on developing 
adaptation measures for the water sector specifically. These mechanisms, with the exception of 
Bangladesh, appear to operate at a somewhat superficial scale, and struggle to overcome perennial 
weaknesses of a sectionalized bureaucracy in transforming from administrative to strategic entities. 
Several factors influence this impasse, including the choice of lead agency and its positioning within 
the political economy shaping interagency collaboration, and the human capacities with which these 
agencies are endowed. Bangladesh, a country with a long pedigree of responding to environmental and 
climatic stresses, offers one avenue for mediating political economies, although investments in human 
capacities will also be necessary. The need for ensuring sector planning and investments to optimize 
contributions to the national adaptation effort, singly and through cooperation, is highlighted by the 
significant gap between incomplete assessments of adaptation costs and levels of mobilized finances 
from international, government and private sources. While this report has focused on climatic risks, it 
is necessary to note here that another advantage of better coordination in planning could be the ability 
to take advantage of any opportunities presented by climatic changes.
Such a view meshes well with the logic of integrated water resources management (IWRM), 
which, if effectively implemented, offers significant contributions to a country’s overall adaptive 
response, given its centrality across multiple development sectors (as argued in Paper 2 [Davis and 
Hirji 2019]). Discernible financial data, however, suggest that this point has not been internalized 
in all the countries, given the small financial flows to the water sector compared to others such as 
agriculture. However, given the water sector’s enabling role across other sectors (such as agriculture 
and energy), available data may be missing other allocations embedded in other sectors. More broadly, 
this analysis argues that placing adaptation as a central element of development, rather than as an 
add-on, is critical. An example of such an approach already exists in Bangladesh’s approach of broad 
sensitization and network development. 
With no clear bridging mechanism to address the funding gap in the short term, making the most 
of scarce resources becomes critical. This then means ensuring that scarce funding is well targeted to 
key adaptation needs, which in turn needs to be defined not only in terms of macroeconomic impacts 
but also in terms of broader human needs among highly heterogeneous populations. This connects to 
other findings on the structural dimensions underpinning planning processes. Some relate to the gaps 
that disrupt the continuum from accessing climate finance to its allocation to meet specific adaptation 
objectives, perhaps also in specific locations, to accountability against these objectives. Given that more 
attention is generally placed on the acquisition of climate finance mainly from external sources, this 
analysis has strived to highlight the importance of structural continuity that sees funding acquisition 
as only the beginning of this continuum. Each country appears to be characterized by vertical gaps 
in information flows and decision-making pathways, in addition to lateral institutional disconnects. 
These effectively deprive both local government and their constituents of agency in defining adaptation 
priorities and modalities, despite well-developed devolution processes in a number of countries. As 
such, adaptation seems to remain centrally driven and quite technocratic.
Finally, much attention and effort has been placed on generating international finance for adaptation, 
and the articulation of risks and response strategies, such as the National Adaptation Programme of Action 
(NAPA), and similar documents and coordinating bodies at the country level. However, this report makes 
clear the need to look more deeply into the actual mechanisms that need to bring together finance and 
technical planning—as well as central government agencies and local stakeholders—if the efforts to raise 
and effectively utilize funds in support of adaptation are to be fruitful.
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APPENDIX. DETAILS OF THE STUDY METHODOLOGY AND 
INFORMATION SOURCES.
Current trends in financial flows and structures, and institutional frameworks are key building 
blocks in identifying how to increase a country’s capacity to cope with climate risks. Information 
on international funding was obtained from an online database maintained by Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)30 as well as from other sources. The regional study by 
Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) on the costs of climate change and estimated costs of adaptation, as 
well as a range of other recent studies, either fill gaps or illustrate variation between different cases. It 
is, however, also understood that this and other sources cited in this paper are based partly or wholly 
on figures provided by governments and may not always be wholly representative. 
Ahmed and Suphachalasai (2014) have been an important source of information on the projected 
economic impacts of climate change in the countries studied. The study is based on a modeling process 
that involves regional climate modeling, physical impact assessment, and economic assessment (using 
the integrated assessment model and the computable general equilibrium [CGE] model). The emission 
scenarios considered were those emerging from the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other developments arising from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. The sectors analyzed were (a) agriculture, (b) 
coastal and marine, (c) energy, (d) forests and other land ecosystems, (e) human health, and (f) water 
resources. For the section on economic impacts, a limitation of the study is that regional estimates 
are predominately based on the results for India. Further, the model does not take into consideration 
extreme events as well as certain other impacts that could arise as a result of climate change. Therefore, 
the estimates are expected to be on the conservative side (Ahmed and Suphachalasai 2014).
The challenge of cross-country comparisons is important to note. Different methodologies underlie 
the various estimates and calculations, and these are rarely based on similar groupings of risks or 
adaptation priorities. Where existing studies on the economic costs of climate change (estimated), 
costs of adaptation, and international and governmental financing were not available, reference was 
made to primary data sources (e.g., governmental budgets, governmental databases that track donor 
funding, and national adaptation plans [NAPs]). In the case of some governmental budgets, only the 
spending on major activities were looked at. As a result, these may not be entirely reflective of the 
actual costs and levels of spending.
Deriving mainly from a broad literature review, the paper has not been able to incorporate local-
level financial mechanisms and institutional arrangements for climate adaptation, since these are 
rarely documented in the literature. Other key constraints stem from the fact that, in each country, 
investments in water resources development and management can be embedded across sectors, which 
makes it difficult to separate out data and values specific to water. For instance, while water resources 
management in Afghanistan falls under the Infrastructure and Natural Resources Pillar, this does not 
limit spending on water-related projects in other sectors such as agriculture and rural development. 
This is also the case in Sri Lanka and Bhutan, where water resources management is spread across 
several ministries and sectors to which finances are allocated, each with varying levels of involvement 
with the water sector. 
How a country classifies the “water resources sector” is also important. Pakistan has a separate 
classification for water and sanitation, but still has projects such as solar pumping that assist farmers 
with improved energy capacity to pump water from groundwater wells. Additionally, Nepal has 
water components related to agriculture without classifying the funding as related to water, though it 
also classifies some hydropower projects as being related to the water sector. Afghanistan classifies 
30 See Climate Funds Update’s website (http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/).
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water-related irrigation under the infrastructure sector. Therefore, tracking funding specific to the 
water sector is challenging, since water spans the energy, agriculture, infrastructure and disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) sectors. The approach has been to reflect water-specific data when available, but to 
base much of the analysis on wider data on climate adaptation.
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